Clausewitz and Strategic Studies Essay example

“For war, as a grave act of killing, needs to be justified.” These words were written by Murray N. Rothbard, dean of the Austrian School and founder of modern libertarianism, who spent much of his academic career trying to determine what, exactly, defined a “just war”. In fact, for as long as humans have been fighting wars, there have been quotations referring to the justification and moralities of wars and how warfare can be considered fair and acceptable to each society’s individual standards. While the time and place of each war differs, the reality of the devastation of battle may be found warranted by those fighting using these just war standards to vindicate their actions.

These developments influenced most of the powerful nations of Europe and were soon repeated in similar forms around the world. Furthermore, many of the Prussian enhancements in army doctrine are the foundation of the command structures of many modern militaries today.

In keeping with his focus on the military aspects of war, Clausewitz defines the enemy’s center of gravity as the enemy army. He supports this with historical reference to such great military commanders as Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII and Frederick the Great. Clausewitz states, “If the army had been destroyed, they would all have gone down in history as failures.” (Clausewitz, p. 596) Though he acknowledges other centers of gravity, such as the enemy’s capital and his principal allies, “…the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin.” (Clausewitz, p. 596)

Much confusion has arisen from misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s discussions on Schwerpunkt or “center of gravity”. Many students of military theory interpret Clausewitz’s ideas through their own historical perspectives. For example, military officers tend to confuse military objectives for centers of gravity, assuming physical objects such as ships or cities are the source of a countries power. While these objects may provide tactical advantages, true power arises from the critical strengths possessed by a country, be they political, diplomatic, military, or informational. The Argentinean military junta made similar mistakes during their invasion of the Falklands. Without fully understanding the source of British power in the region,

In the year of 1792, a twelve year old boy named Carl von Clausewitz enlisted in the Prussian army for war, and soon after appearing in such battles as Jena-Auerstädt and Waterloo, became dedicated in conflict and its reasons for their results most of his life. By being alive at the same time as Napoleon's rise and fall, Carl von Clausewitz was able to document and relate how war was fought, won, and lost. It's important to comprehend that in his writings, he is relaying why it is pertinent to think about how war is fought, not how to win a war. Clausewitz' theories described in “On War,” are not only effective in wars fought in today's time and past, but will remain current in future endeavors, due to its generic layout of

MP1 One of the Carl Von Clausewitz’s central issues that describes war’s dynamic is the concept of “culminating point of victory.” Clausewitz advocated the idea that an offensive should be focused on the defender’s collapse, otherwise there is a “culminating point”, a momentum where the attacker loses his advantage for strategic victory. As he mentioned, “every attack which does not lead to peace must necessarily end up as a defense.” Military history has been enriched by battles of commanders with an overestimating self-confidence and high spirit who failed to identify this momentum. As a result, they lost the tactical advantage and they were defeated. Classical example in the World War II

Set-up - Warfare is constantly changing, for the tools of war are always evolving, as do the societies that wage war. Between 1400 and 1918, western warfare went through four periods that saw such profound change that it can fairly be said that a "military revolution" occurred. According to historians MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, military revolutions "fundamentally change the framework of war" and "recast society and the state as well as military organizations." While all of the military revolutions studied in H100 were important in the evolution of warfare, one clearly stimulated greater change than the others.

War is a human endeavor. Humanity continually pursues solutions to counter evolving threats with the end of preserving power while also enabling peace. Civilizations resort to war to maintain their perception of this equilibrium. Defined threats and adversaries have changed throughout history, however, the essence of human nature and the base concept of conflict itself have not. Carl von Clausewitz’s theories on warfare capture the relationship between humanity and its application of war, remaining relevant in today’s era through their pensive explanations of timeless philosophical principles regarding the concept of war. These theories regarding war in politics, the key factors affecting war, and the extent that war is applied are inherently interconnected, providing insight on the relationships between humanity and its application of war.

To developed the war theory, Clausewitz used the Dialectic approach, which is a method of philosophical argument that involves contradictory process between opposing ideas to establish the truth, propounded by the German philosopher G W F Hegel. His “thesis” on war is an ‘absolute war." According to him total or absolute war carry out with the ‘utmost violence ' for unlimited aims, and there is no ‘logic limit’ to the application of available all power. On total war both warring fraction could not suspend their ‘military operation’ and ‘hostilities’ until one or other side finally defeated, or ‘fully discharge’ His "antithesis" is historical evidence and his own experience of war. By interaction between these thesis and antithesis, Clausewitz develops Synthesis (theory of war).

The influence of various theories and concepts on the conduct World War I has generated a range of studies in an attempt to understand how and why World War I was fought. Specifically, Clausewitz’s theories on warfare have come under a considerable amount of scrutiny with regards to their influence on World War I. This scrutiny has led to the ascertation that the protracted and bloody stalemate of World War I was largely due to a stubborn reliance on Clausewitz’s theories. The question that this paper attempts to address is weather the cause of the bloody and protracted

On War is not just a manuscript on of how to understand war; it also provides insight into what Clausewitz thought about the dynamics of human thinking. Similar to what Claxton outlined in Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind, Clausewitz believed that, “knowledge must be absorbed into the mind that it almost ceases to exist in a separate, objective way.” (Clausewitz, p147). In other words, Clausewitz believed knowledge

These politics do not have to be just foreign or international politics, but also domestic politics. To achieve these objectives, Clausewitz believed in two levels of war: strategic and tactical (Echevarria, 1995). One must also remember that Clausewitz did not believe war could be down to a science, it is far too diverse and unpredictable. He was a strong believer that a theory is an explanation, not a solution. In “On War” Clausewitz states, "the primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled” (Clausewitz, 1832). His theory harps on this idea that if conflict of politics reaches an emotional high, organized violence can breakout. Clausewitz’s theory today is taught with “policy” and “politics” as interchangeable components. However, Clausewitz created his theory based around a dual meaning. He believed war could lose sight of its policy aims, but war could never escape politics. On this basis, he combined three forces into one, which is referred to as ‘wondrous trinity’ (Echevarría 1995).

Sun Tzu understood the nature of war as “the province of life or death,” and a “matter of vital importance to the state.”1 I agree. In my own experience, war awakens your primordial instincts and strips you of your self-rationalizations. Sun Tzu defined the character of war when he wrote, “water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.”2 Accordingly, Sun Tzu’s principals of war offer a framework adequate to explain the nature and character of 21st century warfare, which I rationalize as a near-continuous battle of ideologies fought through asymmetric means to advance the values and interests of state and non-state actors.

Martin van Creveld wrote The Transformation of War book in 1991 when he detailed a predictive hypothesis about the changing character of war into what he called ?Nontrinitarian War. There were conflicts arise as intrastate wars and were not based on the simplified version of Clausewitz?s ?remarkable trinity? of government, people and military forces (Van Creveld, 1991, pg. 49). In his book, Van Creveld offers an account of warfare in the previous millennium and suggests what the future might hold. The drive was that major war was draining and the emergence of forms of war ?that are simultaneously old and new? now threatened to create havoc.

Amongst him were other great military leaders and political thinkers who shared the same doctrine, for example, Napoleon Bonaparte 1769-1821, a French military and political leader who was erroneously believed to have coined the ‘Principles of War'. Another is J.C.F Fuller 1878-1966, a British military officer who came up with six principles in 1912, eight in 1915, and nineteen in 1923 and later came down to nine in 1925. These nine principles are as follows: Direction- (objectives/aim), Concentration- (focusing of effort), Distribution- (positioning of troops), Determination- (the ability to fight, persevere and win), Surprise- (demoralization of the opponent's force), Endurance- (resistance to pressure), Mobility- (outflank the opponent's force), Offensive Action- (disorganization of the opponent's force) and Security- (protection of threats). Carl von Clausewitz 1780-1831, a German general and military theorist who wrote on the "morale" and