Case Study of Challenge Disaster- from a Risk Management Perspective

The challenger disaster called for certain changes in the NASA organizational structure, culture and operations. The Rogers Commission carried out a full investigation into the causes of the disaster and recommended to NASA certain actions to mitigate future incidents. First of all, there was a creation of a Solid Rocket Motor Joint redesign team who would also analyse the sealing system (NATA Technical Reports Centre, 2010).

These consequences can lead to monumental fiascoes. One such fiasco took place in the mining town of Pitcher, Oklahoma in 1950. A mining engineer warned the miners that their town could cave in at any moment from excessive excavating. He suggested immediate evacuation of the town. The leading citizens of the town held a meeting and mocked the engineers’ warning. A few days later, the disaster hit, taking the lives of those who refused to leave. They followed the poor decision made by the leading citizens of the town. All seven symptoms were present in the 1950 mining disaster. A second example of groupthink would be the events surrounding the space shuttle Challenger, the product of flawed decisions. The evidence was inadvisable to launch the space shuttle at the earliest opportunity. NASA’s perspective was that is was undesirable to delay the launch because of the impact it would have on political and public support for the program. Authorities dismissed potentially lethal hazards as only acceptable risks because of NASA’s engineer’s pressure to launch. The decision to launch the shuttle amounted to a much greater loss than the loss of political and public support. A third example of groupthink involves the group around Admiral HE Kimmel, which failed to prepare for the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor despite repeated warnings. Informed by his intelligence chief that radio contact with Japanese aircraft carriers

The memo written by Roger Boisjoly of Morton Thiokol, Inc. regarding the Challenger explosion had a very direct approach with a condescending tone. The author does an excellent job at grabbing the reader’s attention. The subject line states “SRM O-Ring Erosion/Potential Failure Criticality”. With a subject line written in that manner, it stresses the urgency of the memo. In the first paragraph, of the memo the author states that the memo is written to address the seriousness of the current O-ring erosion problem. Again, this is stressing the urgency of the memo and states his purpose for publishing the memo. In the body of the memo, Mr. Boisjoly takes on a more condescending, non-professional tone. He makes two statements that could be taken as if he was questioning authority. First, “The mistakenly accepted position on the joint problem was to fly without fear and failure and to run a series of design evaluations which would ultimately lead to a solution or at least a significant reduction of the erosion problem”. This statement seems as if he does not respect the authority of the company leaders, and the decision they

Ronald Dittemore, manager of Shuttle Program, received reports directly from Wayne Hale (manager of Launch Integration) and Linda Ham (manager of Space Shuttle Program Integration). It is clear that decision about foam issue was made based on communication with Linda Ham, stating that in previous flights had no critical problems with foam. Dittemore did not attempt to receive a professional opinion from the engineers. Furthermore, Rocha sent an e-mail to Dittemore in order to determine whether Columbia’s crew could make a space walk to perform an inspection of the wing. Answer to this e-mail was never received suggesting that communication attempts directly from engineers to high-level managers were rejected. NASA is a complex organization that maintains strict reporting relationship. Information exchange is built on hierarchy and rules did not facilitate fast informal communication between employees and high-level management. This filtering process diminished the information flow to the key decision-makers. To solve this hierarchical structure managers like Dittemore should exaggerate their ambiguous threats, avoid status differences and build trust among employees. Managers ought to communicate with specialists in order to obtain reliable information and understand the situation.

The article includes background information on the event as well as many quotes from people who followed the Challenger mission and remember the tragedy. Many of the quotes express the viewer’s shock at the disaster while others convey a sense of loss. The article also touches on the complacency of NASA leading up to the disaster and refers to a quote which states that “one of the biggest outcomes from the tragedy was the recommendation that NASA needed a stronger safety organization.”

Risk; something we do everyday turning onto a street from a blind corner, jaywalking to get somewhere faster, peeking at our phones while driving and signing up for something new. The everyday risks we take can seem meaningless and uneventful, but for others it can mean their lives; for them everything must be in check otherwise it could result in death. Astronauts are trained for months about how to deal with the risks they will be faced with during their missions, along with proper solutions. These solutions are taught to them by the great minds of scientists; whose duty is to also make sure there is the least amount of risk possible for the mission. The scientists communicate to the head of the programs whether they believe the mission is possible or not, if it should be delayed or pushed up. Unfortunately, the communication between the scientists, and high up workers are ignored or misread. This was the case for the Challenger, a mission that lasted 73 seconds before it exploded, because the weather was too cold for the metal on the O-rings around the rocket. 17 Years later a similar miscommunication cause the loss of the Columbia shuttle because it failed to show the seriousness of the loss of foam from the outside of the shuttle.

President Regan ordered an immediate postponement of the Space Shuttle Program. The U.S. Congress then authorized an investigation of the Challenger disaster. It was a cold morning when Challenger was supposed to fly into space. Several NASA officials urged that the launch be postponed for warmer weather conditions. Since the NASA Launch Decision Team had okayed several space shuttles launches at and below that present temperature and had gotten away with it, the order was ignored (Howell). Seventy-three seconds later NASA realized that their luck had finally run out. President Ronald Regan tasked the Disaster Authority Commission with the investigation of the destructive incident. They concluded that there was two causes leading to the Challenger

Ronald Reagan’s speech “Explosions of the Space Shuttle Challenger” was addressed to the Nation about the first tragedy during a flight to space. President Reagan’s response to the tragedy of the Challenger explosion included an argument about the space program. Reagan’s claim, or position, about the space program was credible and supported by logical reasoning and evidence. Reagan argued that the Challenger Seven knew what they were getting into: “But they, the Challenger Seven, were aware of the dangers” (Line 10-11). Before the shuttle crew ascended into space, they were most likely mindful of the risk they were taking. Reagan also claimed that the space does not “keep secrets and cover things up” (Line 36), instead, they “do it all upfront

Risks management is an important step during the process of a project. Failing to manage a risk may result in unforeseen event happening and a project’s failure. For example, with limited budget, an unforeseen event or an accident occurs in the middle of a project and this matter has not been considered and needs a big sum of expense, then the project may be stopped because of this unexpected event. We should know it is necessary to understand how to identify risks and assumptions based on the information. After identifying risks, it is important for project managers to set contingency plans to prevent and deal with these risks when they occur. Of course, several problems may happen during considering

Risk or threat is common and found in various fields of daily life and business. This concept of risk is found in various stages of development and execution of a project. Risks in a project can mean there is a chance that the project will result in total failure, increase of project costs, and an extension in project duration which means a great deal of setbacks for the company. The process of risk management is composed of identifying, assessing, mitigating, and managing the risks of the project. It

During the year of 1986, on January the twenty sixth, a horrific shock was felt around the country. After Neil Armstrong’s landing on the moon, Americans felt a great sense of national pride and invincibility but many Americans learned on that fateful day that nobody is invincible; one of the worst catastrophes of the United States space program occurred on that day. About forty five seconds after liftoff, Americans witnessed the destruction of the breathtaking challenger space shuttle. Even though the disaster caused nationwide sadness, the reasons for its failure are clear. Named after the British ship that sailed across the Atlantic hundreds of years, could carry more than two thousand pounds the challenger was truly a glorious achievement.

On the cold morning of January 28th, 1986, The Space Shuttle Challenger was launched. Seventy-three seconds into the flight, the space shuttle broke apart, causing the seven deaths of its crew members. Roger Boisjoly, a mechanical engineer for Thiokol brought to NASA’s attention about a failing O-ring safety concern in the shuttles rocket booster. After being ignored by NASA Boisjoly tried to bring the issue of the O-ring to people higher up in his company, all of the people ignored Boisjoly in his attempts to get the issue resolved. Thirteen hours before the launch of the shuttle, Boisjoly strongly urged not to launch the shuttle, all attempts failed. After the disaster took place Boisjoly told the press exactly why the shuttle failed to

Ultimately the fault lies with every person who was a part of the project, except Roger Boisjoly, 3 of his colleagues, and the manager who refused to sign the ok to launch. According to a broadcast by NPR in 1986, Boisjoly’s and his colleague's concerns were escalated to top management. They explained their worries and gave their evidence to the Vice President of Morton Thiokol, Robert Lund. This was then escalated to another meeting with more engineers and managers, which resulted in the conclusion that launching could be catastrophic

One of the greatest tragedies in history occurred on January 8, 1986. Shortly after it was launched, the space shuttle Challenger exploded, killing seven astronauts, including Christa McAuliffe, a New Hampshire schoolteacher chosen to be the first teacher in space (“Challenger Disaster, n.d.). The explosion was caused by a failure of the O-rings of the solid rocket boosters. The O-rings were unable to seat properly, causing the leaking of hot combustion gases, which burnt through the external fuel tank. The malfunction was not any one person’s or organization’s fault; it was caused by many factors including the decision to launch despite the cold weather, the poor communication between management levels of the National Aeronautics and

One well accepted description of risk management is the following: risk management is a systematic approach to setting the best course of action under uncertainty by identifying, assessing, understanding, acting on and communicating risk issues. In order to apply risk management effectively, it is vital that a risk management culture be developed. The risk management culture supports the overall vision, mission and objectives of an organization. Limits and boundaries are established and communicated concerning what are acceptable risk practices and outcomes. Since risk management is directed at uncertainty related to future events and outcomes, it is