Army Operating Strategy

As a Senior Enlisted Leader I aspire to develop a better comprehension of strategic issues. Having in-depth knowledge of the complexities behind decisions, processes, and the totality of circumstances is instrumental when addressing matters to Coast Guard field units. Furthermore, this perspective is integral to a Senior Enlisted Leader’s ability to provide timely, complete and reliable counsel to operational and strategic leaders, particularly when making decisions that significantly affect the workforce.

It is important for the Army Officer to pay attention to the concepts and theories, and not to fall into wrong assumptions that will divert the solution away of the purpose, mission, or goal of the Army Problem Solving Process. When the Army Officer compares the possible solutions it’s important form him to remember all the background and information, and to keep in consideration all the inferences and solutions. The Army Officer critical thinking must keep his options open avoiding to fall into false assumptions, and needs to keep a good baseline of concepts and theories.

Developing decision making models and utilizing outside strategies is the key.13 The Military Decision Making Process is an example of a decision making strategy that when done properly removes much of the intuition from the process. The example J.D. Trout uses in his book Why Empathy Matters, is that of Ulysses and the Sirens.14 Ulysses knows he will be unable to resist the Sirens through sheer will and so using an outside strategy lashes himself to the ship’s mast. Perhaps a more relevant example of outside strategy is that of GEN Stanley McChrystal imposing restrictions on air strikes in Afghanistan. GEN McChrystal understood the damage being wrought on the overall strategic mission in Afghanistan by the ever-increasing civilian death toll as the result of indiscriminate air strikes. GEN McChrystal further understood that these air strikes were being called in and release authority being given by Soldiers in hot affective states. He thought it better to sometimes let the Taliban escape when it was uncertain if civilians lay within the target

Ongoing efforts to continue developing the skills needed to promote efficiency and effectiveness continues. The Army White Paper: The Profession of Arms (2010) notes that “as the Army reflects now on what it means to be a profession in the midst of persistent conflict, a central questions frames major challenges now facing the Army’s strategic leaders: the sergeant

The Army should devote the majority of resources to improve the Human Dimension on Cognitive Dominance. Cognitive Dominance drives both realistic training and institutional agility as

Three short years ago, the 4th ABCT was considered among the best maneuver brigades in FORSCOM. In all areas, the brigade shined. Morale was high and it exerted a pull on the best and the brightest officers and non-commissioned officers. Leaders lead, Soldiers soldiered, and a family atmosphere of support emanated within the brigade. The work ethic was strong. Competition amongst the battalions was positively oriented toward the success of the brigade and there was frequent coordination among peers to share information, resources, and lessons learned. Now, after a jaded Afghanistan deployment, it appears that the climate has shifted and the battalions are striving to make themselves distinct from each other and the brigades rather

In the United States Army we develop and execute projects based on a 5 line principle. The first line is the situation which provides information essential for subordinate leaders to understand why we are doing this project. The second line is the mission which is a clear and concise statement that explains who, what, where, why, and how. The third line is the execution which give the leaders intent to complete the mission and tasks the subordinates. The forth line is service support which describes and allocates the resources and materials needed to complete the project. The last line is command and signal which describes who is leading the project and who the point of contact (POC) is for questions.

so often forgotten--that the test of battle is the only test which proves the combat ability of Commanders was relearned. The ability or the lack of ability of the various Cozmanders in the art of war became apparent. alor alone was shown to be insuffioient, for valor is not an attribute of only one racA, but is an attribute and a heritage of many races.' The indispensable qualification for command, the art of war, was shown to be the ability in con-bat to apply the science of war to aotive military situations.

My observations from the classroom demonstration were that mental illusions, misjudgments, and other concepts of thinking is problematic in the decision-making process as discussed in “The Invisible Gorilla, How Our Intuitions Deceive Us”. Many of the cohorts, including myself automatically jumped to the conclusion that our military peers expertise would help make decisions on what we perceived to be a related experience. There is a misconception that the military is code for trained professionals in most combat and survival situations. As discussed in the book, even trained professionals are not able to completely observe everything and perform

Throughout the history of warfare, the demands placed on the military from changes in fighting styles have pressured engineers from coast to coast to develop a software and hardware that would ultimately lend the title of the “World’s Strongest Military” to the United States. The fact that the engineering field has been able to constantly change and adapt to accommodate the United States military needs is reflected in the American soldier’s ability to adapt to any crisis from. The military field requires people to constantly keep up with the times and to use logical thinking in order to solve an issue. The engineering field in turn, runs parallel with the military field in that new strategies of thinking must be applied in order to keep pace with the ever growing demand for technological advancements in society. One could easily argue that the military field deeply ties with the engineering field in that without one, the other would be obsolete or left behind due to our modern society which heavily relies on new, state of the art technology. Whether it be in the dense, moist jungles of Vietnam, or the arid, blistering heat of Afghanistan, a soldier’s performance will reflect solely on his equipment. The equipment that soldiers carry must be top of the line in order to be able to defeat his enemy, especially in the case of The Vietnam War, in which the “enemy” had a superior home front advantage. This is where the field of engineering ties into the military and its

Strategic leaders in the Army are the sergeants major, colonels, and the general officers. The role of these leaders is to ensure there is balance between the Army’s four fields of expertise and its current and potential future operating environment. (2010, p.9).When this role is not consistently sustained, the Army lacks the expertise and equipment needed to perform the way that is expected of them when and where they are to be deployed. Ultimately, the result is lack of trust in the Army from the American people. The second role is the balance of the Army’s culture and climate with institutional practices.

Serving in the Army gives a person a chance to experience a number of different challenges, both mentally and physically that may not pertain to your actual job, but pertain to your skills as a Soldier. In my career, I have jumped from planes, helicopters, been exposed to riot control agent, tazed, and many other events to help enhance my experiences that I may encounter in a tactical situation. For this paper I am going to discuss a recent event that I had the opportunity to recently partake in, which is known as the Leader’s Reaction Course (LRC). The Leaders reaction course is a series of obstacles that are designed to subject a group of individuals to apply critical thinking, while working together as a team under stressful conditions,

SUBJECT: Information Paper on the United States (U.S.) Army Operating Concept (AOC), Win in a Complex World, dated 7 October 2014, Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1

It offers a framework, based on the Army Vision and Army Operating Concept, to evaluate ideas for force development — and the assumptions on which they are based. It allows Army and civilian leaders alike to properly invest resources in order to adapt, evolve, and innovate. And it synchronizes processes, products, and concepts, and translates them into warfighting capabilities.

The third field, “political-cultural,” summarizes how Army professionals represent themselves outside of military operations (Army, 2015). Commanders must ensure that they present themselves in a professional manner outside of the uniform, because, as leaders in the Army, a commander’s actions will be representative of the Army, regardless of whether they are in uniform. The final field is, “leader-human development,” this field centers around creating leaders and Soldiers who are experts in their fields (Army, 2015). This is the most important field for a commander to understand. The commander has a large influence on the development of the Soldiers in their care. As such a commander, must work to become an expert in the three-other field mentioned in chapter five, so that they can utilize that expertise to create experts within their unit. The development of expert knowledge within the force can help to remedy the lack of political neutrality Foster (2007) identified in his paper. By developing experts, and focusing their development using the fields identified in chapter five commanders have the opportunity to eliminate, what Foster (2007) calls, “pronounced ideological conservatism and Republican political preference.” This political preference can only stem from the development of Soldiers, by leaders who are not experts in the four fields mentioned in chapter five. Otherwise, all Soldiers would make