Clausewitzian Analysis

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

During the past decade of military operations combating terrorism, members of the U.S. government have thoroughly debated the power of the President and the role of Congress during a time of war. A historical review of war powers in America demonstrates the unchecked power of the executive when it comes to military decision-making and the use of force. Throughout history the power of the President to initiate, conduct, and sustain military operations without oversight has greatly increased. Through a historical lens, this essay will

Civilian control of the military is a government policy, written in the constitution, that places responsibility of the the head of the Defense Department in the hands of a civilian political leader rather than a military officer. This doctrine, however, is coming to an end. According to Document 2, military personnel are required to wait 7 years after retirement to gain a civilian position. President Trump has ignored this practice by appointing generals and lieutenant generals to cabinet or high-ranking positions. This proves that the United States is a militaristic country because the military is now moving into positions, that were previously reserved for civilians.

This paper discusses the War Powers Act/Resolution of 1973. Though this resolution was passed by Congress to give it more say in declaration of war and the deployment of American troops to foreign countries promising hostilities, this aim has hardly been achieved. The War Powers Act remains as one of the most contentious legal provisions in the American constitution and has been the subject of several debates and interpretations. More often than not, one finds American soldiers actually engaged in hostilities in foreign lands without the explicit or even implied support of the US Congress. This paper discusses why this is so and hypothesizes that realpolitik has significantly contributed to the practical ineffectiveness of the War Powers Act. Structurally, this paper will first proceed to present a brief history of the War Powers Act and its intended purpose. Afterwards, the linkage between realpolitik and the Act will be discussed.

In the case study “Generals versus the President,” General Ridgeway’s level of dissent eventually crossed the line of acceptability to the point where he committed professional suicide. Initially, he attempted to directly influence the opinions of the members of the JCS and the NSC to not support President Eisenhower’s policy of massive retaliation. His actions within the JSC and NSC were not totally outside of the bounds of normalcy.

Affirming the notion that the elected leader of the United States is privileged following inauguration the title of also being the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, he or she retains the option to utilize the privilege if and when a situation of confounding merit is introduced. During times in which the safety of the national public-home or abroad- is threatened, I believe that the president is entitled, with clarified ramifications of course, to exercise his or her capacity of powers within the United States Armed Forces as a means of temporary resolution to matters regarding support immediate or imminent threat. Although on recent accounts the elicited power of utilizing force has come into conflict with constitutional stipulations

Isn't it possible that military people will bring a cautionary note to any campaign, and be an improvement over some of the civilian leaders in the

The term “military complex” was made popular by Eisenhower who was the president from 1953 to 1961. The term refers to the marriage of military institutions with economic institutions for the reason of securing the nation However, the structure of the intertwined military, government and civilian was started earlier in the century from about 1915. There were many trial and errors to get the ball rolling on such an impacting and controversial issue. Many boundaries had to be overcome for there to function among these industries with the common ground of providing for the nation while at war. Although war’s affect may touch upon many aspects of life not only in America but any nation at war, blurred lines take the place of division between

As a young officer bitter over the Vietnam War, Powell pondered “the what went wrong syndrome … which created a lively ferment.”2 He disagreed with how the war was run and often struggled with “looking to the other for answers that never came conundrums.”3 As a rising strategic leader, Powell was beginning to understand the “implications of the advice given … and the propensity for operating comfortably at the joint, interagency, intergovernment, and multinational levels.”4 He was also starting to grasp from “personal experience; cultural awareness”5,6 the importance of understanding what military objectives are, who sets them and why.

The report additionally concludes that the “Minister,” or President in the United States’ case, should be, “legally responsible,” for security and intelligence policies in these cases (Born and Leigh 2005). The United States’ system represents this framework in today’s practice as the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments legislate the authority of the President to approve covert action. Referring once again to the earlier consensus that covet actions belong to the President, the legal responsibility of the executive is

To understand the argument of Cohen to civil-military relations, we must go back to the influential study, The Soldiers and The State, published by Samuel Huntington in 1957, where the latter sets the foundation of the civil-military relations and how a civilian government controls its military. Huntington presented the concept of “objective control” where military professionalism and civil supremacy are the

Hiring PMCs: the role of public opinion Domestic public opinion often has a significant role in determining the extent of a state’s military actions , some would argue that public opinion can constrain a state leader in their decision to go to war or not (O’Keefe 2009: 5). Yet, some of the pressure of public opinion can be alleviated when

The group that retains the power within the military would be people who are higher ranking, enlisted members being sergeants (E-5) and above while on the commissioned side officers ranking second lieutenant (O-1) and above. These persons are the privileged group within the military, they make the decisions for the rest of their subordinates to follow. This group also has special privileges such as being on their own schedule and not the schedule of what is going on in relation to the company or larger group of military personnel. They are also not ostracized in the same manner as lower enlisted are for seeking medical treatment such

If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long — Our security will require transforming the military you will lead — a military that

Martin L. Cook notes that military officers provide advice and have an input into whether armed conflict is justified, however, it is ultimately at the discretion of a nation’s political leadership to decide if the use of force is warranted as described in the theory of jus ad bellum. When a nation does decide that war is justified, it must consider the conflict’s strategy and its relationship to morality. Joseph L. Allen speaks to contradictory positions between these two pursuits. He notes one position as strategists and ethicist essentially agreeing upon a desired conclusion at the cessation of hostilities. Allen states that the,