Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plan. (2014, February). Congressional Research Service, 7-5700(RL32665), 75. Retrieved from h

Entering the combat systems market is a difficult task that is capital intensive and requires a unique, game changing solution that can be proven safe, reliable and effective in short order and superior to industry leaders such as GD. Though the steady growth within the industry and the large contract award values entices new entrants to explore entry, most will find that it is ultimately not feasible to compete against such industry leaders.

The New York Times article, “Wait Lists Grow as Many More Veterans Seek Care and Funding Falls Far Short” says the Department of Veterans Affairs agency has a new crisis they’re facing. The wait list of Veteran’s is more than 50% higher than it was last year, departments say. They are also facing nearly a $3 billion budget short, which could very well affect the care of our veterans.

Additionally, the so-called "fiscal cliff" is another issue. This prescribes further budget cuts to the VA. There is real concern that further cuts to an already cut-ravaged system will only do tremendous harm to the 2-million-plus veterans that have returned from the Middle East, in addition to the existing vets from previous wars.

The VA health care program is a disaster. Some candidates want to get rid of it, but our veterans need the VA to be there for them and their families. That’s why the Trump plan will:

There are a lot scholarly articles online that debate the validity of the VA as a source of funding for veterans, which is one of its primary purposes. Many argue that government already gives extensive

However as of more recent, the focus has been to cut spending and this in turn has affected most notably, Veterans Affairs (VA) and their health programs. According to the VA, “VA is charged with fulfilling President Lincoln’s promise to care for those “who shall have borne the battle, and for ” their families and their survivors. To support this mission, the 2016 Budget provides $70.2 billion in discretionary funding for VA, a 7.9 percent increase above the 2015 enacted level. In addition, the budget includes $3.2 billion in estimated medical care collections, for a total discretionary budget authority of $73.5 billion (which includes $3.2 billion in Medical Care Collections) and $95.3 billion for VA’s mandatory benefit programs.” This increase in budgetary spending can be deceiving as the VA is also seeing an increase in the amount of veterans claiming benefits. So although there is a budgetary increase, it is not enough (a deficit) to fulfill all claims made by veterans and/or their families and therefore is causing the VA to make cutbacks in both military construction efforts, but more importantly in medical benefits that veterans receive. For instance, improving veterans access to medical care to include strengthening their benefits program is a matter of priority. As has been recently of subject in the news, wait times for veterans has been extreme and inefficient, at times to the detriment of the health of veterans. Although the increase is aimed at providing more physicians and improving the VA’s “physical” infrastructure, the budgetary increase lacks the foresight to address the growing veteran population in concurrence with the needed changes that are being proposed. In an article published in Military Times on

Since 1985, eleven different versions of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) have been in service. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps as a successor to the HMMWV. The Department of Defense (DoD) initiated the JLTV program to replace its aging fleet of the HMMWV. The purpose of this essay is to determine if the high cost of the JLTV should preclude it from replacing the HMMWV as outlined in the 2010 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy. Because of the cost, an inability to meet joint requirements and the presence of feasible alternatives, the Department of Defense should not continue acquisition of the JLTV.

The amount of money used to care for veterans continues to increase as the years go on. CBO states that “In 2010, VHA spent $1.9 billion to treat 400,000 OCO patients. VHA obligated $4,800 per OCO patient, on average, compared with an average of $8,800 per patient for veterans from all eras who were being treated at VHA.” The amount of money continues to increase in order to care for veteran patients. The more veterans fight in the war the more money it would take to care for all of the veterans. The medical costs associated with VHA’s treatment of OCO veterans could, in CBO’s estimation, total between $40 billion and $55 billion over the 10-year period from 2011 through 2020, depending on the number of military personnel deployed to overseas contingencies in the future and the rate of growth of medical expenditures per

The Department of Defense (DOD) was recently approved a budget of $582.7 billion for 2017. $112.1 billion of this budget was specifically to “develop and procure equipment, technology, and capabilities…” [1].

The Department of Defense is dealing with a different frame of war with distributed operations all over the globe, from disaster relief to deterrence, fighting terrorism to peacekeeping. Delivering fuel via truck over

This position paper will address if the F-35 JSF program is worth the current investment the United States has placed into it. First the pros of the program will be presented followed by the cons. Finally, the paper will discuss why the JSF program is not worth the investment.

3. A possible solution to the current retirement program is a recently authorized plan. In fiscal year (FY) 2016 a new military retirement plan was introduced

The MRAP program followed the normal defense acquisition process, but some aspects of the program cannot be duplicated easily. Conatser and Grizio outlined four requirements for a rapid acquisition process – mature technical solution, user’s acceptance of a short term solution, full support by the leadership, and full funding. The MRAP program met all these requirements. There were several MRAP type vehicles already in full production mode that just needed to be mass produced. Using multiple vendors allowed quick mass production of MRAPs. Although later shown to be insufficient to defeat all IED threats as the Insurgents increased the size of IEDs and used Explosive Formed Projectiles (EFP), the commanders in Iraq accepted MRAPs. There were several politicians pushing the U.S. military to procure MRAPs quickly as possible. In 2007, Secretary Gates “made MRAP the top DoD acquisition priority.” Lastly, the Congress allocated sufficient funding for the MRAP program. Secretary Carter cites the MRAP program as an example of “how much can be accomplished with the full backing of leaders in Congress and the

The United Kingdom put its defense under review and decided to reduce the money burden their Royal Navy put on the British people (White paper, p. A-2). It was considered by their leadership that smaller platforms of ships like destroyers and frigates could handle littoral combat if needed. So, the United Kingdom decided to phase out the HMS Intrepid and the HMS Fearless (White Paper, pp.10-11). This of course didn’t work out well because the United Kingdom ended up going to war with Argentina in 1982. Through insurmountable odds, the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy, was able to piece its navy back together and make ships ready for one of the best maritime amphibious assaults ever conducted since World War