Battle of Leyte Gulf Essay

On the Japanese side of intelligence, Yamamoto believed to have the element of surprise at Midway, which was thought to draw the Americans out of Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto had numerical naval superiority in the Pacific to defeat the Americans at sea but remained unaware that the code breakers ascertained its operational and strategic plan to attack at Midway. Spector argues that Japanese submarines knew the American forces were planning something at Pearl Harbor, but the intelligence was never passed on to Yamamoto. Additionally, Yamamoto believed that two of the American carriers were sunk at Coral Sea, which the Yorktown was hastily being repaired in Pearl Harbor. In reality, the Japanese had no idea where the American fleet or carriers were leading up to the Battle of Midway.

Despite all the success Japan had early in the war, they did not do as much damage to the United States Pacific fleet as they would have like to have done. This gave America a false sense of security at the time when Japan was preparing to take stronger action. Rear Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s plan was to draw in the remaining American ships into an area where they could be attacked and destroyed by a much greater number of Japanese vessels. Admiral Yamamoto thought that if Japan captured valuable territory like the Midway Islands that the United States could not afford to give up, he could destroy the remaining American ships with ease because the Americans would have no supply chain.

The American forces plan consisted of a “divide and conquer” methodology. The U.S. focused on landing its assault force expediently and quickly and securing Mt. Suribachi and dominant high ground of the island. The Americans expected victory in less than a week. Their forces consisted of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. The 4th and 5th Marine Divisions were to land on the eastern beaches the 4th on the right and the 5th on the left. The 3rd Marines would either land on the eastern beaches or assume a defensive role, which ever was called (Planning for the Battle of Iwo Jima, n.d.).

The Japanese had planned operation MO, planning to invade and occupy Port Moresby and tuag, to strengthen their defensive positioning for their empire in the South pacific. The Americans were signalled through intelligence of the sighting and Admiral Frank J. Fletcher once receiving the notification sent two US Navy carrier task forces, TF 17- Yorktown and TF 11- Lexington carrying 60 aircraft and a joint Australian/American cruiser force. Over the 4 days The Allied forces had thirteen destroyers, eight cruisers, four light cruisers and two aircraft carriers, the USS Lexington and USS Yorktown. The Japanese force consisted of seven transports, five destroyers, a light aircraft carrier, the Shoho, and the fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku. There were also three heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, a squadron of submarines and six destroyers. The Yorktown squadron took down some Japanese defences but nothing major enough to stop there

The US Navy bombers conducted attacks on the Japanese ships simultaneously, which defeated the Japanese at Midway. Because US Navy utilized this, it contributed to The Navy being able to destroy all of the Japanese carrier ships during the battle of Midway.

The first successful land attack began with the battle at Yalu river. The river was not far from Port Arthur, and its significance was also that it represented the border between Korea and China. The goal of the Russians was in contrast, as General Kuropatkin, Far East Army Russian Commander, was interested only in holding the line long enough to receive reinforcements by way of the Trans-Siberian railway. In other words, the Russian army was on the defensive. He knew the process of replenishment would be a lengthy one, and the Japanese, under the leadership of General Kuroki, did as well. Japan was aware that victory would need to be swift to maintain their strategy of driving the offensive and keeping the Russians on their heels (Warner, pp. 252-268). Kuropatkin had long been vocal about the dangers of expansion and

Up to this point in the war both the army and navy had been fighting this war on several fronts. The closest and most immediate had been the Russian presence at Port Arthur. With that threat now gone, the Japanese could now focus on a single front at a time. The Navy would be concerned with the threat from Vladivostok from East (until it defeated the squadrons when they met on 14 August, 1904) (Warner, 335-336). The army was also tasked with two separate fronts, first with subduing the garrison at Port Arthur and also Russian bases to the North, in Manchuria. Now able to focus their efforts to the north, they would take the battle to the Russian army and General Kuropatkin, who, rather than seeking battle, sought primarily to deny the Japanese

The new technology can make the difference in the results of the battle. The Midway battle was a strategy for the Japanese Admiral Yamamoto. He plans to destroy midway and part of America's Pacific Fleet. Yamamoto next step was to attack Hawaii and towards the U.S. for negotiating for peace. He was dividing the force to plan the attack. Admiral Nimitz in charge uses a new Ultra intelligence that discloses the plans of Yamamoto. He prepares for the incoming attack from the Japanese's with Rear-Admiral Spruance. The first attack on Midway on 3 June, by the bombers, was ineffective. The next day attack left general damage. When Nagumo aircraft's return to rearm, Spruance attacks them in a long range of U.S. torpedo planes. Most of the U.S. planes

As we know, nothing can be certain, and I would have probably been in the same position. If everything could go as I planned, I would have had the men up already and on deck. The planes would have been spotted and reported as soon as possible. The one thing that the Navy did right was that they were still docked. Had they gone out to sea, the Japanese would have been able to sink the ships far away from shore. The men would have died at a higher number than they did with the ships docked. Because the ships were so close to the shore, many wounded and safe military men were able to find a location out of the immediate harm. This may have saved the lives of

Code breakers at HYPO were able to intercept and decipher enough Japanese transmissions to learn that an invasion was being planned, but the question was where. There were only two clues: AF and the United States were operating extensive air searches from the location. Nimitz believed that the island of Midway was the only place, near Hawaii, that the Japanese could be planning to advance on and ordered an increase of military presence on both the island and in surrounding waters. Admiral King, still not impressed with Nimitz or with Pearl Harbor HYPO intelligence, believed AF could be anywhere. HYPO, with permission, came up with a plan: send a transmission from Midway to Pearl Harbor saying that the water desalination equipment was broken and there was a major shortage of water on the island. The following day a Japanese transmission was decoded: there was a water shortage at attack location and to add water desalination equipment as a target.

attack south, since Pearl Harbor was 4,000 miles away from Japan. Pearl Harbor was totally

The Philippines is a small island nation in Southeast Asia that normally has little consequence to the rest of the world. During World War II however, it sat directly in Japan’s oil shipping lanes. This made it a strategic necessity for Japan to hold in order to maintain access to the natural resources that were vital to the Japanese war effort. To compound the necessity of retaking the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur stated that the Allies had a moral obligation to liberate the islands as he had told the people, “I shall return,” when he was forced to retreat to Australia in the winter of 1942. Other plans to bypass the Philippines and attack Formosa (Taiwan) had been presented but due to the large amount of Japanese air assets

Naval Warfare has been a chaotic and devastating endeavor for centuries. With the oceans being a source of major access to trade routes and much needed resources in times of conflict, it is easy to see why so many high stakes battles took place on the sea. In the months following the savage attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Navy was looking for a way to increase the attack range of its bombers while simultaneously luring the weakened American Navy into a single decisive engagement. Simultaneously, the United States, still recovering from the devastating loss of ships and manpower at Pearl Harbor, looked to inflict serious damage on the Imperial fleet in order to equal the playing field for future operations. With both forces in a chess

Their objective was to cripple the navy fleet, and expand their territories to South-east Asia (Source B) during that window of time and then to negotiate an armistice (Source C). The fleet had left Japan on the 26th of November. On the 1st of December the final orders were given to the fleet commander, Vice Admiral Nagumo, accordingly, the troops were positioned 275 miles to the North of Hawaii on the morning of the 7th of December. "At 6 AM the first elements of the air attack consisting of fighter aircraft, torpedo bombers, high-level bombers and dive-bombers were aloft and assembling in the pre-dawn gloom." (Source L) Also the concentrated body of forces and equipment, left practically undefended, presented an opportune target for the Japanese. (Source

The plan for the ground operations in the capture of Leyte comprised four main phases. Phase One covered minor preliminary landings to secure the small islands lying across the entrance to Leyte Gulf. Phase Two included the main amphibious assaults on Leyte from Dulag to Tacloban and called for the seizure of the airstrip, an advance through Leyte Valley, and the opening of San Juanico and Panaon Straits. Phase Three consisted of the necessary overland and shore-to-shore operations to complete the capture of Leyte and the seizure of southern Samar. Phase Four contemplated the occupation of the remainder of Samar and the further neutralization of enemy positions in the Visayas.