Biological Agent Essay

The book is primarily an account of the Smallpox Eradication Program (1967–80), the ongoing perception by the U.S. government that smallpox is still a potential bioterrorism agent, and the controversy over whether or not the remaining samples of smallpox virus in Atlanta and Moscow (the “demon” in the freezer) should be finally destroyed.

In her book, Pox Americana, Elizabeth A. Fenn takes on the challenge of writing about a little-known topic with large gaps in the existing research. Fenn states in the foreword that the previous research about smallpox focused on specific locations, "often with vague but tantalizing references to a larger background pandemic." I commend Fenn on her attempt to write about that large epidemic and I think that she successfully combined the facts and figures that spanned an entire hemisphere into her book.

“Bioterrorism remains a major threat for the United States despite more than $65 billion spent on protecting the country from myriad dangers, the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center said in its latest report Wednesday. The center's Bio-Response Report Card evaluated U.S. preparedness for countering threats from bioterrorism and found the country remains vulnerable to multiple threats and "largely unprepared for a large-scale bioterrorist attack."”(UPI.com, 2011). There have been over a dozen leading U.S. bio-defense experts that have taken part in figuring out where we are exactly as a county and what the effects of a terroristic attack

Chapter four of Viruses, Plagues, and History, entitled Smallpox, provided a broad spectrum of information about smallpox as well as exploring its potential to return and once again cause death and devastation. I found this chapter to be especially terrifying because of the stress put on the fact that smallpox could be weaponized by bioterrorists. All of the information about smallpox itself as well as its history as a virus and a weapon really scared me because it could cause so much devastation.

Beginning in the early 1990’s, a series of governmental actions against biological warfare and bioterrorism were instituted, including the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Act, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, and the Defense Authorization Act. These acts were meant to either dissuade bioterrorists or boost the government’s power in defensive biological warfare research (Lanthrop). In April of 2000, the CDC published a guide, Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response, which covered “planning, detection and surveillance, laboratory analysis, emergency response, and communications” (“CDC”). The APIC and CDC have co-written a guide for hospitals who come into contact with biological agents to follow (“CDC”). To sum up these guidebooks, it is important to look out for the following incidences: an irregular rapid increase in disease occurrences, an epidemic curve, an unusual pattern or time for a disease to thrive, clusters of patients from the same area, large numbers of fatal cases, simultaneous reports of animal deaths (Lanthrop).

These biological agents could be viruses, toxins, bacteria, etc. Agents could be used in war or terrorist attacks. Also, they could be modified to cause extreme diseases and disorders, according to The Center for Disease Control and Prevention. It makes bioterrorism even more tempting to use as it is easy and inexpensive to produce, disseminate and can cause a more widespread panic than other acts of terrorism (1).

Smallpox once raged through cities, leaving its victims scarred for life, or dead. But it was put down decades ago. If it were to come back, devastation would surely be imminent. Any remains are under maximum security for this reason. For it to return at the hands of a bioterrorist could be expected, but at the hands of say, a teenage boy, is ridiculous.

One threat that smallpox poses, is the use of it in biological warfare. According to Colette Flight, "in the 1990s the public discovered that Russia planned to turn smallpox into an effective weapon".

Stevens went into a coma and was dead in less than a week. His death shook up the Center of Disease Control (CDC) and had them scrambling to find out how to stop it. We are then taken to the United States Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) which is the principle biodefense laboratory in the United States. (Page 35, The Demon in the Freezer) On the books, the smallpox virus exists in only two places: “in freezers in a building called Corpus 6 at Vector in Siberia, and in a freezer in a building called the Maximum Containment Laboratory at the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta.” (Page 55, The Demon in the Freezer) Although people are not for certain, but in a safe at USAMRIID, there is said to be a list containing all of “the nations and groups that the CIA believes either have clandestine stocks of smallpox or are actively trying to get the virus.” Russia is at the top of the list. (Page 57, The Demon in the

One way smallpox is still a threat is that, it is still existing in 2 labs. One in Georgia at The Center for Disease Control and Prevention. And one in the State Research Centre of Virology and Biotechnology, in Koltsovo, Nobosbirsk Oblast, in Russia. Another fact is that the government may take action and get rid of the vials of smallpox. They pose as a threat. The government believes someone might go over board and release the smallpox to start another smallpox epidemic.

He brings up concerns about the stockpiles of smallpox posing a threat and the debate between keeping the stockpiles or destroying them. The issues presented in this book are able to be applied to any outbreak, whether it is a virus or a threat of a bioterror weapon. The most provocative question is how smallpox went from eradicated disease to an ideal weapon for bioterrorism. Preston let the question hover over the book as he detailed the Soviet Union’s bioweapons programs, the U.S. Army’s attempts of testing smallpox antiviral drugs on monkeys and the Australians efforts to cross smallpox with mousepox to create “superpox.” The real terror of this Demon is the uncertainty of the smallpox threat, no one knows how big the threat really is nor who has stockpiles of the

The smallpox bioterrorism attack was made more successful when the FBI did not inform the local authorities and health agencies of the potential for an attack. This lack of information caused a delay in the medical community being able to respond quickly and effectively by isolating those exposed and assessing an immediate vaccination plan. People who were infected at the venue went about their lives and would later expose many others to smallpox. Since hospitals were not informed about a potential large-scale smallpox exposure they were not aware to be cautious for any symptoms associated with smallpox. This caused the first few smallpox patients to be misdiagnosed patients with things such as the flu and dengue fever instead. This time lapse

The preparedness community has vastly changed since we first started working toward eradicating smallpox. They have made progressions in areas of communication plans, isolation and quarantine, environmental control, and checklist for different levels of government.

Honestly, the threat of a biological attack is very real. Take this threat back just twenty years ago with the Japanese Sarin Cult, that it was discovered that they had within their inventory of biological weapons Ebola and Anthrax (Wright, 2008). How they gain access to these deadly viruses is somewhat unknown, but still they were obtained. Currently, research organizations and laboratories that carry these viruses are monitored and the security around the faculties is very advanced. But the Ebola virus made its way from Africa to the United States, not too long ago and who is to say that that particular outbreak was not a “dress rehearsal” for an attack on a particular region?

Protecting the public’s health historically has been a state and local responsibility. However, the growing threat of bioterrorism has highlighted the importance of a strong public health infrastructure to the nation’s homeland security and has focused increased attention on the preparedness of the public health system (Frist, 2011). Since the 2001 anthrax attacks Congress has passed new legislation to increase the strength of the nation’s public health system thus the funding has also rapidly increased to meet the potential demand. There is an ongoing debate however, as to what level of contribution local, state, and federal agency’s feel is an appropriate level of ongoing public health investments.