Bank's Ceo Incentives and Credit Crisis

In “The Overpaid CEO” Susan Homberg and Mark Schmitt bring to attention how CEO pay in America is ridiculous in numbers as opposed to other parts of the world. Looking back, in the nineteen hundreds CEO pay was relativity average. As businesses and companies began to expand there was a demand for higher pay. Between 1978-2012 CEO pay increased by 875%! Many rules and regulations were put in to place to limit the pay of a CEO, such as the Securities Exchange Act that I will explain later on, regardless CEO pay kept getting higher and higher as many loopholes were found. Bonuses pay a large part in the salaries of CEOS’, as an effect CEOS’ tend to partake in risky behavior in order to score those big paychecks.

The fact that banks control 97% of the world's money supply makes them a vital institution. Banks are the engine of our modern financial system and a source for economic growth. The bank's ability to create credit can have destructive effects; the Great Depression of 1929 and the Great Recession of 2008. In both cases, banks spurred on an asset bubble through overextending credit to aid the purchase of assets. The result was an economic collapse that wiped out wealth and reduced credit creation which stalled productive investments. The lessons of the two great economic collapse support the notion proposed by the author, that bank credit for transactions that do not contribute to the economy should be restricted.

A Colossal Failure of Common Sense was one of many books to be published in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis of 2007. After seeing the global economy stall in the face of massive losses in word financial markets, many Americans sought to better understand the crisis and its causes. This book, written from the perspective of a financial market insider, provides a glimpse into the world of global finance and also seeks to explain how the players in this world were involved in the crisis. In the words of the author Lawrence McDonald, “My objective in writing A Colossal Failure of Common Sense was twofold. First, to provide … a close-up, inside view of how markets really work…..And, second, to give… as crystal clear an explanation as possible about the real reasons why the legendary Lehman Brothers met with such a swift end”1. By writing about his personal experience at Lehman Brothers and recounting stories from within the famous investment banking firm, Mr. McDonald largely succeeds at his first goal. However, the elements of personal biography and the chronological order of the book make it difficult for the reader to fully appreciate all of the varied causes of the financial crash. I believe that the main value of reading this book is in understanding these causes, with Lehman Brothers acting as a microcosm of the greater financial universe. As such, in this review I have isolated elements from Mr. McDonald’s book which highlight how the crisis

The economic downfall of 2008 illustrates the impact of unbridled corporate pay structures on our economy. Securities fraud, committed as a result of incentive packages offered to executives to create quick profits, had a detrimental effect on the overall economy. As observed during the Bank and Loan bust of 1989, CEOs take greater risks when offered stock options in their compensation packages. The 2008 Financial crisis, sparked by subprime mortgage market and hedge funds, was driven by banking executives making short term risks that served detrimental to stockholders in the long run. Furthermore, many compensation packages offered Golden Parachute clauses with no claw backs to both performing and underperforming executives.

However, there have been many cases where the CEO and executive officers receive outrageous compensation even when the companies suffer. Overall, there is a wide disconnect between the incentive of the executives and the financial performance of their company, which needs to be fixed. By passing regulations and rules such as the Dodd-Frank Act, there is hope of shedding light on the connection between the company’s performance and the executives pay. Although it will provide a clear insight, it will not be able to set a strict regulated compensation or define what an executive should earn. Instead regulations will allow for more transparency for the shareholders regarding corporate governance issues such as executive pay. Along with that, it will force companies to take accountability for their actions. If they do poorly, then the executives should be paid less, and vice versa. Overall, there should be a direct alignment between executive pay and the company’s

In 2008, the United States went through one of the most significant economical period in history. The housing market and banks started to fail and people were unable to pay off their loans on the houses. This lead to a giant need for government intervention in determining which investment banks and corporations were worthy of being considered “too big to fail”. If they were in this category, the government would supply them with the funds necessary to not go bankrupt. Most of the time, the corporations would put this money towards consolidating their balance sheets, rather than solving the problems. This paper looks in depth into the 2008 financial crisis: the course

Generally, under-performing companies are the prime targets of hostile takeovers, so it makes sense that aligning shareholder and executive goals is a major way to avoid that. One popular way of aligning these goals is through the use of elaborate, structured compensation plans for executives which directly tie an executive’s salary to the performance of the company, usually and specifically its stock price (Megginson & Smart, 2009). These compensation plans have become the norm for American corporations, and their effectiveness in solving the agency problem is debatable. On one hand, it should drive an executive to strive to maximize the shareholder wealth, and it also helps companies to attract and retain the best available managers. On the other hand, it serves to sometimes wildly inflate the compensation paid to these executives, either by corporations trying to stay competitive for the best talent, or through easily achievable goals and uncapped maximums. The structured plans, if done correctly, are an effective way to help insure the goal of wealth maximization, but they are also by definition agency costs. Hence, agency problems are inherent to our American corporate system.

The banking crisis of the late 2000s, often called the Great Recession, is labelled by many economists as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Its effect on the markets around the world can still be felt. Many countries suffered a drop in GDP, small or even negative growth, bankrupting businesses and rise in unemployment. The welfare cost that society had to paid lead to an obvious question: ‘Who’s to blame?’ The fingers are pointed to the United States of America, as it is obvious that this is where the crisis began, but who exactly is responsible? Many people believe that the banks are the only ones that are guilty, but this is just not true. The crisis was really a systematic failure, in which many problems in the

In 2008 the world faced the worst financial crisis since the great depression. Many banks closed their doors for good that year. Among them were both small and large banks. One specific bank that collapsed that year was IndyMac, one of the largest banks in the United States. IndyMac marked the largest collapse of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured institution since 1984, when Continental Illinois, which had $40 billion in assets, failed, according to FDIC records (“The Fall of IndyMac 2008). This paper will talk about the cause of the collapse of IndyMac in 2008, the handling of the issues, as well as the aftermath of the collapse.

According to Matsumura and Shin (2005) the ratio of executive to worker pay has climbed from 42:1 in 1982 to 301:1 in 2003. This has invited a lot of criticism from the shareholders, employees and has attracted the attention of restrictive regulators. Perel (2003) tried to assess the issue by examining both the claims that CEOs are overpaid for the value they add to an organization and that CEO pay is inherently

Bank of America, on the other hand, has spent its time during the post great recession managing its Merrill Lynch purchase. With such a large wealth management force often referred to as the ‘thundering herd’, the Merrill acquisition allows the bank to explore untapped opportunities, as well as making the bank the biggest in the nation bypassing “JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM.N) and Citigroup Inc (C.N) in size, giving it about $2.7 trillion of assets” (Stempel, 2009). Similar to Morgan Stanley’s plans for its wealth management arm, Bank of America intends on trading the high volatility of traditional investment banking with the stability of the more retail investor focused wealth management. The strategy and benefits are evident, as various Wall Street firms try and reign in more riskier lines of business with more stable ways of income. Additionally, as explained by Halah Touryalai (2012), the advantage of cross selling traditional banking and mortgage products with wealth management clients “can be a very profitable.” The synergies created between both firms could lead to favorable results “as both sides look to tap into one another’s existing client base… sell more products to existing customers. The more products each one of your customers buys from the bank, the more profitable they become for the bank–not to mention it makes it more difficult for a customer to leave” (para. 5). To emphasize, just the size and scope of Bank of America could lead to more attractive

The 2008 financial crisis should not be the last one readers will experience, but this paper would like to present a picture of how it unfolded and where went wrong, so that hopefully we can learn from it. This paper will address some post-crisis regulations and why regulators responded this way. It concludes that the key is to carry out reforms addressing the moral hazard issue deeply in our current financial system.

It was reasonable for a CEO’s compensation to increase as the company expanded and became a larger entity, and the newly-granted shares and increasing stock options further aligned the CEO’s personal interests with those of the company and shareholders. In this sense, the second compensation package was also well-structured and not excessive. Seeing Sunbeam’s revenue rising and stock price climbing steeply upwards, Sunbeam’s shareholders and directors were fully convinced by Dunlap’s leadership, so they might perceive the increase in compensation amount necessary to retain and better motivate Dunlap to enhance the company’s value. Nonetheless, they neglected the fact that the increased portion of the equity-based compensation also further motivated the CEO’s dangerous behaviors pertaining to improper earnings management.

Recent studies have investigated the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crises on banks’ capital. Berger and Bouwman (2011) emphasised the importance of capital during financial crisis. Their empirical study concludes that banks with solid capital base have some benefits during the crisis than those that are poorly capitalised. Well capitalised banks are more able to withstand the shocks due to liquidity squeeze, and therefore had higher chances of surviving the crisis period. Other benefits accrued to well capitalised banks include increase in their market share and profitability, as customers withdrew their funds from less capitalised to a well-capitalised banks. This conclusion was also reinforced by a recent empirical study conducted Olivier de Bandt et al (2014) on a sample of large French banks over a period of 1993 – 2012. Similarly, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) demonstrate the existence of structural changes during the period of financial crisis. They conclude that banks with weaker core capital positions, greater dependence on market funding and on non-interest sources of income restricted the loan supply more strongly during the crisis period. Using a multi-country panel of banks, Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche (2010) find among others results, that during

According to the work examined in this study the global recession that occurred in 2008 and 2009 was partially a result of the financial industry's failure to be responsible for the decision it made in using financial instruments that were risk and very complex in nature. The culture of corporations were constructed on risk-based rewards instead of rewards that resulted in value for stakeholders. The financial risks that banks took on were not well comprehended by the public or regulators and the mass media also failed to understand the risks that the banks had entered into with certain financial agreements.