Aum Shinrikyo: The Example Of CBRN Attacks

Criminal activity and terrorist activity have a relationship that is closely related, with only minor differences separating the two. Terrorist activity are criminal acts that are motivated by a higher cause beyond the basic causes of crime. Terrorist attack are highly planned out, and the same can be said about criminal activity. Serial killers often plan out their acts just as much as terrorist organizations, however the same cannot be said for certain crimes like random assaults. (Newman & Clarke, 2008) The relationship between crime and terrorism is brought closer when terrorist organizations use common crime to fund their attacks. For example, a terrorist organization may resort to stealing chemical agents to make their dirty bombs. The

A governmental concern is that a bioterrorist attack will trigger panic amongst the population. Panic refers to a group response where intense fear causes people to be concerned with only their survival. While actual panic is rare, there are certain factors that could cause panic in the event of a bioterrorist attack, including limited medical resources where “first come, first serve” applies, a perception that there is poor

Bruce Ivins, other than his suicide when things homing on to him with the FBI, is the anthrax killer, exposing and estimated thirty thousand people to the deadly spores, killing five, leaving its illness with seventeen others. (Shactman) The problem with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism, also know as CBRN, is that, in threats where conventional explosives are not used, chemical, biological, and radiological threats are hard to detect and prevent, and after-the-fact, are, usually, impossible, expensive, or extensive in labor and use of high-tech, cutting-edge equipment, which is complicated and needs technical expertise, to make the clean-up take very long in chemical and radiological threats, and is nearly impossible to collect evidence for examination in a laboratory in chemical and biological threats if aerosolized or in a vapor form, which dissipates into the atmosphere, environment, and plants around it (Center For Excellence in Emergency

The 1995 Sarin subway attack in Tokyo and the Anthrax letters scare along with multiple attempts by terrorists both at home and abroad have illustrated the fact that terrorists are not objected to using chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

Terrorist organizations require a profound amount of cash, as they need to purchase weaponry, supplies, and each recruit needs to be well fed and equipped.

One researcher determined that a hand full of biologists and $10,000 could be used to produce biological weapon agents. This stands in starch opposition to the amount of funding, expertise, and obstacles that terrorist would need to overcome to develop their own nuclear programs (Levi, 2007, p.1). Some states have attempted to create their own nuclear weapons; this takes years and hundreds of millions of dollars to accomplish. The materials needed are hard to acquire and special equipment is needed to make the process work. Biological agents on the other hand are, as demonstrated by the researchers assessment, are cheap and relatively easy.

First there were a doomsday cult that quickly turned into a terrorist organization followed by a Aum Shinrikyo is still on the United States Foreign Terrorist list even though it suffered a split in two thousand and now calls themselves Aleph. The group has also repented for the attacks of Aum Shinrikyo and has been able to organize compensation for those that were effected. Whether or not the group was successful at its goal is arguable because the end of the world has not happened yet, however they were successful in weaponing a biochemical agent. Scholars argue that “terrorist attack suing a specific weapon will be most likely when the industry corresponding to that weapon within the country of attack is relatively large” which brings into question the origins of the beliefs of Aum Shinrikyo. Their belief in war coupled with the availability of Sarin gas may be “evidence” to those that beielve that the end is nigh. Overall, the group has devolved out a terrorist organization but still acts a a threat to national

The fact that anthrax causes non-communicable disease (Abramson, 2012, p17) is a benefit if employing it as a military weapon as controllability is desired, but terror organizations are unlikely to see this as either a positive or negative outcome since their desires are accomplished by sowing fear and causing economic damage. Another factor that makes anthrax attractive to terrorists is the relatively small quantity needed to cause a mass casualty incident. Only ¼ ounce of anthrax spores are required to cause mass casualties over an area of 1 square mile (Kostadinov & Galabova, 2010, p298). The simple fact that anthrax has such a long history of easy cultivation going back to 1915 speaks for the lack of technical equipment required to process this material (Kostadinov & Galabova, 2010,

As discussed earlier, many biological agents such as anthrax and Ebola have negatively affected populations in a way that has scarred the scene of bioterrorism forever. As shown throughout many different bioterrorism events, the use of biological agents has been effective in their cause while causing the fear that was attempted to be achieved. Although biological agents are effective, they are too harmful to use in regular warfare. Putting the entire human race in risk of extinction, or even possibly causing an apocalyptic society, is not worth the outcome of a bioterrorism attack. While the point may be made by the terrorist, the end result may throw the entire world into a mess socially and

The threat posed by Aum Shinrikyo has diminished due to the intense scrutiny they have been under since their 1995 attack in Japan (Alfred 2015, 1). The former threats that the organization posed to the public hold many lessons for antiterrorism officials and would be terrorist networks. The CBRN weapons used by the organization are still in use by others today and pose a continued threat to the U.S. and its allies.

There has only been one case of biological terrorism in the U.S., which has been exceedingly expensive and extensive to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, “and arguably the toughest case in FBI history, the assembled reporters told” (Shachtman). There is no way of knowing when chemical or biological terrorism will be, but it will most likely make it accessible to terrorists everywhere when someone somehow creates the “weapon of mass disruption” and gets other terrorists wanting it for their own use. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism should have restrictions put on the many, many amounts of chemicals or biological bacterium that can be made at home, or bought in from industrial material makers in mass production of matter already potent enough to be fatal to many individuals at once, and available in large quantities for a standard price for the potential capabilities of death it

Sophisticated weaponry is usually acquired by the most funded organizations. The usage of automatic weapons is also becoming common during terrorist attacks. Hijacking aircrafts is also one of the most known terrorism tactic in the world. It also occurred during the 9/11 attacks when four commercial airlines were hijacked simultaneously. However, with modern techniques used in counterterrorism on airports and travelling in general, the incident rate of successful hijacking has decreased. Another historically used means of terrorism is employing biological and chemical weapons. The damage of these weapons depends upon the execution method and quantity used. Many countries in the world have used both chemical as well as biological weapons in

When looking at the situations of the Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo or the Iraqi government in the 1980s, I believe the impact they had on the United States preparedness can be interpreted in either direction. In terms of the Sarin attack on the subway systems in Japan, I believe it did not offer much concern for the United States. The Aum Shinrikyo cult did not fear any retaliation and was already expecting the authorities to raid their facilities (Robertson 2011). To me, this did not warrant a reaction by the United States counter terrorism planning due to its unique and otherwise rare scenario. However, I do believe that the Iraqi government’s use of chemical warfare in the 1980’s did grab that attention. The CIA states that “During

Individuals, groups, and nations throughout history have employed different types of chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear and explosive weapons. Often times, which category depends on factors such as knowledge of the materials being utilized, funding and research capabilities, the ability of acquiring a weapon from an outside source or what the desired end state of the mission may be. In the case of the Rajneesh, that weapon was biological. In 1984, Rajneesh’s cult used a form of Salmonella to contaminate restaurants (Forest 2012).

As of now no terrorist organization is known to have the funding or expertise needed to produce a full scale nuclear weapon so most experts agree that the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack is slim (Mauroni 2010, Under “Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism”). If an attack was to occur the organization would most likely buy or steal one from somewhere in Asia; a prospect unlikely due to heavy security at nuclear sites. What is more likely than a nuclear attack is the creation of a “dirty bomb”, a conventional explosive used to spread a radioactive element. In the past terrorist organizations have sought to purchase enriched uranium from black market sellers in the caucuses with no success (Sinai 2007, Under “WMD Proliferation and Terrorism”). Biological attacks are again more likely than nuclear attacks but are unlikely to cause significant damage because of the difficulty in attaining and arming biological agents. A significant amount of expertise is needed and delivery methods are complex and costly. The deployment of a chemical agent is the most likely form of a CBRN terrorist attack. Chemical agents are used in a number of industrial activities and are much less secure than other CBRN agents. This availability is attractive to terrorist organizations and the delivery methods required can be quite simple. Little expertise is