BG Roshangar Case Study

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate JFCs that conduct military operations within their AORs [JP-1]. GCCs takes on a lot of responsibility they are normally responsible for a large geographical area; not mention the effective coordination of operations within that area falls on the shoulder of the GCC. Directives flow from the President and SecDef through CJCS to the GCCs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national or multinational strategic objectives. GCCs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military force. One plan

When Halstead was given this mission in Iraq, she never anticipated the challenge she would soon face. She had one year to plan her operation, train and certify her units for deployments and after months of painstaking preparation and training, Halstead was confident her soldiers and unit were ready to be certified for deployment. However, certification had to be issued by her superior, a three-star general recently back from Iraq—and the most challenging boss Halstead had ever encountered in all of her years of services.

The purpose of this paper is to address how I, SSG Schumacher, have identified Major Robert Rogers as a legacy leader and a leader of influence in my military career as a non-commissioned officer and member of the military intelligence community. This paper will cover three main topics in which I will first discuss a brief history of the life of Major Rogers. Then, his impact on the evolution of warfare and leadership attributes on the United States Army. Finally, I will discuss how his leadership attributes led to him making an impact on the military today and Soldiers such as myself.

During 2003, General Petraeus and his soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had no clue of the astounding role they were about to embark on. General Petraeus found the city of Mosul in complete destruction, and knew it would take a cohesive effort through mutual trust and teamwork to restore the city. The city of Mosul did not only need a complete make over, but also a regime that shared a mutual understanding as Petraeus. Lastly, with the city rebuilding changes would bring hostility and risk to the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. General David Petraeus was successful in Mosul, because he applied the mission command control principles of building cohesive teams, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk.

There were no breaches in security and the law enforcement agencies that played an active part in this operation worked together as one team upholding a strong commitment to the mission. As Incident Commander of this operation it was my main objective to make sure all security related matters were addressed and corrective action was swiftly implemented. My position required quick decisive decision making without hesitation, developing a strategy that could be implemented effectively yet simplistic in nature. Prior to this operation, it was imperative that I had a full understanding of the area to include the resources that where available. This example shows my ability to quickly adapt to an ever-changing environment, promote teambuilding and achieve operational success through effective

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

General Hugh Shelton was selected as a leader for this assignment since I served in the United States Army’s Group Support Company, 3rd Special Forces Group as he was the Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operations Command before he was nominated as the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff. General Shelton was the 14th Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of

SGT Davis’s ability to adapt to different situations was showcased during the Units Joint Mission Readiness Center rotation. SGT Davis created an in depth link diagrams depicting organized crime groups, current slants, and specific roles in multiple municipalities using open sources tactics resulting in a refined product; defining his outstanding proficiency with limited assets, nevertheless exceeding expectations.

GoArmyEd is an Army Continuing Education System program that provides the virtual gateway 24/7 to request Tuition Assistance (TA) for Soldiers, scholarship payment for Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) Cadets and professional development for Army Civilians online, anytime for classroom and distance learning college courses. GoArmyEd is a dynamic online portal that automates many of the paper-based processes historically conducted in-person at Army Education Centers.

The purpose of this paper is to address how I, SSG Schumacher, have identified Major Robert Rogers as a legacy leader and a leader of influence in my military career as a non-commissioned officer and member of the military intelligence community. This paper will cover four main topics, in which I will first discuss a brief history of the life of Major Rogers, then, his impact on the evolution of warfare. Afterwards, I will identify his impact on leadership attributes in the United States Army. Finally, I will discuss how his leadership attributes led to him making an impact on the military today and Soldiers such as myself.

LTC (P) Pete Owens is faced with numerous challenges and issues as he is preparing to take command of 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). The 4th ABCT has command climate issues and disengaged leadership that needs to be addressed immediately because failure to address and correct these issues has the potential for the unit to be unprepared for the Regionally Aligned Forced (RAF) mission.

Howard, E. 2003). CENTCOM wanted to keep as little of a footprint in Afghanistan as it could, and, therefore, tasked JSOFT DAGGER, known through the case study as TF DAGGER, to develop a plan to clear out the Shahi Kot Valley (Fleri, E. Howard, E. 2003). There are several key components necessary when planning such as “task organization, mission statement, commander’s intent, concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units, coordinating instructions and control measures” (ADRP 5-0, para 2-69). During COA development, the mistakes in planning became apparent. In the case study there are missing elements “Initially Task Force Mountain was not designated a joint task force which led to joint planning problems” (Fleri, E. Howard, E. 2003).

COL Licorish is a top 5% performer chosen to re-energize the staff’s key measurement tool, earmarked to evaluate variables in order to improve command readiness. Sam manifests complete authority over the Command’s Organizational Inspection Program; which continues to yield outstanding results and eliminate root cause issues. He took a team of 42 subject matter experts from each directorate and forged a relationship with USARC, FORSCOM and HQDA. ensuring compliance.

During the period from 01.01.2016 -31.12.16 Raila worked in the residence RBIK44 and in the office DBIK 04, mainly on the ground floor. The residence accommodates 1 expatriate with family consisting of 3 people. Upon request of the expatriate, she attended the residence part time every working day and the office.