Battle Of Mogadishu Battle Analysis

Mission Command is the framework used by the U.S. Army to ensure key leaders receive clear direction from commanders. Clear commander’s guidance allows subordinates to make disciplined and informed decisions to best accomplish assigned tasks. Ideally, application of mission command principles ensures all elements integrate and sync actions, thus creating a shared understanding and purpose. Analysis of Major General (MG) William Garrison’s decision making during the Battle of Mogadishu demonstrates how mission command principles must be applied to gain and maintain a position of advantage during military ground operations. As commander of Task Force Ranger (TFR), MG Garrison demonstrated both successful and failed application of mission command principles. Four principles will be discussed in the

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

As acknowledge in the paragraph above the authors of this third edition book are Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis and they completely revised and expanded the book by adding more events and details of the American military experience in the Balkans and Somalia,by analyzing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to 2012, and by providing two new chapters on the Vietnam War.All of the authors of this history book are well educated and obviously know a lot about the history of the United States. Millet is a “University Research Professor,Ambrose Professor of History, and Director of the Eisenhower Center for American Studies at the University

During 2003, General Petraeus and his soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had no clue of the astounding role they were about to embark on. General Petraeus found the city of Mosul in complete destruction, and knew it would take a cohesive effort through mutual trust and teamwork to restore the city. The city of Mosul did not only need a complete make over, but also a regime that shared a mutual understanding as Petraeus. Lastly, with the city rebuilding changes would bring hostility and risk to the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. General David Petraeus was successful in Mosul, because he applied the mission command control principles of building cohesive teams, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk.

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

The U.S. military made the same mistakes initially in the 2003 Iraq War. The U.S. failed to allocate the proper number of troop strength, failed to adapt to the terrain, and failed to foresee the used of improvised explosive device (IED). The U.S. also lacked control of the civilian population, and the mistakes in Abu Ghraib became the rally cry for the insurgents, which the Iraqis rose to support the insurgency. (Montanus, 2005) However, the lessons learned from the British 200 years ago, the U.S. adapted and formed a concept to win the hearts of mine of the people into their counterinsurgency operation. The U.S. allocated more troops, adapted to the terrain, and employed new method to defeat IEDs. Furthermore, they opened dialogues with the Tribes, resolved conflicts, and addressed issues in order to win their support for the war. The U.S. assisted the Iraqi’s create a democratic government, provided logistic support, training

Conflicts within the nation of Somalia were sometimes planned as a means to an end. Whereby the United States Government supported a certain regime before they used their power to gain control of the situation and overthrow the tyrant. In other cases the use of national power was used such as the Islamic Courts Union to gain control over Somalia by implementing logical line of operations by providing the people their needs and services to gain their trust. In these situations it would be considered as an irregular warfare environment, because they were violent struggles

Deceased philosopher Bertrand Russell once said, “War does not determine who is right- only who is left”. Those left are the soldiers of the 1-502nd, specifically Bravo Company 1st plt, and the Janabi family and to a greater extent, the ever-changing global world we all live in today. The tragic events that conspired in a small Iraqi village became a microcosm of how leadership failures at every level shaped the actions of a few soldiers who committed atrocious acts. One can also see how a high operational tempo, along with prolonged violence and death, has on a person’s psyche. It is the ugly side of war that the average American citizen may not want to hear or talk about. For a soldier, it is inevitably what they train their

This case study is on the battle of Mogadishu. This battle took place on October 3rd and 4th of 1993 in the country of Somalia which is located in Africa. This battle changed the foreign policy of the United States. The battle cost the Americans 18 lives, and 77 wounded. Estimates are that it cost the Somalis about 500 lives and wounded 1000.1 This battle was fought with some of Americas most highly trained and lethal warriors. The main effort of the battle was led by Rangers from the 75th Ranger Regiment and Special Operations Forces Detachment- Delta. It started out as a peace keeping mission and escalated into a mission to capture a Somali warlord. It ultimately ended up being a mission

This ignorance was revealed in the way the United States fought the Iraq War, a classic example of an insurgency requiring a counterinsurgency, until 2007: by completely contravening basic principles of successful counterinsurgencies codified by 20th military

Somalia has been engaged in a civil war since 1991. The war has destroyed national governance structures leaving Somalia a patchwork of clan fiefdoms. In this chaotic environment, Non- governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Islamic organizations replaced the government in providing necessary services to the people of Somalia.

While it is obvious that Somalia has a plethora of problems that it needs to solve before it can repair the damage it has sustained, one problem in particular is the most prohibitive to a developed Somalia. The strangle-hold on society that clans have achieved prevents any form of national identity building or institution solidification. With citizens more enticed by being a member of a clan than being a citizen of Somalia, any institutions created will be seen as just another way to enrich their clans. It is imperative that clans either be eliminated completely, or integrated into government in such a way that they sustain said government. Somalia will not be able to function as a successful state until the problem of clans has been addressed.

Secretary Rumsfeld repeatedly pressed for reductions throughout the planning process for what eventually became COBRA II. In the end, 150,000 troops participated in the initial military operations that began on March 19, 2003. Even in the midst of the war, Rumsfeld would question, for example, why both the 1st Armored and 1st Cavalry divisions still needed to be sent to Iraq. He ultimately pressured Franks to cancel the latter on April 21, 2003. “Rumsfeld just ground Franks down,” said Secretary of the Army Tom White. President George Bush declared the end of major combat operations on May 1, Coalition forces killed Saddam Hussein’s sons on July 22, and captured Saddam on December 13. By the end of 2003, troop levels had fallen to 122,000.