Introduction
Carl von Clausewitz stated that “the value of [the] object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration.” (Clausewitz, 92) With that maxim in mind, it makes strategic sense for an outside power to intervene in an insurgency when it supports the power’s policy objective and the cost of the intervention does not exceed the value of the object.
Successful examples of insurgency intervention that made strategic sense can be observed during Athen’s support of the Helot revolt against the Spartans, France’s support of the American revolutionaries against Great Britain, and the United States’ support of the Afghan tribal militia uprising against the Taliban.
Athens’ Support of the Helot Revolt
During the Peloponnesian War, Athens’ policy objective was to avoid war and maintain the status quo. Donald Kagan stated “The goal of deterrence is to arouse such fear in the enemy as to make him to decide against fighting.” However, under Pericles’ leadership, Athens had adopted a defensive strategy consisting of hiding behind its Long Wall, which was insufficient for deterring Spartan attacks. (Kagan, 65)
After Pericles’ death, Athens then shifted to a deterrence strategy. It recognized that, at minimal cost, it could continue being defensive by hiding behind the Long Wall. However, Athens could also exercise its maritime superiority to cause damage to Sparta by executing raids on its coastal allies and interrupting its trade. Athens
The Peloponnesian War pitted the Athenians against the Spartans. The Peloponnesians’ were an alliance of city-states controlled by Sparta. These two powerful city-states became locked in a struggle for dominance of the eastern Mediterranean area. The roots of the conflict and in particular this expedition is highly complex. As Thucydides says in his history of the war, the underlying cause was Spartan fear of Athens' expansive power. But, the triggering event was Athens' aggressive behavior towards Corinth, an ally of Sparta.
The Peloponnesian War changed Greece and nothing was the same after the war. Athens was never to be as powerful again. As a result of the war, the Athenian Empire was never the same again because of the change in the balance of power in the Greek world. This greatly alarmed Sparta and its allies. The aggressive policies of Athens did not de-escalate the situation whilst the ambitions of the city-state certainly provoked the Spartans. Increasingly, the Spartans became very nervous about the growing naval and commercial power of Athens.
In his funeral oration, Pericles praises Athens and the city's focus on balance between personal care and care for the state. He compared it to Sparta, where personal comfort was overlooked to benefit the state and said that the personal comfort allowed to Athenians is what makes the war worth fighting.16 By praising Athens, he showed his love and loyalty to his city. Alcibiades had no such loyalty. When he fled to Sparta he was asked if he did not trust his country, his answer was with everything other than his life.17 When in Sparta he gave military advice that caused more "ruin and destruction to his city" than anything else.18 After
Action from necessity is a constantly recurring theme in Thucydides’ The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. A sentiment used to explain the growth of the Athenian Empire which some Athenians espoused to an assembly at Sparta best quantifies necessity, “. . . we were necessarily compelled at first to advance the hegemony to where it is—especially by fear, and then by honor, and later by benefit.” (Selected Passages 1.75.3). This claim, referred to as the Athenian Thesis, is used to advance the two following implications: all states act with the motivations of fear, honor and interest and no one can condemn a state for doing so. The Athenian Thesis influences the way many of the Athenian elite structure their patterns of reasoning in both noticeable and subtle ways.
In conclusion The Students off Socrates feel that by not rebuilding the fleet or wall we are making Athens a sturdier more dependent
The battle between Sparta's well-built army and Athens's exemplary navy was like a battle between a bear and a shark. If the bear goes into the water, the shark wins. However, if the shark enters land, the bear will kill it. The Athenian general and military genius Pericles knew this. Therefore, he devised a strategy that was based on the strength of his navy and the Spartan inability to battle him on sea; he devised a strategy of attrition where they would sit at home, and outlast the enemy (Kagan 52). In his mind, if Athens disregarded the Spartan land attacks, and instead survived off sea trade from their allies, the enemy would be unable to cause much damage. He wanted to drain them out psychologically, to get them to surrender from attacking the Athenian Empire (Kagan 52). One of the most important steps in doing this was to connect Athens to its navy city and their port. They did this by building walls that connected them, later known as the Long Walls (Kagan 9). Back then, walls were almost impregnable to attacks, and were one of the best defenses in the ancient world. Therefore, the addition of the Long Walls made both Athens and the port extremely hard to crack; they were ready for any Spartan land attack that would come their way. When the war finally started and the Spartans did come, they found that their attacks were not going to work. Their strategy of totally crushing the Athenian Empire and fighting a battle of annihilation was countered by the
"Just before the Peloponnesian War began, Pericles of Athens and King Archidamus of Sparta provided net assessments of the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the two sides. Evaluate their projections."
The army was responsible for maintaining the reputation of Sparta, arguably the most important role it played. Knows as the best warriors of the Peloponnese the Spartans used their strong military tactics in order to conquer neighbouring lands in order to further expand Sparta and gain larger areas of fertile land. Sparta lead the untied Peloponnese army and was greatly feared throughout the Mediterranean due to their title as the greatest army throughout Greece. This title in itself made the thought and task of attacking or declaring war on the spartiates a feared happening, further defending them from attacks dismissed as useless and never carried out by neighbouring states. The army was the main defence of Sparta keeping the citizens safe and
A reading of Thucydides’, Pericles’ Funeral Oration and The Melian Dialogue uncovers both contrasting and comparable viewpoints on Athenian politics, power, aims of war, and empire. Thucydides presents two differing characteristics of Athens, one as the civilizer in Pericles’ funeral oration and the other as an tyrant in the Melian dialogue. In the funeral oration delivered by Pericles during the first year of the war, the Athenian leader emphasizes the idealized personal image of the Athenians in regard to their constitution and good character. Pericles goes on to praise the Athenian democratic institution of Athens that contributes to their cities greatness; in Pericles’s own words, “The Athenian administration favors the many instead of few… they afford equal justice to all of their differences” (112, 2.37). This quote emphasizes the good character of the Athens’ to coax and encourage the Athenians to preserve and better their great empire into the future. On the other hand, in the Melian dialogue, this notion of justice and equality is irrelevant; one, because Athens compared to Melos, is the stronger of the two and thus, is more powerful. Further, Athens, will continue to acquire absolute power and build its empire by conquering Melos and whomever else stands in its way. Through Pericles’ funeral oration and the Melian dialogue, the following conclusions/themes will demonstrate both the changing and somewhat stable nature of Athenian policy with regards to empire,
It is remarkable how timeless the Speech of Archidamus is. One could easily imagine the Spartan King were speaking to a modern occupied territory, itching for a revolt. King Archidamus urges the Spartans to head caution when entering war with Athens. He has “seen too many wars” [pg 25, 80] The battles he has witnessed in his lifetime have swayed him of any naive fascination with war. He has learned that violence begets violence, so one should only enter a battle they are prepared to win. Archidamus explains that Athens is stronger in terms of wealth, military might and political power. If the Spartans take the offensive route under these circumstances, they will surely loose both in combat and in terms of public relations. [pg 26, 81] Furthermore, Archidamus explains later that Athens had agreed to mediation, making any fight that Sparta were to start an unlawful preemptive attack. [pg 28, 85] The King assures his people he is not blind to their suffering, he just envisions better ways of ending it. [pg 26, 82] One of these methods would be to create partnerships with other nations who would lend armed forces and capital to the cause. To be done in tandem with confederation would be the accumulation of Sparta’s assets. Archidamus predicts that under these circumstances, Athens could be motivated to surrender. Under the very different circumstances from which he is speaking, the King pushes to avoid war at all costs citing that “complaints can be resolved, whether they are
In 431 B.C., even before the Peloponnesian War, Athens’ strength compared to other Greek polises was evident. Athens had islands, a powerful, a well-trained navy, and one, if not the best, general at the time: Pericles. Pericles says in his speech that, “war is inevitable,” but in fact the war was preventable (72). Even with all of the military strengths and assets that Athenians had afforded to them, they chose to be merciful to the Peloponnesians who were in no shape to go to war. They did not have the experience, money, manpower, or means to participate in a lengthy war and Pericles makes the citizens aware of this (70). Pericles is both modest and humble for choosing to point out these facts which in turn helps the Athenians see the potential
Sparta invaded Attica in 431 B.C, and easily gained control of the area surrounding Athens. Athens was most known for having a superior navy, while Sparta was known for having a superior army. This caused the war to drag on, because neither side could easily gain total domination of the land and sea. Sparta tended to use a strategy that involved annually invading Athenian territory, and destroying anything that helped the Athenians survive. Farms and other resources were targeted by the Spartans, but the effectiveness of this strategy is questionable. Athens was protected by its "Long Walls" that it had constructed earlier, so it was near impossible for the Spartan army to break through and ravage Athens. Not to mention, these walls ran all the way to the port supplying Athens. There was no way that Sparta could match the Athenian navy, so Athens could receive supplies from outside from their port. It soon became clear that the war would be won not from battle alone, but from time itself.
Pericles' speech was propagated by the horn of war against the Lacedaemonians. In the midst of the conflict, the Athenians called an assembly to determine their course of action. Their choices were to either agree to Sparta's demands, which included dismantling the siege of Potidaea, freeing Aegina from their rule, and cancelling their embargo of Megara, or war. At this juncture, the prime Athenian statesman, Pericles, presented his advice: never give in. For Pericles, Athens can never subjugate itself to any power and must fight for its autonomy. In order to win the war, Athens must focus on its people and avoid mistakes. They cannot base their campaign on saving their property, but keeping the integrity of their forces. This stance is exemplified as Pericles said,
When Sparta gave its ultimatum to Athens, Pericles was more than happy to oblige and go to war. He embodies Athenian arrogance and overzealousness. Pericles speaks to the Athenian assembly convincing them to go to war because according to him, they cannot lose. Pericles explains how Sparta doesn’t have the same financial advantages that Athens does and how Athens has a far superior navy. According to Pericles, the best strategy is to use that to Athens’ advantage, leaving Attica exposed by only attacking and defending the sea were they have an advantage. Pericles finishes of by saying that Athens possesses all of Sparta’s strengths and none of its weaknesses, and Athens must fight so that future generations will have an Athens that is as good as ever.
This essay examines the evolution of the Athens strategy from the beginning to the end of The Peloponnesian War (431 to 404 BCE). The Strategy will be evaluated in the context of the relationship of ends, means, and ways by testing the suitability, acceptability, feasibility, and risk.