Coin Operation And Us Involvement

2. In the film it was stated the “U.S. commanders argue that for now, kill/capture is a crucial part of a wider counterinsurgency campaign that is starting to roll back the Taliban.” The counterinsurgency campaign also involves U.S. troops hunting down the enemy and killing them, but just killing the right people. Where the kill/capture is not just aimed at taking out the enemies in the battlefield, but in reducing the survival of the enemy organizations as well. Due to the fact that it was stated both special operations forces and conventional troops can wage kill/capture campaigns, I believe that the Kill / Capture policy enhances the goals of the counterinsurgency program as it not only has the same goals in the end, but goes a step farther as well.

Since the early 1900s the United States has been embroiled in Iranian affairs, something that would have great effects both in 1979 and now. The United States’ interest in Iran was originally spurred by the discovery of oil, but due to the Cold War U.S. interest in Iran grew even more for strategic reasons. To continue to exert their influence in Iran, the United States, through the CIA, installed shah Pahlavi as ruler. The shah was a cruel and strict dictator and was eventually overthrown and exiled. In place of the shah, an Islamic Republic came to power under the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini.

“We lost the war in southern Afghanistan and it broke my heart.” This statement used by Graeme Smith in the introduction to his book, The Dogs are Eating Them Now: Our War in Afghanistan, sets the tone for the rest of the book. Although foreign forces had, arguably, the best of intentions going into the war, the Taliban always regrouped and reappeared, often larger and harder to defeat than before, no matter how tremendous their losses were in previous battles. International forces did what they thought was essential for rebuilding of Afghanistan, including the elimination of the Taliban through air strikes and poppy eradication, even though they did not truly understand the needs and priorities of Afghan citizens and were constantly perceived negatively by the Afghan civilians. In an accessible method, Smith provides general knowledge about how the intervention on the behalf of the international community impacted the country and its people. This book also leaves me with reflections on the dynamic between insurgents and villagers and how the international forces could have helped to prevent a power vacuum from occurring during the years where most foreign forces pulled out of Afghanistan.

The Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) quarterly report for January is a bleak read. At close to 30%, not only do the Taliban hold more Afghan territory than any time after the 2001 invasion, but "The insurgency is spreading (Afghan forces) thin, threatening rural districts in one area while carrying out ambitious attacks in more populated centers." The Taliban trifecta of high-stakes attacks in late 2015 adds weight to SIGAR’s assessment. Moreover, even before militants briefly overran Kunduz, Kandahar airport and besieged Sangin district, UN figures revealed a 19% increase in “security incidents” between August and October.

Instead they “revealed COIN as a tool, not a cure-all.” This begs the question as to what level of importance we should give to both COIN and my proposal that postmodern thought can be used to effectively respond to serious political issues. Perhaps the inability of COIN to produce a perfect solution in Afghanistan and Iraq means that my suggestion has been proven incorrect. If the presumption is that a successful strategy either solves the situation entirely or doesn’t work at all, then this criticism is valid. However, from the postmodern ‘perspective’ self-critique is always necessary. While COIN is not flawless it managed to oversee the evolution of the American Army to a certain extent. The army became “more flexible, more adaptive;” it became a “learning institution.” COIN changed the way the military thought about war and there will “be no going back to a frame of mind that defined war strictly as a titanic clash of uniformed foes of comparable strength.” The arborescent methods of conventional warfare will no longer be thought of as infallible. Certainly, postmodern theory shows us that there are always multiple approaches, including the aforementioned discussion of avoiding a military response to the War on Terror all together. It helps open up a discussion as to what strategies might work better, but it cannot provide a simple solution. It is a tool, not a cure-all. Never assume that

Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 and Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2 have slightly different definitions of insurgency. JP 3-34 defines it as the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. FM 3-24.2 defines it as a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. I have problems with both definitions. However, I disagree more with the joint publication. This paper will explain why.

Successful examples of insurgency intervention that made strategic sense can be observed during Athen’s support of the Helot revolt against the Spartans, France’s support of the American revolutionaries against Great Britain, and the United States’ support of the Afghan tribal militia uprising against the Taliban.

Galula theory is based on the support of the population. This is divided between an active minority supporting the insurgency, an active minority who would be willing to support the force or forces that promote measures COIN, and finally, a large majority of the population passive . The aim of COIN operations would therefore gain the support of the active minority that is potentially in their favour, so that this in turn get mobilized the passive majority of the population against the insurgent group. Besides military measures to reduce and eliminate the insurgent forces, for the author it is essential to isolate the population of these groups, in order to avoid a possible mobilization of the same against the interests of the COIN. This will require removing the alleged political organization that insurgent groups have developed in that area, and replace it forces an interim basis to ensure the necessary services in the area, and thus add up support within the local population.

As with much of Latin America, the support for insurgency came from peasants and indigenous communities who had been displaced from their lands by elites (UNDP 2006). The government officially became engaged in counterinsurgency in 1960, following a coup attempt and the establishment of formal revolutionary groups under the URNG umbrella. However, it is noteworthy that during its initial years, instead of large scale guerrilla war, the conflict took the shape of political oppression. It was not until 1966 that there was a clear military counterinsurgency effort (Ball, 1999). Deaths and assassinations per year did not surpass 500 in the first two decades (Ibid). However, during the 80s, this number rose to approximately 18,000 deaths per year (Ibid). Army numbers surpassed 40,000, with the support of 500,000 members of civil patrols, while the URNG had a total of approximately 2,000 soldiers (Keel, 1998). Some scholars have gone as far as suggesting that “guerrilla groups did not have the strength or numbers to pose a serious threat,” and that the war went on for as long as it did merely because it allowed the government to eliminate opposition of all types (Chapman, 2001). The continuation of the war benefitted the two main actors: insurgent groups who wanted to achieve national prominence, and the government, whose power and cruelty was justified as counterinsurgency. Paramilitary groups stood

The United States and the Western Coalition has long looked at the Middle East as a asset with little risk high reward potential. They have all have looked at them as high reward low risk a region that in contrast has an abundance natural resources in particular oil with very underwhelming population. Even if they had a product that could reach out and touch the masses the internal struggles and lack of cohesion and structure to get out of the region. Both the United States and Western coalition watched the struggles intervened when necessary and when a reward could reaped even if it was a better deal on the oil prices to actual occupation of land. The intervention however did began to elevate and inflate the Middle

Counterinsurgency is the act against the activities of guerrilla warfare tactics or revolutionaries by military or political action. In a sense, states are trying to make peace without war. Counterinsurgency came into effect after the end of World War 1. Increasing mechanization is one the main reasons for this. The United States in an attempt to be proactive, as always, adopted a new way in which to possibly defeat insurgents.

Through the use of my resources I will use the book “On Guerilla Warfare” as well as to explain the successful tactics of the Taliban, and how important the tactics explained in this book were monumental to the movements success. Also I will use a story dubbed, resources which describe the methods that other sovereign countries used to utilize support and ultimately proved affective in ending the conflict.

The United States has minimized its military participation in Afghanistan. For more than a decade Afghanistan has struggled with the Taliban. Power, authority, and influence has played a role in Afghanistan’s political and military strategies. The emergence of international jihadi-insurgent groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have brought uncertainty regarding political, economic transitions, and the security of the nation. The formation of the National Unity Government (NUG) in Afghanistan outlines the limitations of military support from the U.S. The NUG discusses the end of NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its new mission, Operation Resolute Support. This new mission outlines the planning

Irregular warfare has become the centre of much military and academic study in recent years, due mostly to the ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan. However irregular warfare is by no means a recent revelation in the evolution of warfare and strategy, numerous examples exist throughout history in which irregular warfare tactics and strategy have been adopted and later analysed by academics and military professionals. This author will focus on the key issues that governments face in creating effective strategies for irregular warfare with a particular emphasis on counter-insurgency (COIN) and terrorism. Resources such as time, space, legitimacy and support present themselves as key issues in dealing with insurgency and terrorism and are

The first tenet of COIN aligns with the first two statements of COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance. The primary focus is on the people and earning their trust. The people function as the internal intelligence for the government and support the goal of eliminating, harboring and providing safe havens for the enemy. This effort is supported by the United States Soldiers and its allies taking up residence in the community with the Afghanistan people. This also reinforces President Obama core element of a civilian surge to reinforce positive action. It is imperative to get the people out in the public view and not living in fear. Constant and daily interaction is essential in gathering local intelligence on what is going in the government in hopes of understanding how the people feel and think about their leadership. Communication is helpful but being a good listener is an invaluable asset to information gathering. Secondly, the United States military goal is to support the fostering of renewed trust of the Afghanistan people in their government and security forces. The ultimate goal is that the Afghanistan people reject the insurgents and stop them from infiltrating their infrastructure. This approach was taught by