Case Analysis : Low Carbon Processors, Llc V. Kennametal, Inc.

Case Study: Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes, AIR 2003 SC 2629

Defendants, Gerry Goldman and Mary Goldman, by their attorneys, ADLER, MURPHY, & MCQUILLEN LLP, and respectfully submit this Reply in Support of their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint in its entirety, or in the Alternative, Dismiss Counts I, II, VI and VII of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.

Because this is an appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Poe, the non-moving party. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 261 F.3d 318, 324 (2d Cir.2001).

The district court’s decision to enter judgment in Plaintiff’s favor in accordance with CCG’s offer of complete relief was well-reasoned, consistent with existing Second Circuit and Supreme Court law, and consistent with this Court’s subsequent decisions in Tanasi and Bank v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 606 Fed. Appx. 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2015). Accordingly, the district court correctly held that upon entry of judgment in his favor, Plaintiff’s individual claim was moot.

The Respondent, Prime Hospitality Corp., filed a motion for summary judgement in Circuit Court, Dade County, Florida. Eugene David, petitioned for writ of certiorari in the third District Court of Appeal of Florida.

Summary Judgment: Because the issue was discrete, related to the ownership of the domain name, the court ruled a summary judgment.

In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgement, a party must demonstrate that there are no issues of substantial fact remaining to be contested.

Defendants, Gerry Goldman and Mary Goldman, by their attorneys, ADLER, MURPHY, & MCQUILLEN LLP, and respectfully moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint pursuant to section 2-603 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-603(a) (West 2014)), or in the alternative, dismiss Counts, II, V, VI, VII and VIII of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2014)).

Plaintiff’s allegations, even if taken as true for purposes of this Motion only, cannot meet the legal standards to support a declaratory judgment action or any other cause of action against St. David’s, and therefore the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s action as against St. David’s with prejudice.

No specification is given as to on what basis it was averred by the Pursuer that the Defender breached the Confidentiality clause of the Service Agreement. Further, the Pursuer fails to give a reasonable explanation for dismissing the Defender without having followed the proper process for dismissal. Moreover, the restrictive

Because his admissions preclude him from creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the company's reasons are false or not credible and that the real reason (or a motivating factor) for the transfer denial was unlawful race discrimination, summary judgment is appropriate.

The party asking for the judgment has the burden of pricing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. IN determining whether to grant summary judgment, the trial court must view the recored in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In sum, only when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ, may a trial court properly enter summary judgment.

The defendant moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the prosecution had not established the facts. The judge agreed and dismissed the case.

The plaintiff started legal proceedings on 17 October 2008 but this action did not proceed on 14 September 2009 due to the plaintiff’s failure to abide with an unless order to furnish S$19,000 as security for the defendant’s costs. In the end the present action was started on 12 May 2010.

This current lawsuit has been brought by the Masons regarding the old vehicle, the van that was sold by the dealership to a third party. In response, the dealership has made claims against the Masons for the use of the new vehicle. However, there was no sale of the new vehicle to the Masons. Thus, the arbitration agreement does not cover the present dispute, and the Masons are not required to resolve their dispute using binding arbiration.