Baqubah Battle Analysis

This paper will examine the Battle of Fredericksburg through the research of analytical papers, historical articles and technical reports by conducting the four steps of battle analysis. It will analyze the effects of the use and dismissal of intelligence assets and disciplines when applied to the planning of a territorial battle campaign. Using terrain analysis it will discuss how the choice of advantageous terrain can sway the outcome of a battle. It will also discuss how timing and momentum can be critical to our overall military planning. Finally, it will present an alternative outcome to the battle by establishing the utilization of intelligence assets available to both commanding generals and how altering critical decision points would have presented a significantly different result.

The Iraqi Army 1st Brigade, 4th Division and 3rd Brigade Commander (COL Steele, Michael) out of Fort Campbell, executed a highly planned operation similar to the Exercise Swarmer. Over 1500 Soldiers partook in this operation, 800 United States Army Soldiers, and 700 Iraqi Army Soldiers. The operation was to target insurgents/Al Qaeda in the southern province (Salah Ah Din) of Samara. The key mission was not to go after one person, but to prevent a safe haven for insurgents to hide. Even though during the mission there was no resistance or injuries, the coalition forces worked together and claimed multiple caches. These caches’ included, artillery shells, explosives, IED-making materials, and military uniforms, long range cell phones and military identification cards. They continued to search for key Al Qaeda leaders, but turned out they had left earlier before the mission started. By the end, they detained 48 personnel in which 31 remained captive while the rest waited for distribution to the public. They searched for multiple days ensuring there were no insurgents or suspicious personnel within the 50-mile radius of Samara. This was not like the “Shock and Awe” doctrine with air strikes or killings; this operation was an Air-Assault mission, a sneak attack with over 1500 soldiers to include 50 aircraft along with 200 ground

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

In February 2002, Special Forces intelligence agents along with Advanced Force Operations (AFO), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), were starting to make a connection between an increase presence of high-value targets (HVT), the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda fighters in an area called Shahi-Kot Valley (Neville, 2005). Shahi-Kot is located in Afghanistan, just southeast of a town called Zormat. A plan was devised to eliminate the enemy threat in that area. Major Franklin L. Hagenbeck was to command the mission called Operation Anaconda. This operation was the first large-scale battle in the United States War in Afghanistan since the Battle of Tora Bora (Call, 2007, p. 57-86). Operation Anaconda was also unique in the fact that it would involve a great number of Afghan militia, U.S. and coalition Special Operations, and conventional forces (U.S. Army, n.d.),

The U.S. military made the same mistakes initially in the 2003 Iraq War. The U.S. failed to allocate the proper number of troop strength, failed to adapt to the terrain, and failed to foresee the used of improvised explosive device (IED). The U.S. also lacked control of the civilian population, and the mistakes in Abu Ghraib became the rally cry for the insurgents, which the Iraqis rose to support the insurgency. (Montanus, 2005) However, the lessons learned from the British 200 years ago, the U.S. adapted and formed a concept to win the hearts of mine of the people into their counterinsurgency operation. The U.S. allocated more troops, adapted to the terrain, and employed new method to defeat IEDs. Furthermore, they opened dialogues with the Tribes, resolved conflicts, and addressed issues in order to win their support for the war. The U.S. assisted the Iraqi’s create a democratic government, provided logistic support, training

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the real world consequences of when Army leaders become complacent dealing with foreign national soldiers, and the day to day operations while in a combat theatre. To gather lessons learned from the example discussed in order to lower the probability of a reoccurrence among the force. Through the example demonstrate the need for Army leaders to constantly fight against complacency, and the extreme importance that leaders know their soldiers, and place their soldiers’ needs before their own. The scenario discussed was a real incident that took place in Iraq in 2009, at a Coalition Outpost (COP) approximately 30 kilometers south of Mosul, in a city called Hammam al-Alil.

US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) lack of understanding the operational environment led to a poor definition of the problem. The key to understanding the operational environment is the ability to describe the current and desired operational environment. (JPiii8). CENTCOM’s planning did reflect a good understanding of the current operational environment. CENTCOM understood the influences Iraq’s current political structure

The Battle of Beersheba was fought on 31 October 1917, when two infantry and two mounted divisions of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), attacked units of the Yildirim Army Group garrisoning Beersheba. This EEF victory began the offensive, which six weeks later resulted in the capture of Jerusalem, during the Sinai and Palestine campaign of World War I. I think that the Australian soldiers were very effective in winning Beersheba although the charge was born of the desperation of having no water and needing to capture the wells in Beersheba.

Throughout history, the United States Government and Armed Forces have learned from devastating mistakes and decisive victories making the US Armed Forces superior to most, if not all, other militaries; however, the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia throughout Operation Restore Hope, Operation Provide Relief, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force missed the mark on such “lessons learned”. The inadequate intelligence; the ignorance of tactics, techniques, and procedures; and absence of reinforcements cost needless loss of US troops, and crippling a sophisticated, well-equipped military at the hands of an under-equipped militia using irregular warfare tactics. Even 24 years later, the impact resonating still weighs heavily on minds of key leaders in the government along with all echelons of military commanders.

The purpose of this essay is to apply the four steps of battle analysis to evaluate a historical battle using intellectual standards and the elements of reasoning to provide an alternate outcome for the Chosin Reservoir Campaign, which took place during the Korean War. The alternate outcome will be based upon different factors, to include the utilization of intelligence assets and how the alteration might have changed the actual outcome. I will start this essay with an introduction, review the setting, and compare the principle antagonists.

There are eleven principles in unit training that the Army has put into place, I will be covering three of the principles that played an important role in the failure of training, first is train to develop operational adaptability. During the planning process, intelligence estimated a limited number of Al Qaeda fighters from 50 fighters to as high as 1000 would be on the ground in addition to the Al Qaeda’s knowledge of tactics. The final number of fighters estimated on the ground prior to the operation was 150 to 200, approximately 1400 villagers, and other noncombatants in the valley. Shir Khan Keyl, Babol Keyl, and Marz located in the south central part of the valley. CJTF intelligence assumed that like other Taliban and Al Qaeda forces encountered during previous engagement the fighters would be armed with AK-47s, RPGs and 82mm mortars. CJTFs intelligence produced three courses of action, the most likely course of action was the enemy would be the frontline to fight long enough to let their leaders escape, and then they would attempt to escape in various trails leading out of the valley and blend in with the local villagers in Pakistan. The most dangerous course of action was that the enemy would scatter, reconsolidate and then attack U.S. and joint Coalition forces using guerilla tactics. The likely course of action was that

The battle I will be discussing is the battle of Tora Bora. The engagement took place in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan from December 12, 2001 to December 17, 2001. The units involved were from the CIA, numerous Special Forces groups, Pakistani soldiers and local anti-Taliban fighters. The mission given to the forces was to kill Osama bin Laden from the caves, leave the body with the Taliban and disrupt the Al Qaeda organization by removing their leader. The intent was to infiltrate the cave system, remove bin Laden and return home.

My role in the research process of the battle analysis brief was to determine how communications (C3) affected the actions of the fighting forces during the battle. First, I defined the communications concept or what communication systems, both fighting forces used during the battle. The communication systems consisted of “runners” and verbal commands for both forces. The US forces also utilized the drums to start or end offensive efforts. The drummer was Americus Hammock, an African American slave that later was freed for his participation in the battle.

Following this incident a Tactic Technique and Procedure (TTP) was developed and implemented by the Battalion. We no longer drove the Stryker down the streets within neighborhoods. Instead we would position the vehicle to pull security along major roads and then dismount and walk into the city. Soon the Battalion Commander’s request for more troops to assist in clearing the city was answered and the Brigade Headquarters, another Infantry Battalion from the 3rd Stryker Brigade, and an Infantry Battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division were moved to Baqubah. In early June 2007 Operation Arrowhead Ripper commenced, and 2000 U.S. Soldiers converged on the city of Baqubah to eliminate the Al Qaeda forces imbedded there. Operation Arrowhead Ripper defeated Al Qaeda in Baqubah. During the operation over 100 insurgents, including the al Qaeda emir of Baqubah, were killed, 424 suspected insurgents were detained, 129 weapons caches were captured or destroyed, and approximately 250 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were found and reduced, including 38 house-borne IEDs and 12 vehicle-borne

The brand new mission that involved the 1-502nd Infantry regiment was not only a hostile, but a confusing one in the least. In 2005, the 502nd Infantry Regiment was flung out to the 330-square mile region in Southern Baghdad known as the “Triangle of Death,” homing one of the most dangerous insurgency in the country. This area was the focal battleground between the Sunnis and Shi’ites as well as the central grounds for terrorists to ferry men, weapons, and money into the capital (Frederickson 113). The 502nd Regiment was assigned to the task of root out insurgent strongholds, promote social and municipal revival, and to train the local Iraqi Army battalions into a competent fighting force,