Bear Steearns Failure

A decade ago the Lehman Brothers were the fourth largest investment bank in America. Dealing with Investment banking and investment management, the Lehman Brothers was one of the largest global financial service providers. Consequently, the subprime mortgage crisis left the company filing for the declaration of the chapter 11 bankruptcy protections, due to the unnecessary undertaken risk and obnoxious negligence accusations directed towards the group. Companies should utilize observational and analytical pundit functions in identifying the presence of crisis situations to avoid an economic downturn in the business (Pontell, 2014). The fraud would have prevented through stronger and better internal controls, which

In Frontline’s The Meltdown, the causes of the stock market crash of 2008 came into discussion. The topics regarding Bear Stearns, the Lehman Brothers’ and their collapse, and the huge bailout made in results to the market crash. There were great points being made on the mistakes Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke did not view from their perspective, which in turns were the problems that made up the crash.

A Colossal Failure of Common Sense was one of many books to be published in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis of 2007. After seeing the global economy stall in the face of massive losses in word financial markets, many Americans sought to better understand the crisis and its causes. This book, written from the perspective of a financial market insider, provides a glimpse into the world of global finance and also seeks to explain how the players in this world were involved in the crisis. In the words of the author Lawrence McDonald, “My objective in writing A Colossal Failure of Common Sense was twofold. First, to provide … a close-up, inside view of how markets really work…..And, second, to give… as crystal clear an explanation as possible about the real reasons why the legendary Lehman Brothers met with such a swift end”1. By writing about his personal experience at Lehman Brothers and recounting stories from within the famous investment banking firm, Mr. McDonald largely succeeds at his first goal. However, the elements of personal biography and the chronological order of the book make it difficult for the reader to fully appreciate all of the varied causes of the financial crash. I believe that the main value of reading this book is in understanding these causes, with Lehman Brothers acting as a microcosm of the greater financial universe. As such, in this review I have isolated elements from Mr. McDonald’s book which highlight how the crisis

In the midst of the current economic downturn, dubbed the “Great Recession”, it is natural to look for one, singular entity or person to blame. Managers of large banks, professional investors and federal regulators have all been named as potential creators of the recession, with varying degrees of guilt. No matter who is to blame, the fallout from the mistakes that were made that led to the current crisis is clear. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the current unemployment rate is 9.7%, with 9.3 million Americans out of work (Bureau of Labor Statistics). Compared to a normal economic rate of two or three percent, it is clear that the decisions of one group of people have had a profound affect on the lives of millions of

Many people today would consider the 2008, United States financial crisis a simple “malfunction” or “mistake”, but it was nothing close to that. Contrary to what many believe, renowned economists and financial advisors regarded the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 to be the most devastating crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930’s. To make matters worse, the decline in the economy expanded nationwide, resulting in the recession of 2007 to 2009 (Brue). David Einhorn, CEO of GreenHorn Capital, even goes as far as to say "What strikes me the most about the recent credit market crisis is how fast the world is trying to go back to business as usual. In my view, the crisis wasn't an accident. We didn't get unlucky. The crisis came

“The Fed did not bailout Bear at taxpayer expense, but enabled – as it is mandated – the financial markets to continue to function. History will call the Fed’s action the right move at the right time”, says Jeremy Siegel, Ph.D. The Bear Stearns Company began a financial meltdown in July 2007. By March 2008, it was ready to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Some people believe that the Federal Reserve should not have stepped in to bailout Bear Stearns because it was rewarding reckless business behavior and Bear should have been left to file bankruptcy. The deal of Bear Stearns was not a government bailout; it was rather a loan to preserve jobs, homes, savings, the economy, the shareholders of Bear, and the financial

The United States has always funded the opportunistic financial well-being of its citizens. There has never been a financial crisis worse than that of the Great Depression until the 2008 financial crisis. Even though times were much tougher within the 20’s than that of the late 2000’s, policies were much different, condensing the absence of hope of happiness. There is always room for improvement among any economic standpoint of the ladder, but sometimes it’s just very hard to make some. Times are always tough and people functioning as a society always focus upon the short term involvements of the stock(s), but never seem to concentrate on the long run. However, with mistakes come lessons learned and improvements to economic ventures. Both the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Depression has taught us many things about our own markets and budget capabilities. Upon coincidental financial crises, times and polices were much different, but the reasoning upon the doubt can and will alter the course of economic futures and endeavors.

The beginning of the crisis is marked as the downfall of Bear Stearns Financial. The company, with a triple A rating, was sidelined with problems of lack of cash flow, and a piling up of unpaid debts on housing mortgages. Bear Stearns invested heavily in these mortgages, because they were lucrative so long as the loans were being paid off. Foreclosures did not begin to pile up until after the 2005-2006 years of mass investment in the housing boom had already seeped into every corner of the United States. The first feeling of a tremble in the market caused Bear Stearn's stock to plummet, and the

In the wake of the recent financial crisis, many commentators attempted to analyze the roots of the conflict from a political or economic perspective. Anthropologist Karen Ho, a veteran of Wall Street as well as an academic, attempted to understand the reason that Wall Street behaves the way it does in her 2009 anthropological study of American finance entitled Liquidated: An ethnography of Wall Street from a cultural perspective. The central paradox with which Ho begins her book is: " the economy experienced not only record corporate profits and the longest rising stock market ever, but also record downsizings," further concentrating the wealth in America (Ho 2009: 1-2). But how can corporations grow richer as the American public as a whole grows poorer? Corporations no longer view themselves as responsible for taking care of their employees, creating good products, or serving their original mission. Instead, the focus is on generating shareholder wealth (Ho 2009:3). Shareholders, not the larger public, have become the symbolic and real focus of firm strategy. The shareholder "symbolized and 'stood in' for the whole of the corporation and became the sole locus of concern and analysis" during the time Ho conducted her study in the late 1990s and continues to this day (Ho 2009:175)

The ‘sub-prime’ crisis triggered by the meltdown of the US mortgage backed-securities market in 2007 was a precursor to the global financial crisis. It would drastically change the competitive landscape for all firms in the financial services sector, including Campbell and Bailyn (C&B), one of the world’s five largest investment banks.

At the height of the 2008 financial crisis, Mr. Lawrence G. McDonald wrote a book on the fall of Lehman Brothers, entitled "A Colossal Failure of Common Sense." This book is a risk manager 's guide to the right and wrong moves on Wall St., and explains why investors must stay ahead of policies coming out

1. What role did Bear’s culture play in its positioning vis-à-vis its competitors, and what role might that

In 2008, the US experienced the traumatic chaos of a financial downturn, whose effects rippled throughout Europe and Asia. Many economists consider it the worst crisis since the Great Depression, and its alarming results are still seen today, a long six years later. Truly, the recession’s daunting size and formidable wake have left no one untouched and can only beg the question: could it have been prevented? The causes are manifold, but can be found substantially rooted in illogical investments and greedy schemes.

The move came after Bear Stearns was bleeding cash after word spread about the company’s crumbling position. European banks and other brokerage clients were pulling their investments and loans with Bear Stearns rapidly—and the company was losing billions in a week. In a swift move, the CEO of Bear Stearns, Alan Schwartz, was connected with the FED Chairman Ben Bernake, who agreed to loan money to JPMorgan if the financier company took over the quickly deteriorating Bear Stearns. It is argued that the FED was right in doing so as this move not save one of the largest American investment banks thus preventing a crushing blow to the US economy.

According to the work examined in this study the global recession that occurred in 2008 and 2009 was partially a result of the financial industry's failure to be responsible for the decision it made in using financial instruments that were risk and very complex in nature. The culture of corporations were constructed on risk-based rewards instead of rewards that resulted in value for stakeholders. The financial risks that banks took on were not well comprehended by the public or regulators and the mass media also failed to understand the risks that the banks had entered into with certain financial agreements.