Classical Compatibilism: Free Will Vs Determinism

Before I begin it is pertinent to note the disparate positions on the problem of human freedom. In "Human Freedom and the Self", Roderick M. Chisholm takes the libertarian stance which is contiguous with the doctrine of incompatibility. Libertarians believe in free will and recognize that freedom and determinism are incompatible. The determinist also follow the doctrine of incompatibility, and according to Chisholm's formulation, their view is that every event involved in an act is caused by some other event. Since they adhere to this type of causality, they believe that all actions are consequential and that freedom of the will is illusory. Compatiblist deny the conflict between free will and determinism. A.J. Ayer makes a

There is much debate over the issue of whether we have complete freedom of the will or if our will caused by something other than our own choosing. There are three positions adopted by philosophers regarding this dispute: determinism, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Determinists believe that freedom of the will does not exist. Since actions are events that have some predetermined cause, no actions can be chosen and thus there is no will to choose. The compatibilist argues that you can have both freedom of the will and determinism. If the causes which led to our actions were different, then we could have acted in another way which is compatible with freedom of the will. Libertarians believe that freedom of the will does exist.

Determinism is a doctrine suggesting that for every event there exist conditions that could cause no alternative event. Free will is a philosophical term describing a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Understandably, the dichotomy between these two concepts is a topic philosophers have debated over for many years. As a result of these debates, a number of alternative philosophical perspectives arguing for the existence of free will, namely libertarianism and compatibilism, have emerged, existing in stark contrast to determinism. In order to ascertain the extent to which free will is compatible with determinism, one must first consider these different approaches to

In the following paper I will talk about A.J. Ayer’s “Freedom and Necessity,” and I will explain the dilemma of determinism and Ayer’s compatibilist solution to it. I will explain some of the examples Ayer uses to explain the difference between cause and being constrained, and how both affect one’s free will. I will also discuss on why Ayer’s compatibilism solution to the dilemma is the best solution so far.

When discussing the topic of compatibilism, several aspects of the concept must be considered, such as free will and determinism: those who are skeptical and criticize this philosophical position and or stance, are typically weary or concerned with the reality of both free will and determinism flowing freely together.

There are 3 basic views that can be taken on the view of determinism, (1) deny its reality, either because of the existence of free will or on independent grounds; (2) accept its reality but argue for its compatibility with free will; or (3) accept its reality and deny its compatibility with free will.In this paper I am going to be defending the view compatibilism, specifically W. T. Stace’s view of compatibilism.

In this paper I will defend W.T. Stace’s position of compatibilism in respect to the problem of free will, as presented in Religion and the Modern Mind. I will explain Stace’s position on how free will and casual determinism are compatible. I will consider the following two objections against Stace’s position of free will: compatibilism is too weak a notion of free will that it conflicts with determinism, and there is no real difference between free and constrained action.

It offers a solution to the free will problem. Free will goes along with determinism because of the moral responsibility and it is incompatibility between each other. We are still held responsible for our voluntary actions and our actions are still determined. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism (McKenna). He or she can be morally responsible even if determinism is true, which there are logical reasons that this could be true. In this paper I will defend how compatibilism is tied up with both freedom and moral responsibility and give some examples that will support my argument for compatibilism. Also talk about the other two, determinism and libertarianism and give examples and then explain why I still agree on compatibilism. Free will is like a box of chocolates, unless you do not eat the free will chocolates, you will not feel guilty. How can one feel guilty for what they are compelled to do?

People believe that genuine freedom of choice is not always possible because our decisions and actions are determined by factors beyond our control. This view is known as Determinism. There is also an extreme form of determinism known as ‘hard determinism,’ in which they believe that every demeanor can be traced to a cause, although they may disagree about what those causes are. The idea of determinism poses a difficult issue to the concept of ‘free will’. Are we able to make free choices if all our thoughts and actions are predetermined by our own past and the physical laws of nature? Majority of us would like to believe that we have the freedom of will and are able to make decisions based on our own discretion but, I personally believe that the deterministic view holds true to a certain extent and that most of our actions are a result of a force that is beyond our comprehension. My purpose in this essay is to explain and critically analyze Baron d’Holbach’s view on determinism.

Compatibilism is right in the middle of both the other two theories of free will. They believe that events are determined by prior events just like the hard determinist do, but they do also believe in free will like libertarians. In every situation prior events shape the present or future events. Every time we think of a reason to do something this is because of our prior events that caused us to think one way or another. But then how can we have free will? We can have free will by the decisions we make. For example, if you are thirsty, you may drink water or milk. Prior events have caused you to be thirsty, but what you chose to drink or when is free will.

When analyzing the free will/ compatibilism argument, one must choose the argument they agree with the most. In my case, I chose the compatibilist vs. Libertarian free will case, which will provide to broader cases, one with a determined outcome made by some sovereign “god” (Compatibilisim), and the opposite end of the spectrum the idea that nothing can be predetermined (Libertarian). These views contrast on arguments of free will, being that the compatibilist has free will to make decisions that are predetermined through god, where the Libertarian would disagree with that logic and say, how can someone make a choice if his actions are already determined through god.

Those who identify as a compatibilist believe that even though determinism is true, thus meaning that every event that occurs is determined by preceding events and/or the laws of nature, our actions can still be free. Stace is a philosopher that identifies as a compatibilist and believes that free will occurs because of internal mental states like desires. He also believes that actions that are not free are the ones that are caused by external physical forces such as the laws of nature or preceding events. Stace believes that, “acts freely done are those whose immediate causes are psychological states in the agent. Acts not freely done are those who immediate causes are states of affairs external to the agent” (Stace, 378). However, Stace realizes that there are some cases in which an external physical force can cause you to have a desire that you act on therefore this is

In his essay, “Freedom and Necessity”, A.J. Ayer speaks of his disagreements with the deterministic view. Ayer specifies the problem is not in determinism itself, but in the intersection of free will and determinism. Determinism is the belief that humans do not act on their own free will, rather they are influenced by other factors that predetermine their actions. In this paper I will elaborate on Ayer’s questioning of determinism and how compatibilism offers a great solution for his dilemma. I will further elaborate on Ayer’s examples in an attempt to explain how ones free will is affected by the boundaries of constraint and cause, and the difference between the two.

In the discussion of free will, one controversial issue has been that we do not have free will. On the one hand, determinists argue that every event has a cause and that concept of free will is false reality because it cannot be explained by the scientific process. On the other hand, libertarians believe the opposite is true. Whereas, others like compatibilists argue both beliefs is correct in the sense that we have to change the meaning of freedom. My own view is that the position of the compatibilists solves the problem.

In this essay I will explain why I think the strongest position of the free will debate is that of the hard determinists and clarify the objection that moral responsibility goes out the door if we don’t have free will by addressing the two big misconceptions that are associated with determinists: first that determinism is an ethical system, and secondly that contrary to common belief determinists do believe in the concept of cause and effect. I will also begin by explaining my position and why I believe that the position of the indeterminist does not hold water as an argument and the third