Carl Von Clausewitz And John R. Boyd

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

The concept of war as a static and unchanging occurrence is an outdated and dangerous miscalculation. More accurately, war is a fluidic, evolving and shifting phenomenon constantly reinventing itself, rendering stagnant, inflexible principles potentially disastrous. Consequently, as students of war and future players in this transforming theatre, the study of eras of significant development is an extremely relevant pursuit. Recognizing the need for adaptation and the creation of doctrine is now a prerequisite for any effective modern commander. War is unpredictable in nature and particularly so in current theatres of operation, in which change is rapid

Clausewitz’s attack of enemy centers of gravity and Sun Tzu’s prioritization of attack of important elements of national power provide contrasting approaches to the development of effective strategy. These contrasts are reflections of each author’s perspective on how war should be waged, the proper use of force, their definitions of the ideal victory and how best to achieve that victory as well as their methodologies,

In the year of 1792, a twelve year old boy named Carl von Clausewitz enlisted in the Prussian army for war, and soon after appearing in such battles as Jena-Auerstädt and Waterloo, became dedicated in conflict and its reasons for their results most of his life. By being alive at the same time as Napoleon's rise and fall, Carl von Clausewitz was able to document and relate how war was fought, won, and lost. It's important to comprehend that in his writings, he is relaying why it is pertinent to think about how war is fought, not how to win a war. Clausewitz' theories described in “On War,” are not only effective in wars fought in today's time and past, but will remain current in future endeavors, due to its generic layout of

To move from a point to another A Commander does not create the openings for an advance due to the unpredictability of the weather. Instead he uses the changes in the weather to aid the advancement of his troops. The significance of this chapter is clear in the landings on the Normandy beaches in the Second World War. In this chapter Sun Tzu also informs that talent and experience are above rules and theory. The knowledge in his book ‘Art of War’ isn’t grasped by simply reading the texts. Understanding it and knowing when and where to appropriately apply these concepts takes practice. These concepts were not created with scientific knowledge or calculations, because war cannot be analytically calculated. War is like water, Sun Tzu says “it shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.” Accordingly this book was written by generals in the army with years of experience, and wisdom and cannot be easily repeated. Sun Tzu says “One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.” Reading these texts only provides the reader with the theory; however to gain an understanding requires practice. Therefore the rank of a commander can only be attained through the medium of reflection, creativity, study, thought and intellectual instinct.”

Carl Von Clausewitz and Helmuth Moltke the Elder were both practitioners and theorists of the war art in the 19th century. Their military thoughts on war’s character and its dynamics have influenced the later militaries in the conduct of war. Particularly, the Clausewitzian concept of the “culminating point of victory” and the Moltke’s principle of “Auftragstaktik”, or mission type tactics by a decentralized command were implemented and culminated in the battlefield of World War II. Moreover, today, the US Army has adopted both concepts in its latest refined “AirLand Battle” doctrine recognizing their importance in the operational art of modern warfare.

Deceased philosopher Bertrand Russell once said, “War does not determine who is right- only who is left”. Those left are the soldiers of the 1-502nd, specifically Bravo Company 1st plt, and the Janabi family and to a greater extent, the ever-changing global world we all live in today. The tragic events that conspired in a small Iraqi village became a microcosm of how leadership failures at every level shaped the actions of a few soldiers who committed atrocious acts. One can also see how a high operational tempo, along with prolonged violence and death, has on a person’s psyche. It is the ugly side of war that the average American citizen may not want to hear or talk about. For a soldier, it is inevitably what they train their

War is a dangerous game, many people would likely agree to this, however, very few have ever seen a battlefront. The truth is that war, no matter how awful we can imagine it, is always exponentially worse. In Timothy Findley’s The Wars, Robert Ross, the protagonist,­ faces a situation that he finds difficult to come to terms with, and when faced with a similar situation later on in the novel, he must take drastic measures to reconcile the uncertainties of the past situation. Timothy Findley suggests, through the life of Robert Ross, that one’s need to reconcile the uncertainties of past experiences dominate our actions when such situations come up again in our lives. In the words of Hiram Johnson, a US Senator during the First World War,

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

War is a human endeavor. Humanity continually pursues solutions to counter evolving threats with the end of preserving power while also enabling peace. Civilizations resort to war to maintain their perception of this equilibrium. Defined threats and adversaries have changed throughout history, however, the essence of human nature and the base concept of conflict itself have not. Carl von Clausewitz’s theories on warfare capture the relationship between humanity and its application of war, remaining relevant in today’s era through their pensive explanations of timeless philosophical principles regarding the concept of war. These theories regarding war in politics, the key factors affecting war, and the extent that war is applied are inherently interconnected, providing insight on the relationships between humanity and its application of war.

Nature of war which usually remains unchanged irrespective of changes in environment or war. Four elements of nature of war are; ‘greater political nature’, ‘human dimension’, ‘uncertainty’, and final one is ‘contest of wills.’ The trinity of war, Clausewitz 's famous theory, comprises three basic elements of warfare are ‘people; the second commander and his army; and the third the government, ' essential basis for successful military operations. He describes these three tendencies are must be balanced to

On War is not just a manuscript on of how to understand war; it also provides insight into what Clausewitz thought about the dynamics of human thinking. Similar to what Claxton outlined in Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind, Clausewitz believed that, “knowledge must be absorbed into the mind that it almost ceases to exist in a separate, objective way.” (Clausewitz, p147). In other words, Clausewitz believed knowledge

Carl Von Clausewitz is one of the most well known, as well as important, war theorists in our history. Although he has been dead for almost two decades, he still plays a major role in shaping military thinkers around the world. The reason his theory is somehow still relevant is because of its flexibility. He did not prepare for nuclear warfare or cyber warfare, but you can apply his theory to the 21st century. Clausewitz believed in two levels of war and that war was continuous. Clausewitz believed that when one goes to war, they should have an achievable political objective; "war is the continuation of politics by other means” (Clausewitz, 1832).

Combat compliance is framed as an analytic puzzle related to the variability of behavior, or responses of combatants, both individuals and as a collective, to the realities and risks of warfare. The underlying assumption here is that there is an intrinsic risk of death in any scenario of combat (Magagna, 2016). The enemy is always rationally assumed to have an interest in your death. What follows is that obeying of commands presents itself as an implicit acceptance of such risks. The puzzle here is figuring out how and why vastly differing reactions occur. At some points soldiers show limited levels of compliance, sometimes even ending up in mutiny, while in other cases units show extremely high levels of compliance, exhibiting tenacity under conditions of overwhelming odds (Magagna, 2016). This essay attempts to explain the factors that give rise to the variability of combat compliance. What is important, as alluded to earlier, is to be able to provide a generalizable argument that is applicable across time and space. The essay will first lay out of varying levels of combat compliance to discuss the characteristics and consequences of variability. Secondly, it will explore and contrast the factors of automaticity as a function of training and institutional design and the factor of the combat contract as a rational cost benefit analysis of material and moral incentives, in an attempt to critically analyze their merits in accounting for the variability of combat compliance.

Throughout history, every military conflict has involved psychological warfare in one way or another as the enemy sought to break the morale of their opponent. But thanks to advances in technology, the popularity of the Internet, and proliferation of news coverage, the rules of engagement in this type of mental battle have changed.