Battle Analysis Paper Takur Ghar

had survived.” This second quote explains the solution to the plane’s crash, which required the

Air support had planned to bombard enemy positions for 55 minutes; however, miscommunication between Texas 14 and higher led to a short bombardment and a total of six bombs being dropped. TF HAMMER was unsuccessful in entering the valley due to a heavy amount of small arms fire and mortar attacks. The lack of air support triggered by bad communication frustrated Afghan and Special Forces alike and led to Afghan trucks being hit heavily by pre-registered mortar fire on known choke points by Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. Unity of command is crucial in conducting a successful military operation: communication flows smoothly through a unified command, but unfortunately for a non-unified command, the reverse effect holds true.

Many elite forces from around the world came together for operation Anaconda. The focal point of the operation was the Lower Shahikot Valley, which housed and protected a large number of foreign fighters – “Afghan Arabs” from al-Qaeda, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens from the Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan (IMU) 5. Takur Ghar was the highest point overlooking the Shahikot Valley and was a key terrain to capture for the mission. A noted Afghanistan specialist, Lester Grau, believes there were initially 600 estimated enemy fighters in the valley, which tallied with other credible sources6. The valley was protected by multilayered defenses. At the entrances to the valley, the insurgents maintained checkpoints, which allowed an early warning system of attempted ground attack7. The valley was “classic guerilla terrain – easily defendable, controlled access, numerous routes of escape, and near a sympathetic border”8.

It was in pennsylvania. It was 2 miles far from a place that could of been crashed.

Flight 77 would have had to travel 310 feet through 9 feet of steel reinforced concrete.

Assigned to the 3rd Security Forces Squadron, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, Sergeants McElroy and Norton made the supreme sacrifice when their vehicle struck an IED while on patrol near Taji, Iraq on January 22, 2006.

The Iraqi Army 1st Brigade, 4th Division and 3rd Brigade Commander (COL Steele, Michael) out of Fort Campbell, executed a highly planned operation similar to the Exercise Swarmer. Over 1500 Soldiers partook in this operation, 800 United States Army Soldiers, and 700 Iraqi Army Soldiers. The operation was to target insurgents/Al Qaeda in the southern province (Salah Ah Din) of Samara. The key mission was not to go after one person, but to prevent a safe haven for insurgents to hide. Even though during the mission there was no resistance or injuries, the coalition forces worked together and claimed multiple caches. These caches’ included, artillery shells, explosives, IED-making materials, and military uniforms, long range cell phones and military identification cards. They continued to search for key Al Qaeda leaders, but turned out they had left earlier before the mission started. By the end, they detained 48 personnel in which 31 remained captive while the rest waited for distribution to the public. They searched for multiple days ensuring there were no insurgents or suspicious personnel within the 50-mile radius of Samara. This was not like the “Shock and Awe” doctrine with air strikes or killings; this operation was an Air-Assault mission, a sneak attack with over 1500 soldiers to include 50 aircraft along with 200 ground

Future requirements were not assessed as the team advanced toward the enemy, with all casualties having passed off their weapons to other team members thus rendering the wounded and the aid unable to return fire if need

Armed Forces Soldiers participated in Operation Urgent Fury alongside of 353 Caribbean allied Soldiers up against Grenadian Forces estimated to give little opposition. The original intelligence estimates turned out to be incorrect, supplemented with Cuban Army the enemy force was much larger and better equipped than originally thought. After the dust cleared, U.S. forces suffered 19 killed in action and 116 wounded in action. Enemy casualties included 25 Cuban and 45 Grenadian forces killed in action, 59 Cuban and 358 Grenadian forces wounded in action, and 638 Cuban Soldiers captured. Throughout the operation, coordination between joint forces was lacking to say the least. Each branch of service operated with its own set of communication equipment, which resulted in ground units not being able to talk to each other. Examples of this are the accidental bombing of a hospital located next to Fort Frederick resulting in the deaths of 18 civilian patients as well as the bombing of a Brigade headquarters of the 82nd Airborne Division wounding 18

The unit being re-supplied had moved into the town and set up a landing zone. The landing zone was in the middle of very tall trees that required a steep approach and confined take off area. This required a high angle with max power to take-off; once they cleared the trees, they could nose over to build airspeed. The crew landed and left three different times with great success and returned to the firebase awaiting further instructions.

The inside service said firefighters had confronted a "tremendous blast" when they touched base at the scene. French TV demonstrated elevated pictures of the mentor's scorched shell. The majority of the casualties were thought to have been murdered by the flame.

threw 11 flashbangs as they breached in, firing 22 bullets which 7 of them hit on Monis

Although, crashing, the two remained as they had been, and they set fire to the aircraft and decided to return to the pilot 's aircraft. Pilot Rutherford 's aircraft was close to being captured by the

On February 25, 1991, during the Gulf War, an American Patriot Missile battery in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, failed to track and intercept an incoming Iraqi Scud missile. The Scud struck an American Army barracks, killing 28 soldiers and injuring around 100 other people.

In an attempt to find the lost flight, a Martin Mariner PBM-5 flying boat was sent to search for the mission squadron. The flying boat left Fort Lauderdale Airport at 7:27 p.m. (Cusack, 16). At 7:30 p.m. the plane's radio failed, and flight disappeared forever.