Civil Military Operations

2. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) counterbalances the Defense Departments tendency to focus on winning conventional conflicts rather than irregular wars by empowering those small nations to improve the security of their countries to prevent conflicts from happening. The NDS focuses on the different irregular warfare tactics that can be used by our enemies in the strategic environment. It gives us guidance on what we need to do to prevent the use of these irregular warfare tactics. It was not until the last decade that the U.S. military started fighting the irregular wars; our Special Forces units were the ones that were fighting the unconventional wars. The U.S. military has had a difficult time changing its focus on fighting conventional wars to fighting irregular wars. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military became very experienced in guerrilla warfare tactics. However, when that war ended the focus shifted back to fighting the conventional wars and that experience was lost. Now, because of the lack of experience, the U.S. military is having a difficult time fighting the unconventional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

One of the primary benefits of this program would be the information and resource sharing. Today’s military forces currently hold a level of operational experience not seen in decades. For over ten years our forces have been increasing their effectiveness in a multitude of security and reconstruction efforts. As the level of violence along the border increases the US Customs and Border Agents are face with a new kind of “enemy tactics” that can be perceived as middle ground between current border operations in Afghanistan and the historical security issues along the border. A melding of the military tactics used to train Afghani security force on the protection of their own border, historical US Customs and Border tactics and techniques along with effective rules of engagement can reduce violence and illegal cross border flows. An initial “cross training” between military tactics subject matter experts, military mission planning subject matter experts and operational Customs and Border Patrol agents can be much more efficient and effective than training a group of new agents.

The USAFRCOM campaign plan requires building medium term security partnership with Transitional Government of Somalia’s defense force, in order to sustain US security interest in the Horn of Africa. In a very practical sense, the Somalian defense force lacks human and material supplies to protect the whole land. The challenge has more complicated because of the lack of technical skills and protracted process of political transition. The Somalian Transitional Government defense force has specifically lacks the capacity to train, equip, and deploy force to defend the cost and main land. Consequently, US citizens are at risk and the

Special Forces Warrant Officers play a critical role when detachment’s work in Joint Interagency International (JIIM) Environment. If you look at the elements of national power, defined by DIMEFIL, you receive a view of the different players from the JIIM realm. As detachments continue to operate in realms that combine all elements of partial power, fusing our operations with interagency partners will be a key to overall mission success, not just the detachment’s but strategic success as defined by Geographic Combatant Commanders, theatre special operations commands and country teams. The ability to weave our operations into FBI, DEA, CIA and Department of State operations is paramount to overall mission success.

There is a compelling urgency to delicately scrutinize the depth of threats encroaching on our nation to better strengthen our tacticians and security. “A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting threat effects.” The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has stated “We will ensure that NATO is able to effectively address the specific challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design.”

A hybrid threat is, according to TC 7-100, ?the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.?[footnoteRef:1] This essay will address three of the four major characteristics of a hybrid threat. A hybrid threat comes in different forms, but they almost always employ some combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and criminal elements simultaneously, employ an ever-changing variety of equipment and tactics, and acquire or refine their ability to adapt[footnoteRef:2]. [1: Department of the Army, Hybrid Threat (Washington: United States Army Publishing Directorate, 2010), 1-1.] [2: Ibid., 1-1?1-3.]

A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (Publication 2010). Hybrid threats which were previous labeled as irregular warfare or guerrilla warfare, have now emerged in an alarming rate. Hybrid threats are comprised of regular, irregular forces, and criminal organizations merged to achieve an economical or tactical objective. Having the flexibility to transition from a regular to an irregular force allows the threat the ability to exploit weaknesses, permitting the hybrid threat the ability to become more effective. The hybrid threat can exploit a multitude of

military in providing humanitarian relief and civic action should be longstanding, but it is today also becoming a much more complex international effort. This effort clearly has a long-term goal with a foothold in foreign countries for years to come. Sensitive issues like economics and social change need a long-term approach and will not be solved simply with boots on the ground. Perhaps the next generation’s involvement will aid in changing the cycle of terrorism. This next generation will have to have a broader counterinsurgency, nation-building, and counterterrorist effort mindset. This new context will have significant important challenges for coordination between civilian and military individuals. This prolonged irregular warfare, will continue to drain resources from states that are involved specifically the US. I feel that it is not an expense rather an investment for years to come. Don’t we have a moral and ethical obligation as a country of resources to invest in the future of the world, I think

A Line of Effort (LOE) is a conceptual/logical line that connects tasks to objectives, as well as identifies measures of effectiveness (MOE), measures of performance (MOP), and indicators, essential assessments nodes that focus energy towards accomplishing the end state. In order to assuage the commanders concerns regarding the objectives and milestones missing from the LOE, I propose that the following objective be added to the Establish Civil Security LOE: Conduct targeted raids with Host Nation Security Forces to attack key insurgent leadership and cells. This objective bridges the gap as 1/1 SBCT and Host Nation partner to transition from combat operations to a policing role as we seek to secure the people and separate them from insurgents and hostile activity. Furthermore, it is imperative that the kinetic initiative is maintained through deliberate targeted raids with

Our first challenge to understanding Unconventional Warfare (UW) is there is no national policy or joint doctrine. This lack of appetite for incorporating UW into national strategy stems from two reasons. First, UW does not fit into the time constraints our key leaders have to work within. POTUS, Congress, members of the JCS, and our military commanders are not willing to invest in a campaign that exceeds their tenure. To do so would be career suicide. UW campaigns need about 18 - 24 months to achieve effects. This requires SOF activities conducted in the steady-state to synchronize with a whole-of-government approach.

South Sudan is the newest country in Africa; it received its independence in 2011 from Sudan after a prolonged 22-year civil war. The war between the government of Sudan and Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement/Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA) started in 1983. The civil war ended when the two parties in conflict signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The CPA ended the war leading to South Sudan independence through a referendum held 2011. Throughout the CPA, the USA got involved and supported the process as well as supporting the new leadership of South Sudan towards development, stability and political systems. Therefore, the USA played a great role in creating

Yes, there are times when the military is called upon to assist with disaster responds. The number of people seeking care has the potential to quickly overwhelm the healthcare industry. Therefore, to meet the needs of the arising large influx, the assistance of the military is requested. The military is able to move quickly in both forecasted and unexpected situations (Different Medical Resource, 2016). For example, the military may provide help and support that availed them of the advantages attached to military operations and response. These benefits include: manpower with specific qualifications, skills and expertise, strategic and rapid mobilization, updated technology and a variety of equipment (helicopters, aircraft, earth-moving machinery, respirators, medical supplies, power and lighting equipment, under-water capability, etc.) that most emergency organizations are unable to acquire.

Stability operations are an important function of the military arm of national power after a period of conflict. Stability operations by definition assist in supporting the host nation government by establishing civil security, civil control, supporting the host nation government (HN), restoring essential services, and assisting in infrastructure and economic improvements. In order for stability operations to be effective, there must be a complete and thorough analysis of the lines of effort (LOE), identification of risks and mitigation techniques with the intention of advance the desired end state.

Civil-military relations can be influenced at all levels in the military. As a field grade officer, my decision making process must take civil-military relations into account if I am to cast a positive light onto this relationship.

International peacekeeping efforts are a relatively new feature in military strategy. They have their roots in earlier conflicts, most notably the First Schleswig War between Denmark and Prussia in 1849-1850. A combined force of 3,800 troops from both Sweden and Norway with the intent of maintaining law and order and keeping the peace were assembled, while an armistice was worked out. This set the precedent for peacekeeping operations that would become more commonplace in the twentieth century. After the First World War, the League of Nations was established, the predecessor of what would later become the United Nations. The League was established in large part to hopefully avoid another world war as devastating as the Great War, as it was called. The League of Nations ultimately disbanded, giving way to the United Nations, but peacekeeping operations increased and evolved to encompass broader and more complex conflicts, including civil wars, which were ignored by the League out of respect for a nation’s sovereignty. This brief summary will address how peacekeeping operations evolved over time and how these operations, or a specific operation, shapes the view of peacekeeping operations by the American people.