COIN Compaigns: Vietnam and Afghanistan

Theoretically, it holds that the United States (US) invaded Afghanistan as a self-defense strategy following the 9/11 attacks. Practically, however, as US foreign policy is about conquest, self-protection and resource-extraction, it seeks strategic dominance of geographical space to sustain its global relevance. The rationality of the US suggests the need to continuously accumulate capital, resources and military proficiency to ensure autonomy. Therefore, a pragmatic reading into the motivation behind the invasion of Afghanistan negates the self-defense theory. Rather, the shifting coordinates of power within central and southern Asia crafted the perfect criteria for US intervention. This work explores the motivations and systemic cover-ups designed by the Bush administration in ordering military troops into Afghanistan in 2001. It will hold that this invasion was not just a War on Terror, but rather a tactic to ensure US prevalence within the region, and henceforth, the rest of the world. Thus, why did the US invade Afghanistan?

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

The American “way of war” is primarily based on the American interpretation of the national fundamentals and values to include capitalism and basic freedoms surrounding financial enterprising as applied in the democratic system. Along with these ideals concerning free marketing and democracy, the American “way of war” seeks to reinforce alliances with nations that uphold similar concepts and values through international trade and commerce. In doing so, the United States intrinsically denounces political ideologies that are contradictory, such as communism.

The United States has recognized that local threats have worldwide consequences. Recognizing our global interconnectedness was essential for any foreign policy, especially in a world where traditional borders are quickly breaking down. The Doctrine highlighted that foreign intervention does not need to rely solely on military action. Today, political and economic sanctions are a key part of American foreign policy (Bolinder 2013). The Doctrine also calls for the U.S to lead the international community in spreading peace, prosperity and democracy around the world. It has become the foundation for United States foreign policy and a guidebook for international relations in a nuclear and digital age.

The Vietnam War and the war against terrorism are highly unpopular and controversial wars amongst American citizens. The United States went to war in Vietnam to keep their sphere of influence and to stop the spread of communism, and they went to war against ISIS to stop terrorism. Even though these wars don’t provide any direct benefits to us, the government deemed them to be necessary. However, many American citizens believe that these wars did not need to happen in the first place. Despite differentiating opinions, the Vietnam War and the war against terrorism are very comparable because of their similarities, but also their differences.

As communism began to spread steadily and gain more and more attention, Americans became immensely concerned in what most saw as a detrimental threat. President Eisenhower only added to the hysteria by outlining the Domino Theory: the theory that a political event, in this case referring to the spread communism, in one country will cause a similar turn of events in neighboring countries, like a falling domino that causes an entire row to fall down. Although the Vietnam War is seen by many as the only option to try to end the spread of communism, the specious outcome of the war was not effective enough to justify the amount of unethical decisions and situations that were allowed to take place. In 1961, under President Kennedy, 100 Special Forces troops were sent to South Vietnam and by 1963, just two years later, U.S military advisors and Special Forces had increased to 21,000 troops. We will soon see that this is just the beginning and in my paper I will outline the full record of events all the way to the end of the war, including the reasons for U.S involvement, unethical decisions that were made, America 's effort to end the war, and the lasting impact the war had on the United States.

The US has been known to diverge from its once-isolationist state, engaging in international affairs like World War I and several other events alike. It’s therefore no surprise that the US intervened in the Vietnam War during the 1960’s. At the time, President Lyndon B. Johnson put forth new ideas, plans and tactics to help and protect the South Vietnamese and surrounding countries from communist influence. However, the United States’ initial goals and plans didn’t always go the way they had expected. Indeed, Johnson’s Vietnam policies failed because of his unreasonable military strategies and his inefficient political actions.

The United States from the Cold War and into the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues to face challenges in translating military might into political desires due to its obsession with raising an army, electing politicians and assembling a diplomatic corp that continue to gravitate towards State-to-State engagements that if not rectified could lead to substantial delays in fighting terrorism and non-terrorist adversaries or worse total failure of the United States Military’s ability to properly carry out it’s politicians objectives due to being blindsided.

1. In President Obama’s speech at West Point, he announced that 30,000 additional troops would be sent to Afghanistan. He made this decision because he said it was vital to the United States’ national interest. The vital national interest at risk in President Obama’s address is the security and safety of the American people as well as the “security of our allies and the common security of the world.” By involving the military and increasing the troop strength, President Obama can achieve the objectives of his strategy. His objectives are to keep the Taliban from becoming powerful, prevent them from government rule, improve Afghanistan security forces and government so they can manage their own country and prevent Al Qaeda from

The ways in which the United States has conducted its military operations since becoming an independent nation has largely depended upon the overall political and military objectives of each individual conflict. The United States first three hot wars after the end of World War II display the marked difference in US objectives and the operations used to achieve them better than any other modern wars in which American troops participated.

a. Coalition Legitimacy: Empowering, strategic utilization, and promoting of coalition forces (and regional population) while minimizing overt U.S. presence.

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

Many people believe that the persistent armed conflict in Afghanistan is was beginning to resemble another famous war that the United States has been in: The Vietnam War. Some people have coined it “Americas Second Vietnam” There are many similarities between the two wars, the majority pertaining to Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations and campaigns.

Conventional warfare that is prolonged and resource intensive is not sustainable and eventually leads to descent into attrition type warfare. Irregular warfare operations, be it COIN or counter-terrorism, from the Western perspective consume time and resources. This consumption is predominantly fuelled by the asymmetry of Western and insurgent forces which results in significantly different tactics being used by the two forces. Western powers, in almost all cases, tend to have superior technology and a larger number of forces and rely heavily on these factors during conflicts, however this perceived imbalance of power is not necessarily advantageous for the Western power. Andrew Mack discusses this idea that military superiority does not always result in victory when facing an unconventional enemy, Mack states " In such asymmetric conflicts, insurgents may gain political victory from a situation of military stalemate or even defeat." Here Mack surfaces the idea of 'political capital' and argues that insurgents' ability to win wars stems from "...the progressive attrition of their opponents' political capability to wage war." This concept is solidified if we observe the planned withdrawal from Afghanistan, after having a Western military presence in the nation for over ten years, public support has declined and it is no longer politically viable to continue operations in that theatre. Insurgents continue to function in this state and the threat of

The first tenet of COIN aligns with the first two statements of COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance. The primary focus is on the people and earning their trust. The people function as the internal intelligence for the government and support the goal of eliminating, harboring and providing safe havens for the enemy. This effort is supported by the United States Soldiers and its allies taking up residence in the community with the Afghanistan people. This also reinforces President Obama core element of a civilian surge to reinforce positive action. It is imperative to get the people out in the public view and not living in fear. Constant and daily interaction is essential in gathering local intelligence on what is going in the government in hopes of understanding how the people feel and think about their leadership. Communication is helpful but being a good listener is an invaluable asset to information gathering. Secondly, the United States military goal is to support the fostering of renewed trust of the Afghanistan people in their government and security forces. The ultimate goal is that the Afghanistan people reject the insurgents and stop them from infiltrating their infrastructure. This approach was taught by