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Bulk Third Stage Separator Exploded

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1. What happened? Describe the actual realisation of the event.
On March 4, 1998, near Pitkin, Louisiana, a Bulk Third stage separator in a Facility owned by Sonat Exploration co. exploded, causing around $200,000 worth of damage to equipment and resulted in 4 deaths. The process utilised two wells, where one was located 2 miles (3.2kms) away. In order for ideal production, the pipelines needed to be purged to remove the air as the air was purged it was unable to escape to the atmosphere, resulting in over-pressurisation within the tanks which were unaccounted for, resulting in rupturing of the tank, releasing flammable material which in present with any ignition source ignited resulting in a large fireball.
2. What were the consequences of …show more content…

Four workers were killed immediately due to being within close distance of the separator (See Figure 1). The operator which was near the head was thrown five feet due to the blast, as well as the construction supervisor whom was severely jolted as he exited his truck, however both survived with no serious injuries. The total damage is claimed to be around $200,000 as the separator, the vehicles of four personnel were damaged, as well as the backhoe, oil and water storage tanks were damaged as …show more content…

As shown in Figure 2; valve 11 and 13 must remain open during the process (Planned Valve Lineup) however, the valves 11 and 13 were closed during the process (As Found Valve Lineup) for the third-stage separator. Since the valves were closed, there was not a process by which the purge gas could vent out. The purge gas could have vented out through the block valve 14 and 15, however they remained closed (See Figure 2). A Block valve does not replace a pressure relief system but can contribute to the division of the separator and the storage tanks. As a result of the valves remaining closed, there was a build-up of high pressure purge gas within the vessel. Hence leading to one aspect of the failure. Whilst designing the system, Sonat considered the third stage separator as a vapour recovery tower which was identified as a storage tank. Consequently, the design was done accordingly and there was a lack of a pressure relief system which would account for any human errors and mechanical failures that may occur. Furthermore, Sonat did not produce any documented piping and instrumental diagram before the incident. This meant that, thorough analyses of the plant could not have been done or was either done ineffectively. Hence, safety issues concerning the plant were not addressed and appropriate modifications were not made which could have prevented

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