Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy

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Does the high cost of the JLTV preclude it from replacing the HMMWV, as outlined in the 2010 U.S. Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy? In September 2011, the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee voted to cancel the Army and Marine Corps' Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) in their version of the fiscal year 2012 defense bill (Munoz, 2011). This measure could have completely shut down efforts to replace a thirty year-old fleet of Humvees, loyal but potentially outmoded tactical wheeled vehicles. The Army's Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle program has been a project set to replace the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) family in the works for years. The project, however, continues to be stymied by budgetary constraints. Per-vehicle costs for the JLTV begin at $250,000 and are likely to climb, as Lockheed-Martin secured a preliminary contract for engineering, design, and development. The high cost of the JLTV does preclude it from completely replacing the HMMWV, and yet cost does not preclude the JLTV from supplementing the Army's fleet. A middle-ground solution is the best method of maximizing initial investments, while also banking on the robustness of national security. The primary argument against adopting the JLTV as a full replacement for the HMMWV is that the HMMWV remains viable, and that resources have already been diverted towards adapting and upgrading the fleet. A considerable amount of money has already been spent on upgrading the existing
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