Army War College Students: Case Study

As a Senior Enlisted Leader I aspire to develop a better comprehension of strategic issues. Having in-depth knowledge of the complexities behind decisions, processes, and the totality of circumstances is instrumental when addressing matters to Coast Guard field units. Furthermore, this perspective is integral to a Senior Enlisted Leader’s ability to provide timely, complete and reliable counsel to operational and strategic leaders, particularly when making decisions that significantly affect the workforce.

The Balancing Role of the Profession Leaders, is challenging. U.S Army strategic leader’s main objective one, balancing the link of the Army current situation and its future area of operation. Profession leaders understand, if balance is not meet, the Army cannot function at its

For the next 10-15 years, leadership development is critical within the military. Training to develop agile leaders will yield a competitive advantage within both private and public organizations. Importantly, leadership training should mirror as if one would fight in the new Era International Security Environment. Such tenacity will confront limited engagements in the next 10 years, plus a great deal of offensive operations in the 15 years. Therefore, trained leaders are flexible to their changing missions, roles, and responsibilities, thus are more adaptive to compelling new conflicts.

Leadership goals should always contain methods of a continuous process of learning through education, training, and individual experiences that help ensure that the message will be communicated in a confident and competent manner when leading troops. Soldiers tend to follow leaders that demonstrate and live the Army values, while displaying their confidence in every decision that affects change. Leaders are not born as organizational or tactical leaders; but grown by their genetic determinism, which is inside and the characteristics they work toward; that mold is which type leader they will become. Not just anyone can lead; you must have the desire to lead, be willing to make the commitment to being a leader, and prepare yourself properly, then you have the desire to become a leader. (Fulton, 1995).

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

As an officer in the United States Army, it has been imperative for me to understand every facet of leadership and why it remains important to be an effective leader. During this course, I have learned some valuable lessons about myself as a leader and how I can improve on my leadership ability in the future. The journal entries along with the understanding of available leadership theories have been an integral part of my learning during this course. For all of the journals and assessments that I completed, I feel it has given me a good understanding of my current leadership status and my future potential as a leader. All of the specific assessments looked at several areas in regards to leadership; these assessments covered several

They represent a finely balanced combination of high-level thinkers, accomplished warfighters, and geopolitical military experts”. The US Army War College (USAWC) educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level. It will force you to move from beyond the operational/tactical level to the strategic level. This is be much more difficult than it sounds. For the last 28 years I have been working at the tactical/operational level. I was an enlisted combat engineer, patriot missile officer and now a Chaplain. That is where I’m comfortable and what I know best. Taking in to consideration that I am a Chaplain and not on the exact career path as much of my fellow students. How do I navigate this

As a professional leader, role models are an important source of inspiration and development. The ability to deliberately aim to improve as a leader is equally important. In the Army, the Leadership Requirements Model found in doctrine provides the framework necessary to make those deliberate improvements. This framework presents the opportunity to analyze our leadership role models using the Leadership Requirements Model and assess how that leader has contributed to the Army or the Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps. Additionally, it is important to apply the same analysis to how that role model has influenced our own leadership. Lastly, with these considerations in mind, leaders can project into the future and determine what kind of legacy they wish to leave. The purpose of this analysis is to explore these opportunities and the relationships between doctrinal leadership, a legacy leader, and my own leadership and legacy. My father, retired Chief Warrant Officer 2 (CW2) Nelson Stydinger, had a significant influence on the profession during his own service. He also represents my most important leadership influence throughout my career and his record informs the type of legacy I would like to leave as an Army leader.

Purpose. This memorandum outlines my vision on leadership as a senior noncommissioned officer. It also defines my leadership philosophy and principles towards seniors, peers, and subordinates. My philosophy reflects the foundation of my personal and professional beliefs that makes us successful Soldiers.

Ongoing efforts to continue developing the skills needed to promote efficiency and effectiveness continues. The Army White Paper: The Profession of Arms (2010) notes that “as the Army reflects now on what it means to be a profession in the midst of persistent conflict, a central questions frames major challenges now facing the Army’s strategic leaders: the sergeant

For this paper, I am going to define strategy using Joint Pub 3.0’s definition: A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multi-national objectives. Using this definition of strategy, I’ll argue that Nightingale makes a valid claim when he states that the US is weak in formulating strategy by highlighting several aspects of strategic development where the US needs improvement. Nonetheless, let the record show that America’s success rate in conflicts in the last century is mixed, laying claim that the US may not be great at strategy development, however, it has done well enough to defeat some pretty ruthless villains ie., Hitler, Saddam, Milosevic, and Bin

General Powell highlights 18 lessons learned in leadership that are applied to successful companies, and how they are applied to leadership in his presentation to the Outreach Program, and the Sears Corporate Headquarters. These approaches can be applied not only in business but life in general. I will highlight three of the lessons that have impacted my career in the military

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

Within days of Iraqi forces invading Kuwait in 1990, President Bush publicly backed the United Nations’ (UN) stance on the incursion with four national strategic objectives and determined that, ‘if invited, US forces would be deployed to deter further Iraqi attacks, defend Saudi Arabia and enforce UN resolutions.’ From the national strategic objectives, the military end-state is deduced. The military end-state is a conceptual element of operational design which describes the conditions that forces must achieve to attain strategic objectives/ hand over main effort responsibilities. The military end-state does not necessarily indicate the end of a military activities to attain national objectives. While one specific national objective would not

Grand Strategy and the dimensions of the abovementioned. In reviewing the multiple definitions of strategy, one has to look no further than the United States Air Force for the most compelling understanding, “Strategy is the continuous process of matching ends, ways, and means to accomplish desired goals within acceptable levels of risk.” The least compelling definition derived from Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini who states; strategy encompassed the whole theater and was “the art of making war upon the map.” Jomini, brilliant as he was, misses the main appreciative aspect of grand strategy in his definition, the ends, ways, and means of strategy and here is where we will focus and clearly define, with examples, why the United States is strategically slipshod. In understanding, how the ends desired create problems for the U.S., we will look at three components of that variable to identify and understand the shortcomings of U.S. grand strategy. They are international relations, power, and nested within both is the theory of