Sime Darby Case Summary

There is the possibility that Timken can lose its BBB investment-grade rating. This is due to Timken taking on the $800 million in debt it needs to purchase Torrington. The change in the company’s debt composition will change ratios such as debt-to-capital which is used to determine the investment-grade rating. Compared to other industrial firms, Timken shows relatively high sales numbers ($279.4 million) as well EBITDA figures ($275.7 million). According to table 3 (p. 4), only three ratios will change as taking on the $800 million in debt. The first one is EBIT Interest Coverage Ratio, which drops from 2.63 to 0.90 and investment-rating scale falls from BBB to B. The second ratio is EBITDA Interest Coverage Ratio, which drops from 4.3 to 3.14 and investment-rating scale falls from BBB to B. The third one is Total Debt/Capital Ratio, which increases from 43 percent to 67 percent and drives the rating from BB to B. In conclusion, the $800 million debt has a negative impact on Timken, since it lowers company’s investment-rating scale.

Be Our Guest’s balance sheet shows good signs of liquidity. Current Ratios for the past four years have remained above 1 proving that the company can handle its current liabilities. The current ratios are not extremely high (19941.27, 1995- 2.17, 1996- 1.15 and 1997- 1.16), but they can cover the current liabilities. It is important to note that the company is operating on a thin line because the current assets are barely covering the current liabilities. This is particularly unpleasant because we are dealing with a company operating in a seasonal business. It is a concern that the current ratio slightly eroded after 1995, and this is primarily due to Be Our Guest converting the bank line into long term debt in

This report will analyse and outline the company’s profitability, liquidity, solvency and investment potentials based on 15 ratios. All information is taken from the Next plc 2011 statement.

Based on the above income statement data (assume interest income is zero), the company's interest coverage ratio is

CML's equity ratio increased to 0.4 and correspondingly debt ratio decreased to 0.15 from 2001 to 2005. Generally it is a good trend, even though there has been a decrease in equity ratio in 2005 from 0.45 to 0.40 and an increase in debt ratio from 2004 to 2005, it may be due to the acquisition from US group KKR. However, in 2005, equity is almost three times debt, which means the capital structure is still in good condition.

The findings of this report has found that the current performance of Chester, Inc. is not positive. Chester, Inc.’s liquidity ratios are steadily eroding over the three-year period. Profitability ratios are showing a trend that is slightly above industry averages, while being below their main competition each year. Solvency ratio analysis has showed the firm having sufficient leverage, but cash flow issues make us believe that acquiring more debt will not be beneficial to the company. A detailed explanation of the individual ratios used to draw these conclusions appear in the ratio analysis section of this report. Ultimately it is up to management to take action to remediate

Increase in current liabilities Substantial increase in current liabilities weakened the company’s liquidity position. Its current liabilities were US$2,063.94 million at the end of FY2010, a 48.09% increase compared to the previous year. However, its current assets recorded a marginal increase of 25.07% - from US$1,770.02 million at the end of FY2009 to US$2,213.72 million at the end of FY2010. Following this, the company’s current ratio declined from 1.27 at the end of the FY2009 to 1.07 at the end of FY2010. A lower current ratio indicates that the company is in a weak financial position, and it may find it difficult to meet its day-to-day obligations.

Overall regards to liquidity ratios, the higher the number the better; however, a too high also indicates that the firms were not using their resources to their full potential. Current ratio of 1.0 or greater shows that a company can pay its current liabilities with its current assets. JWN’s ratio increased from 2.06 in 2007 to 2.57 in 2010, and slightly decreased to 2.16 in 2011. JWN’s cash ratio increased significantly from 22% in 2007 to 80% in 2010. JWN has a cash ratio of 73% in 2011, which is useful to creditors when deciding how much debt they would be willing to extend to JWN. In addition, JWN also has moderate CFO ratio of 46%, indicating the companies’ ability to pay off their short term liabilities with their operating cash

The company lost money almost every year since its leveraged buyout by Coniston Partners in 1989. The income generated was not sufficient to service the interest expenses of the company which stood at $2.62B in 1996. From Exhibit 1, we can say that interest coverage ratio computed as EBIT / Interest Expense was 1.31 in 1989 and has been decreasing over years and currently stands at 0.59. This raises a question of how the company can meet its interest payments without raising cash or selling assets.

The company’s debt ratios are 54.5% in 1988, 58.69% in 1989, 62.7% in 1990, and 67.37% in 1991. What this means is that the company is increasing its financial risk by taking on more leverage. The company has been taking an extensive amount of purchasing over the past couple of years, which could be the reason as to why net income has not grown much beyond several thousands of dollars. One could argue that the company is trying to expand its inventory to help accumulate future sales. But another problem is that the company’s

Also, according to its leverage ratios, the company’s debts are not only very high, but are also increasing. Its decreasing TIE ratio indicates that its capability to pay interests is decreasing. The company’s efficiency ratios indicate that despite the fact that its fixed assets are increasingly being utilized to generate sales during the years 1990-1991 as indicated by its increasing fixed asset turnover ratio, the decreasing total assets turnover indicate that overall the company’s total assets are not efficiently being put to use. Thus, as a whole its asset management is becoming less efficient. Last but not the least, based on its profitability ratios, the company’s ability to make profit is decreasing.

We assume linear increase in the EBIT and EBITDA at 3% for 1999 from 1998 figures. Considering the debt will be long-term, we test both 10- and 20-year corporate yields as interest rates to see what would be the coverage ratios, using the 1999 projected figures.

Leverage and liquidity ratios in respect to the O.M Scott & Sons Company vary widely. The overall liquidity of the company does not indicate that lack of cash will impede their operational ability. Although the current ratio increases to a high of 4.2999 in 1960, their ability to meet short-term obligations should not be affected. However, it may indicate that there is too much inventory or cash could be better spent in other areas of the business. The financial leverage ratio increases from a low of .5335 in 1957, to a high of 1.3928 in 1961. This change shows that the company is becoming more dependent on using debt to finance its assets.

Although not quite as conservative as other UK firms (with Equity/Assets ratios of 42%), it was successful in achieving these goals and retaining a credit rating of A+ (a rough average of Guinness’ AA and Grand Met’s A ratings) by re-levering the firm via

The long-term liquidity risk ratio such as LT debt/Equity, D/E, and Total Liabilities to Total Assets all show a decline from year 2005 due to the repayment of debts. The interest coverage ratio also shows a healthy number of 29.45 in comparison to the industrial average of 15.04 indicating a high ability to pay out its interest expense. Such a low relative risk is not surprising due to the nature of its business depending heavily in R&D development and large intangible assets.