Coin's Role In The Iraq War

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

Hanson’s 2012 premise, albeit over two years old today, is immediately discernible: America faces devastating self-inflicted wounds by implementing the current Administration’s defense spending budget. The dawn of 2014 finds this debate ongoing and the implementation of this budget well in progress, with even more drastic cuts taking effect than the ones analyzed by Hanson previously. While few historians of repute would argue against the reality that the siren song of defense reductions has lured the nation onto the shoals of unpreparedness for future conflict many times in the past, two shortcomings in Hanson’s piece beckon us to pause and reexamine.

suffered the same issues during the 2003 Iraq War and made the same mistakes the British made in the American Revolutionary war. The U.S. failed to allocate the proper number of troop strength. The lack of control of the civilian population and the mistakes the U.S. made in Abu Ghraib became the rally cry for the insurgents. (Montanus, 2005) The United States initially losing the hearts and minds of the populous and as a result there were more Iraqis supporting the efforts against the United States. The difference between the U.S. now and the British 200 years ago, the U.S. adapted and formed a strategy to help the local populace. The U.S. opened dialogues with the Tribes to resolve conflicts and issues in order to win their support for the war. The U.S. assisted the Iraqi’s create a democratic government, provided logistic support and training of the country’s security forces, and resulted in stabilizing the country. (Montanus, 2005) The U.S. established a Counter-Insurgency

In his article, “Why Has American Stopped Winning Wars?” Dominic Tierney discusses some of the topics in his recent book, “The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts.” The book, unlike the article, provides recommendations for how America can adapt to a new era of warfare. Having said that, Tierney’s article published in the The Atlantic, provides no such recommendations nor does it provide adequate reasoning to support his argument, rather he leaves the reader emotionally charged and unable to make an informed judgement concerning the validity of his claims. Specifically, the author commits the fallacies of appealing to emotion, followed by the presentation of glittering generalizations and a false dichotomy. Therefore, the purpose here is to analyze his argument as outlined in the article, “Why Has American Stopped Winning Wars?”

1. In President Obama’s speech at West Point, he announced that 30,000 additional troops would be sent to Afghanistan. He made this decision because he said it was vital to the United States’ national interest. The vital national interest at risk in President Obama’s address is the security and safety of the American people as well as the “security of our allies and the common security of the world.” By involving the military and increasing the troop strength, President Obama can achieve the objectives of his strategy. His objectives are to keep the Taliban from becoming powerful, prevent them from government rule, improve Afghanistan security forces and government so they can manage their own country and prevent Al Qaeda from

In the article, Why has America Stopped Winning Wars? the author, Dominic Tierney, asserts that the United States has entered an age of “unwinnable conflict”. Tierney argues that since the end of World War II excessive military power, an international shift from state-on-state war to internal conflict, the emergence of non-state actors and peace between states have contributed to The United States’ inability to win major conflicts. Tierney uses mistakes in strategy and tactical failures to support his argument.

Since the beginning of time there have been battles fought that have ravaged through nations and stripped away the cultural integrity of those who are the most willing to protect it. These battles were created as a fault in the system of life and are not seen as being fought with artillery, but rather with the mightiest of all pens. In the United States, we the people have witnessed the first hand destruction of such battles that were and are still currently being fought on our home front. However, the battles that are presiding in our society today are taking an alternate course in terms of the outcomes that have sofourth been presented to the American public. Although, there are many examples of this type of “alternate course,” the one that

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

The concept of war as a static and unchanging occurrence is an outdated and dangerous miscalculation. More accurately, war is a fluidic, evolving and shifting phenomenon constantly reinventing itself, rendering stagnant, inflexible principles potentially disastrous. Consequently, as students of war and future players in this transforming theatre, the study of eras of significant development is an extremely relevant pursuit. Recognizing the need for adaptation and the creation of doctrine is now a prerequisite for any effective modern commander. War is unpredictable in nature and particularly so in current theatres of operation, in which change is rapid

Giulio Douhet, in his seminal treatise on air power titled The Command of the Air, argued, “A man who wants to make a good instrument must first have a precise understanding of what the instrument is to be used for; and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like.” The United States (US) military establishment has been asking itself this exact question for hundreds of years, in an attempt to be better postured for the future. From the Civil War, through the American Indian Wars, and up until World War II (WWII) the American military’s way of war consisted of fighting traditional, or conventional, wars focused on total annihilation of an enemy. Since that time, there has been a gradual shift from the traditional framework towards one that can properly address non-traditional, or irregular wars. While the US maintains a capability to conduct conventional warfare, the preponderance of operations where the US military has been engaged since WWII have been irregular wars. Therefore, this question articulated by Douhet, as to understanding the character of the next war in order to properly plan, train, and equip, is certainly germane to the current discussion of regular war versus irregular war. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the questions remains, which will dominate the future and therefore, garner further funding and priority. Based on the current threats and the US role as a superpower, the US

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

Van Creveld predicted that armed forces of the world would have to adapt to the frequency of involved conflict. This challenging book was too readily dismissed by some critics as reflecting Van Creveld?s personal proximity to the first intifada against Israel and a classic case of overgeneralization (1991, pg. 25). The massive mechanized assault conducted by an American-led coalition to pry Iraq?s invading force out of Kuwait in 1991 lent credence to those who did not want to contemplate the rise of new modes of combat. ?The Changing Face of War? represents van Creveld?s second attempt to flesh out the developments in military history and the rise of unconventional methods in book-length form.

“The hearts and mind (HAM) theory is identified as winning the hearts and minds of the population which is a technique based on the implementation of the counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy of persuading the population to support the government and reject the insurgents.” The counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy as outlined by President Obama and General Petraeus’s most closely embrace is the heart and minds (HAM) theory. President Obama speech identified the United States strategic approach with Afghanistan in three elements. The three core elements addressed by President Obama during his speech on the strategy in Afghanistan are identified as: 1) utilize the military effort to create conditions for transition, 2) a civilian surge that

While “The Art of War” was written by Sun Tzu during the 6th century B.C., long before the colonization of the Americas, the onslaught of the Crusades, and before the Persian Wars of around 490 B.C., it remains relevant to this day. There is also strong evidence that the work inspired Napoleon and was used in the planning of Operation Desert Storm. “The Art of War” has withstood the sands of time due to its simplistic approach, and its applicability to non-military strategies. “The Art of War“, interpreted by Gerald, A. Michaelson, as well as other authors, use Sun Tzu’s timeless strategies and apply them to the modern day corporate world.