Specifically, the court relied on Gorte v Dept of Transp, 202 Mich App 161, 164; 507 NW2d 797, 799 (1993). In Gorte, the plaintiff filed a complaint for adverse possession against the state on March 3, 1988 claiming that he held title to land via adverse possession from the state. Id. at 164. MCL 600.5821 was amended to preclude adverse possession claims against the state and became effective on March 1, 1988, prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Id. The trial court held that since 1966, plaintiff and his predecessors had adversely possessed the disputed acreage and that the amendment to MCL 600.5821 did not bar plaintiff’s adverse possession claim because he had a vested property right before March 1, 1988. Id. In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals
The key point of contention in this scenario is the quitclaim deed with which Julio Gazpacho attempted to convey ownership of the easement to his neighbors, Ruben and Regina Gomez, because contrary to popular public belief, quitclaim deeds have at best a tenuous legal status within the state of Texas. In this case, rather than utilize a proper warranty deed to legally transfer title of ownership to the easement, Mr. Gazpacho elected to use a quitclaim deed that Texan legal precedent has universally deemed to be invalid. According to the landmark decision made in Diversified, Inc. v. Hall, "a quitclaim deed conveys any title, interest, or claim of the grantor in the real property, but it does not profess that the title is valid nor does it contain any warranty or covenants of title. Thus, a quitclaim deed does not establish title in the person holding the deed, but merely passes whatever interest the grantor has in the property"Â Diversified, Inc. v. Hall, 23 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). The fact that the only claim to title on the easement held by Ruben and Regina Gomez is made through the fundamentally flawed legal device of the quitclaim deed is crucial to properly deciding this case.
What this entails is that the actual sole physical occupation of the land with the intent to keep it solely for the person occupying the property must be establish. Lisa demonstrated this by construction a fence between her house and Danny’s. In fact, by doing this, she establish sole possession of the property in question. Once more, by fencing in the property, and the fact that Danny knew what she was doing because he lived next door and did not contest, showed Lisa was being open, visible, and notorious with her actions. She also was continuous and peaceable with her actions because during the fifteen years of usage, there were no issues with Danny, and he never complained that her actions were wrong. Only after fifteen years and a survey, did the ownership questions come up. Lastly, Lisa believed that the property was hers and never asked or obtained permission before erecting the fence. Since all the elements coexist, Lisa has a legal right to claim adverse possession to the property. Furthermore, the state has a statutory period for adverse possession of ten years. What this means is that Lisa must have occupied the property for the full statutory period, and this action must have coexisted with the other elements of adverse possession before the statute of limitations runs out. It was not until fifteen years later, and only after the survey, Lisa found out
Real Property Robert Briggs and his wife purchased a home located at 167 Lower Orchard Drive, Levittown, Pennsylvania. They made a down payment and borrowed the balance on a 30-year mortgage. Six years later, when Mr. and Mrs. Briggs were behind on their mortgage payments, they entered into an oral contract to sell the house to Winfield and Emma Sackett if the Sacketts would pay the three months’ arrearages on the loan and agree to make the future payments on the mortgage. Mrs. Briggs and Mrs. Sackett were sisters. The Sacketts paid the arrearages, moved into the house, and continued to live there. Fifteen years later, Robert Briggs filed an action to void the oral contract as in violation of the Statute of
The agreement did not include any personal property, but it did cover: " All buildings, plumbing, heating, lighting fixtures, storm sash, shades, blinds, awnings, shrubbery, and plants". The purchasers took possession on June 14, 1946, and discovered that certain articles which had been on the premises at the
In this case, Mr. Brandt had filed a lawsuit against the Federal Government for "the right-of-way crossing" his land had extinguished after the cessation of the railroad activity in the corridor. The Government had argued that this right was created by the Federal General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 and should be valid on the gounds that the railroad line was affirmed to be abandoned. While reviewing this case, it must be determined whether or not that the Government, under this Act, had retained an interest in the abandoned railroad right-of-way.
The front page of the 2005 edition of the Contract for the Sale of Land (Standard Contract) deals with whether or not vacant possession will be provided on settlement. The Contract is either marked “vacant possession” or “subject to existing tenancy”. If no box is marked, then vacant possession is the default choice. Clause 17.1 of the Standard Contract provides that normally, the vendor must give the purchaser vacant possession of the property on completion.
According to Ohio law, the person wanting to obtain title from adverse possession must have possessed the property for 21 years without the permission of the owner, but in clear knowledge of the owner ("Ohio Adverse Possession Laws"). There are four requirements listed to obtain a quiet title starting with using the land without permission of the owner. Then they must treat the land as their own, use the land in an obvious way and for a continuous period of time without sharing with others ("Ohio Adverse Possession Laws"). Matt Daman easily completes all four of these requirements. He never asked Brad for permission to clear the land and build a barn on Brad’s land, but did. Brad repeatedly visited and inspected the property in 1986, 1996, and 2002, seeing the barn but never saying anything to Matt. Matt appears to have also used the land for a continuous period totaling 21 years before requesting title to the one acre of land. Brad may have a defense if he had talked to Matt at any time about the property and can prove it, but it will be a hard case to win for him. Matt will win this case for a quiet title to the one acre of land with his barn on it because of the time that had passed with no objection or other claims of possession by Brad.
The main legal issue to examine regarding this case deals with encroachment, which is simply defined as: A possessory right to the property of another that may be acquired by the passage of time. Crockett has well documented existence of the woodlot property dating back over 20 years and was not met with objection on the part of the Smith, who is the true owner. Due to the fact that the plantiff left the defendant undisturbed for over 20 years, he lost his right to dispute to object the encroachment. Smith would have had to make his objections known regarding Crockett’s occupancy in the log cabin, constructed on his wood lot, many years earlier if he wanted to maintain his right to object.
1) Opie cannot claim possession because North Carolina statutes state that in a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, the land is automatically transferred to the other or in this case, the last living joint tenant. This supersedes any conveyance made in the will. Additionally, Opie did not occupy the land. Ernest did. In order for there to be a claim for adverse possession, there must be an adherence to the conditions in the adverse possession doctrine.
Danny Davidson sold a single family home to Paul and Priscilla Peterson. A long-term relationship between Danny and Paul is the basis for not including a written agreement. The simple contract was made orally and only included the legal object and the amount to be paid. Danny did not disclose a dispute with his neighbor over boundary lines or include information about a soil subsidence in the front yard he claims not to have known about.
The Land Registration Act (LRA) 1925 has drawn much flak over the years with regards to one of its most important provisions on overriding interests (OI), which often goes unnoticed until it swoops up and takes priority over the rights of a future purchaser. These interests often come in the form of other occupiers in the property with an equitable interest and, like in the case of Boland , this leaves the lender in a tight spot when they find out about the existence of these interests only after they have initiate proceedings for possession against the defaulting borrowers. Due to the other occupier’s concealed nature on the property register, the lenders have regained their footing by applying the concept of overreaching and ….. The Law Commission, on the other hand, contemplated abolishing these interest altogether but did not go to that extent because it was neither feasible nor desirable Instead, they shrank their impact on land by reforming the operation and scope of the OI. With LRA 2002 sch 3 para 2, lenders now have more control over what may bite them. …. This essay will access…. with a focus on how the lending world have dealt with the implications of Boland…. The best way to access the impact of … would be to go through the pre – post blabla to show how the thing has balanced.