In Part II, Cleanthes presents the argument from design through stating that nature resembles, although it much exceeds, the product of human design and intelligence. He believes that nature can be seen as “one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of less machines”, which in turn is similar to human inventions (Hume 15). Due to this similarity, it can be inferred through the rules of analogy that the causes of these products must also resemble one another. Thus, the author of nature must be similar to the mind of man. Cleanthes’s argument from design can be presented as:
1. Nature resembles a machine that is designed by an intelligent being. (P)
2. Similar effects have similar causes. (P)
3. The cause of nature is similar to the cause of a machine, that is, an intelligent being. (1,2)
Accordingly, Philo objects to this argument through attacking Cleanthes’s premises and conclusion. What Cleanthes seems to be taking for
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We can know that x produces y if we have repeatedly seen x produced y. (Argument from experience)
2. We can know the origin of our universe only if we have had experience if the origin of the worlds. (1)
3. We have not experienced the origin of the worlds. (P)
4. Therefore, we cannot know what originated our universe. (2,3)
Cleanthes replies to Philo’s second objection through directly attacking Philo’s first premise. He does this through presenting an example of a library filled with books. He states that know that a human minds produced the books, although we have not actually seen those human minds produce the books. Thus, although we did not see that the authors of the books produce them, we can still know that human minds produced them. This reply to Philo’s second objection can be presented as:
Suppose you enter a library.
1. We can know that intelligent minds produced the book. (P)
2. We have not seen intelligent minds produce those books. (P)
3. Although we have not seen x produce y, we can still know that x produced y. (1,
In David M. Armstrong’s “The Nature of Mind”, Armstrong praises the field of science and seeks to put the concept of mind into terms that agree with science’s definition of minds. His interest is in the physico-chemical, materialist view of man. Armstrong considers science to be the authority over other disciplines because of its reliability and result in consensus over disputed questions.
4. In Part Five Philo criticizes Cleanthes’ argument in two ways, reason one, Philo points out Cleanthes is taking away all of the deities’ miraculous attributes so you can fit him inside a type of box so that we can understand him in our own limited way. Philo’s second criticism of Cleanthes’ is he has no reason to ascribe that this deity is perfect in every conceivable way. He states that it is impossible for us humans to understand if this system has any faults, and not perfect in every way possible. In part two while responding to Cleanthes’ argument about the earth and everything on it, is one big machine. He argues that everything will do what it is supposed to for example, “…a stone will always fall, a fire will always burn…”, which
In this paper, I will refute Aristotle’s argument in the Physics in showing the need for formal and final causes in explaining natural things, by showing that his theories do not allow for any ‘chance’. Aristotle claims we observe order in the presence of ‘nature’ and ‘forms’. Accordingly, final and formal causes give structure and regularity to the natural world. I will argue, especially from the stance of materialism and Empedocles’ theories that chance can lead to order.
3. His approach to the issue of of “Design in Nature” is that there is no sufficient condition to guarantee the nature of the world we experience. James tells us that the arguments of the past for intelligent design are no longer supported by our experience and, therefore must be false under all probable possibilities. He then explains that theologians have now reinterpreted their systems under the effects of Darwin’s Theory of Evolution and found that there is no sufficient guarantee that the world was not, in fact, created. In other words, the world could very well have been created by God and evolution offers merely more information ot come to understand God’s creation.
Greek philosophers commonly offered two types of explanations to account for natural phenomena: naturalistic and anti-naturalistic/supernatural explanations. Anaximander was a Greek philosopher who offered naturalistic explanations for natural phenomena. After defining naturalistic and supernatural explanations, I will argue that Anaximander’s explanations concerning the origin of man and creation of the world are wholly naturalistic explanations.
Assignment: Compare Aristotle’s teleological view of nature with the mechanistic view of nature, with particular emphasis on Descartes.
There are diverse embodiments of counterfeit science, cheap science, and deviant science. Over time, mankind has seen the rise and fall of various scientific fields of study. However, none ever seem to vanish completely. Humanity’s views of the flat earth, astrology, crop circles, ancient astronauts, and perpetual motion continue to gain advocates even today. These are compelling paradigms of how human beings possess the ability to hold on to various forms of reasoning without any use of appurtenant evidence. With that being said, the matter of intelligent design and its counterparts, Darwinism, evolution and creationism, are noteworthy topics to discuss.
Observe anything by interpreting with objects. Different observer has different aspect observation, so result are different.
Replicability means being able to test a claim multiple times in a variety of ways and still yield similar outcomes. Scenario A fails to display this principle because Dr. Preleg only conducted two experiments, both of which produced the same results. However, the professor should have conducted more trials in order to support his claim and disprove the fact that his initial discoveries were coincidental. For instance, he could have conducted his experiment with another class of a different subject, not just macro-economics. In addition, he could have tested his claim with various age groups and switch the two groups from his previous experiment. By doing so, this will provide Dr. Preleg a great collection of data and therefore obtaining more
Rene Descartes’ “Discourse on the Method” focuses on distinguishing the human rationale, apart from animals and robots. Wherein, he does so by explaining how neither animals, nor machines possess the same mental faculties as humans. For Descartes distinguishes the human rationale apart from non-humans, even though he does agree the two closely resemble each other because of their sense organs, and physical functions (Descartes, pp22). Nevertheless, it is because the mechanical lacks a necessary aspect of the mind, which consequently separates them from humans. For in Descartes “Discourse on the Method,” he argues that the noteworthy difference between humans, and the mechanical is that machines are only responding to the world through of their sense organs. Whereas humans possess the significant faculties of reasoning, which allows them to understand external inputs and information obtained from the surrounding environment. This significantly creates a dividing ‘line’, which separates humans from non-humans. For in this paper, I will firstly distinguish the differences between the human and mechanical’s mentality in regards to Descartes “Discourse on the Method”. Secondly, I will theorize a modern AI that could possess the concept of an intellectual mind, and then hypothesize a powerful AI that lacks the ability to understand its intelligence. Lastly, in disagreeing in why there are no such machines that is equivalent to the human mind. For humans don’t possess all the
George Berkeley seeks to prove that “everything there is, is a mind or a mind’s contents” . His overall goal consists of arguing against materialism in an attempt to promote idealism instead. Berkeley does this by introducing his “likeness objection”, in opposition to the traditional representation theory of perception. Another approach that Berkeley takes in describing the lack of distinction between primary and secondary qualities. I, however, believe that his “likeness objection” and his thoughts towards primary and secondary qualities is not as convincing as he honestly thinks it is, and that its usage could potentially help promote materialism instead of dismantling it. In order to fully explain how I believe the “likeness objection” is ineffective, I will present three sections worth of information. In section one, I will state Berkeley’s approach to idealism and how he integrates his “likeness objection” into it; in section two, I will put forth my thoughts and claims about the matter; and in section three, I will anticipate one possible criticism and respond to that criticism accordingly.
Thirdly, it relies on the assumption that nature acts in a uniform manner, and through experience we know this not to be the case (Jackson, 2005). For example, someone might
There are a great variety of embodiments of counterfeit science, cheap science, and deviant science. Over time, mankind has seen the rise and fall of various scientific fields of study. However, none ever seem to completely become useless or . Humanity’s views of the flat earth, astrology, crop circles, ancient astronauts, and perpetual motion continue to gain advocates even today. These are compelling models of how human beings possess the ability to hold on to various forms of reasoning without any use of proper or relevant evidence. With that being said, the matter of intelligent design and its counterparts, Darwinism, evolution and creationism, are noteworthy topics to discuss.
In science, explanations are built of cause and effect. But if nothing is truly nothing, it lacks the power to cause. It’s not simply that we can’t find the right explanation—it’s that explanation itselffails in the face of nothing.
That argument contradicts itself, because it uses itself as a cause for existence in its premise, when it is proving the concept of cause being a necessity. Therefore, it begs the question to prove cause and effect by relying on the conclusion to prove the premise. The ideas of cause and effect cannot vary too far from actual impressions of the mind or ideas from the memory. We must first establish the existence of causes before we can infer effects from them. We have only two ways of doing that, either by an immediate perception of our memory or senses, called impressions, or, by an inference from other causes, called thoughts. For example, “A man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island would conclude that there had once been men in that island” (160). Regardless of the source of the impression, the imagination and perceptions of the senses are the foundation for the reasoning that traces the relation of cause and effect. The inference that we draw from cause to effect does not come from a dependence on the two concepts to each other or from a rational objective look at the two. One object does not imply the existence of any other. All distinct ideas are separable, as are the ideas of cause and effect. The only way that we can infer the existence of one object from another is through experience. Contiguity and succession are not sufficient to make us pronounce any two objects to be cause and effect, unless we