Chief Intelligence Training Report

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

3. Fulfill a prerequisite for selection as a Defense Intelligence Senior Leader and eventual preparation for

Develop and integrated a comprehensive 40-hour Integrated MTC Tool Suite training program that provided training to MTC and unit staffs to efficiently plan, design and executes exercises through the primary use of G27 Tool Suite; Exercise Support Application (ESA), Exercise Design Tool (EDT), Virtual OPFOR Academy (VOA), and Information Operation Network (ION). Validated the MTC Integrated Tool Suite training program and team certification to ensure a standardization of training and DATE compliancy. Provided briefings to the 84th Training Command and AVNCoE Commanding Generals, the United Kingdom ISR Bde Commander, NTC, JMRC senior leaders and individual staffs to continuously fostered enduring partnerships that resulted in a substantial growth in recognition and usage of G27’s web-enabled

In my previous article I gave tips for Senior Noncommissioned officers (NCO) coming to a Combined Training Center (CTC) prior to their units arrival. This article focuses on gaining success during Mid-Rotation (MIDRO) of a CTC exercise. The Senior NCO is key to an Aviation Task Force success. They are First Sergeants, Platoon Sergeants, Staff NCOICs, and Production Control NCOICs. Each has their own distinctive role, if ignored they can negatively affect the success of a CTC rotation or combat deployment. If senior NCOs are proactive, committed, and critical thinkers they can be the key to success. Senior NCOs need to be comprehensively involved in the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). They need to know the capabilities of the Aviation Task Force, including our Multinational partners. Most importantly they must understand the CTC scenario and the Aviation Task Force Commanders training

BCT modularity and increased deployments over the past 15 years has validated the need for mobility experts at every level of command. MWOs today typically start their career in Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The MWOs

Forward deployed to Kuwait to stand up the initial SOJTF-OIR mission. During deployment period, I became the Senior Syrian All Source Intelligence Analyst for the J2 and J3 Command Staff. I became the Subject Matter Expert on all things relating to the Syrian conflict and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). On a routine basis, I provided daily comprehensive intelligence assessments to the J2 Intelligence Director that exposed threats to friendly forces and enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP). Additionally, I created and briefed daily intelligence reports to the J3 and Command Staff that shaped operational planning for future operations. These briefs provided in-depth knowledge on critical intelligence gaps for the CDR to answer the Commanding General's Priority Intelligence Requirements

were dedicated to the response. Lead the S3 shop integration of SC HART training events into a mutually beneficial staff training event for staff USR validation. During this rating period 2-151st forward recovered back to home station, I provided rear coordination for the reception and recovery of all personnel and equipment from their assignment. I planned and coordinated all facets of the battalion’s participation in Patriot South Exercise a National Guard Bureau Joint Service Multi–Agency response to a DOMOPS exercise, a first of its kind conducted at Gulfport, MS. I spent countless hours in the logistical planning and development of events scenarios for a battalion sized Aviation Task Force. I worked with planners from other services for over a year out in the development and execution of the safe and successful employment of our Aviation resources from SC. As a result over 150 hours were flown in transit and execution of Patriot South Exercise I worked with B/2-238th GSAB in the implementation of the Pre-Mobilization training horse blanket for that unit allowing for a success mobilization arrival at Ft. Hood. Concurrently I coordinated for the A/111-th GSAB return back from their mobilization, resulting in over 60 personnel being REFRAD along with all

US military intelligence and the US army need a modern vision and a well-balanced relationship with policy or political orders

In response to an increase in overt and clandestine acts by terrorist groups, transnational ideological movements and other nations, governments around the world have moved more resources into gathering intelligence to protect its people and national interests. As a result, the contribution of Intelligence Analysts in matters of national security have increased considerably in recent years. To be effective an Intelligence Analyst is required to be adept at evaluating different types of intelligence data, liaising with other departments and organisations effectively and remaining objective in scrutinising collected information. Intelligence comes in many formats, and a good understanding of these various formats and the process by which they

Special Operations Forces (SOF) and interagency partners have become interdependent in today’s operational environment. Future Special Forces Warrant Officers (SFWO) need to a have clear understanding of authorities with the ability to articulate their activities. The article, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate,” highlights underlining tensions between the military and intelligence partners.

This week’s lesson was comprised with the various forms of intelligence, the revamping of the Intelligence Community (IC), and the associated challenges that the U.S. Government strives to combat. These recognized challenges include domestic and foreign threats, internal coordination amongst U.S. agencies, external coordination with outside government partners, and the methodology for improving the U.S. information-sharing environment (ISE). The events of 9/11 motivated the reorganization of the intelligence community in an attempt to prevent future terrorist threats. In order to the answer the question, one must reflect on the relationship between the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), IC, and the Interagency Threat Assessment and

The evolution of intelligence centers continues but has major thresholds to meet before they can become effective enough to meet the demands that commanders put on them. Additional investments into intelligence centers will be required. Intelligence center force generation and integration with the wider intelligence community must be improved. Processes within the FVEY community need to be codified so that there is consistency in the approach to analysis and synthesis. In order to exchange both explicit and tacit knowledge the underlying networks need to be improved. Perhaps most importantly, the integration of intelligence and operations needs to improve. Not only to fix the issues surrounding collection management but also to ensure

MAJ Sachnik deployed as the Executive Officer for the largest aviation task force in Afghanistan comprised of over 550 Soldiers, Sailors, contractors and civilians consisting of four companies and detachments and 38 manned and unmanned aircraft located at four geographic locations throughout the Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan (CJOA-A). Task Force Thor conducted over 5000 flight hours and over 600 sorties of aerial ISR a month that by several factors exceeded every Aerial Exploitation Battalion in the Army. These flight hours and sorties represent a combined equivalent of a Combat Aviation Brigade’s (CAB) operational tempo. The many missions for the task force included full spectrum aerial ISR support, distinguished visitor movements, and kinetic strike capability operating out of multiple geographic bases across Afghanistan required numerous complex administrative, personnel, and logistical requirements. Through most of MAJ Sachnik’s deployment, the battalion staff manning was minimal. As a result, he was one of only three other Officers on a small

On the contrary struggles still remain because not all of the systems and networks are fully integrated. A huge intelligence issue is the need for quality personnel. In other words, training and maintaining quality intelligence professionals has been a difficult issue identified by numerous government commissions. The biggest ordeal in this is the limited federal direction regarding training initiatives. There is limited availability on the great upheld standards of programs that teach critical thinking and analytic techniques. Also, national security programs have limited investment in new programs and in spite of this they still have to accomplish their objectives of the nation’s core needs under the constant threat of another terrorist attack.

Soldiers win the battle and intelligence wins the war. Understanding and utilizing all available intelligence assets is the key to victory. To inform commanders the threat of the enemy information is gathered vetted and analyzed. Every facet of the intelligence process needs to be scrutinized with oversight to determine shortfalls then revised for a more comprehensive method. The media or public sentiment must not be swayed intelligence process. Intelligence needs the be the raw facts derived from assumptions and gaps of known information. At the same time intelligence needs to stay vigilant to avoid complacency in the battlefield. The intelligence community needs to collaborate to share critical data as well improve