Case Analysis : Fluor Corp V. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. Essay

In the case against Sage Rent-A-Car the defendant filed a surety bond with the superintendent of insurance when it incorporated. Therefore, the court should dismiss the suit against Sage Rent-A-Car for failing to state a claim under rule NMRA 1-012B(6). Also under section 66-5-207(E) (1988) of the New Mexico Financial Responsibility Act states, “a motor vehicle approved as a self-insured by the superintendent of insurance is exempt from the act. Therefore, the defendant is not liable for any damages due to filing a surety bond with the New Mexico superintendent and for being self-insured. Lastly, under New Mexico case law Las Lumarias of the N.M Council v. Isengard, 92 N.M 297, 300-301 (Ct. App. 1978) the court held a motion to dismiss due to the plaintiff not being able to recover or be entitled to relief under any state of facts provided under the claim. As one can see under the statutes provided and case law the defendant Sage Rent-A-Car is not liable for damages per the New Mexico Financial Responsibility Act not constituting negligence due to Sage’s actions when

Jeffery Calkin, the defendant, leased a vehicle for our client, Sage Rent-A-Car Inc., and was involved in a car accident with the plaintiff, Jane White. A negligence suit was filed by Ms. White against Mr. Calkin and our client, Sage Rent-A-Car Inc. The suit claims that our client is required to carry insurance and therefore has a duty to assume responsibility for this accident under the provisions of the Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act (MFRA).

One of the principal grounds for rejecting insurance claims is that the claim is not covered by the terms of the policy, or is specifically excluded. The rule that coverage provisions should be interpreted broadly and exclusion clauses should be interpreted narrowly is really just a corollary of the Contra Proferentem rule which applies in the event of ambiguity i.e. it is the insurer who likely drafted the insurance contract and construing coverage provisions broadly, or exclusion clauses narrowly, will be to the detriment of the insurer as the party who drafted the contract. The construction of exclusion clauses and coverage provisions helps justify the objective intention of the contract. This is the intention which the court considers, a reasonable person in the position of the contracting parties, would have had. It is submitted that coverage provisions should be broad and encompassing and exclusion clauses should be narrow. However, before such a conclusion is reached, this paper will aim to justify the reasoning behind such a claim analysing arguments for and against such a proposition, drawing upon the landmark case Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd to help relate the discussion to issues raised by such considerations.

Plaintiffs contend the forum selection clause limits them to Virginia state court, where a class action remedy would be unavailable to them; this, they contend, violates California public policy favoring consumer class actions and renders the forum selection clause unenforceable.” (Doe 1 v AOL LLC, 2009) The district court granted AOL’s motion and dismissed the action.

Brohawn, supra, 276 Md. at 399. Subsequently, the other party to the altercation filed an action against Brohawn seeking damages for intentional torts and negligence. Id. at 399-400. Transamerica, Brohawn’s insurer, refused to defend Brohawn on the grounds that her coverage contained a policy exclusion whereby Transamerica was not responsible for intentional conduct. Id. at 400. Thereafter, Transamerica initiated a declaratory judgment action, in the same court, seeking to have the court declare that Brohawn’s conduct was intentional, and, therefore, fell within the policy exclusion. Id. at 401. The circuit court dismissed the declaratory judgment action because “the question of coverage would be ‘determined by the jury’s verdict in the tort suits]. . . .” Id. at

In Maryland, insurance policies are generally construed in the same manner as contracts. Collier v. MD-Individual Practice Ass 'n, Inc., 327 Md. 1, 5, 607 A.2d 537 (1992). An insurance contract, like any other contract, is measured by its terms unless a statute, a regulation, or public policy is violated thereby. Pac. Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 302 Md. 383, 388, 488 A.2d 486 (1985). We do not follow the rule, adopted in other jurisdictions, that an insurance policy is to be construed most strongly against the insurer. Collier, 327 Md. at 5; Cheney, 315 Md. at 766. We construe the instrument as a whole in order to determine the parties’ intent. Pac. Indem., 302 Md. at 388; Collier, 327 Md. at 5; Aragona v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 281 Md. 371, 375, 378 A.2d 1346 (1977). In order to determine the intention of the parties, “Maryland courts should examine the character of the contract, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the parties at the time of execution.” Pac. Indem., 302 Md. at 388 (citations omitted). In doing so, we give the words their usual, ordinary, and accepted meanings. Id.; Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ackerman, 162 Md. App. 1, 5, 872 A.2d 110 (2005) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scherr, 101 Md. App. 690, 695, 647 A.2d 1297 (1994)). The test is what meaning a reasonably prudent layperson would attach to the term. Pac. Indem., 302 Md. at 388.

David A. Goldmeier and Terry C. Goldmeier v. Allstate Insurance Company 337 F.3d 629 (6th Cir 2003) case supports our

The main issue of this case is to determine if Tricontinental may recover from PwC for negligence. In order to show negligence there must be four requirements that the plaintiff must show. The four requirements are: the defendant owed a duty of care, defendant breached that duty, breach of duty to care caused the plaintiff’s injury, and fourth that damages resulted.

State Farm has asked whether it has a duty to defend the insured pursuant to the insured’s homeowners policy. It is our opinion that State Farm has no duty to defend the insured under the insured’s homeowners policy. The insured’s homeowners policy entitled the insured to a defense for “a suit brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies, caused by an occurrence.” In this case, these elements initially triggering the insured’s homeowners policy are likely satisfied. Nevertheless, the SECTON II – Exclusions section provides that the liability coverage does not apply to any of the fifteen exclusions specifically enumerated therein.

Coverage: Appears to be proper. Insured has no PUP. Only an active Homeowners and Auto. Loss occurred on named insured property and the named insured is the responsible party. The lawn mower is under the 40hp exclusion, mower is 14hp.

This case involves a dispute over whether the laws of North Montana, South Montana, or Old York should be applied. Old York and North Montana have laws that prevent insurance companies from putting provisions in their insurance contracts that prohibit the stacking of multiple insurance claims for a single incident. In contrast, South Montana specifically allows such provisions. This Court ultimately concludes that Old York’s law should apply in this case because this dispute is one over a contract and the place of contracting is Old York. Defendants argue that the public policy exception should apply, but this Court rejects this argument because the Old York law is not fundamentally against the public policy of this state.

Insurances The contract allows either the contractor or the owner to insure. Provision is also made for one party to take out and maintain the insurance where the nominated party fails to do so or fails to provide acceptable evidence that the insurance in is place

"[a]n insurance company has a duty to act in good faith in settling claims and a breach of that duty will give rise to a cause of action by the insured." Pasipanki v. Morton, 61 Ohio App. 3d 184, 185, 572 N.E.2d 234 (1990) (quoting Bean v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 9th Dist. No. 13543, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4275, 1988 WL 114464 at *1 (Oct. 26, 1988)). Gekko did not act in good faith to settle Vic’s claim against Donna, and their failure to do so enables Donna has a cause of action against Gekko.

Note that a duty of care may not be owed to a particular claimant, if the claimant was unforeseeable. See:

The scenario is a horrendous string of coincidences that resulted in a tragedy. However, every party carries some responsibility for the eventual double amputation. This paper examines each of the parties, their possible liability and how that is covered by negligence law.