This article written by George Kennedy is essentially a review of the United States Government's views on the Soviet situation. It introduces the idea of a policy of containment which ultimately was going to be the way America would battle the Cold War with the Soviet Union.
The article begins with Kennan outlining the Soviet's position after World War Two, primarily about their adoption of Marxist ideas into their own. Kennan thought that the Soviets saw no future in which capitalism and communism could exist peacefully together and have equal power. An autocratic power was introduced to put into action, policy that aligned with Marxism, but the Communist party in Russia was only small and so there was scepticism because of the economic issues it created. The system generated a want for total power, and the Soviets used the 'evilness' of capitalism as a reason to try to overthrow the world's major powers.
Kennan then discusses the unreliability of the Kremlin's foreign policy. He talks about how the soviet policy changes were tactical and a way of getting what they wanted, without technically breaking any rules. Kennan then said that because of this outlook, the Soviets were going to be difficult to deal with
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Direct conflict, post-World War Two, was undesirable, but there was an undercurrent of rivalry and competition which kept the Soviets alert of any place in the world where they might spread their influence. This leads to the introduction of the policy of containment. Kennan proposed that an effort should be made to contain soviet expansion in order to ensure protection of Western Europe and Japan, who both had indispensable military and industrial sources, from Soviet power. Kennan indicated that the policy of containment was going to be long term, firm and
During the cold war, the United States engaged in many aggressive policies both at home and abroad, in which to fight communism and the spread of communist ideas. Faced with a new challenge and new global responsibilities the U.S. needed to retain what it had fought so strongly for in World War II. It needed to contain the communist ideas pouring from the Soviet Union while preventing communist influence at home, without triggering World War III. With the policies of containment, McCarthyism, and brinkmanship, the United States hoped to effectively stop the spread of communism and their newest threat, the Soviet Union.
This essay will focus on the Reagan Administration which spanned from January 1981 to January 1989. When Reagan became President, he had only one clear, defined foreign policy goal – containment of the Soviet Union, or the “evil empire” as he referred to it. He primarily wanted to stop the USSR from growing larger and to keep other non-Communist countries from becoming Communist. In the past, American presidents had used a theory called the “Domino Theory” to justify the need for intervention around
Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts -- and facts they are - this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up” (Document C). This quote set the precedent for containment and gives understanding as to why America reverted from its original policy of isolationism into an alternate strategy of preventing the spread of communist expansion. Moreover, George E. Kennan’s Long Telegram, or Document D, sketched “the roots of Soviet policy” and contained “warning of serious difficulties with the Soviet Union in the years ahead”. Kennan’s telegram portrayed the Soviets as aggressive and intent on world domination, suggesting that they would only respond to force and not
George Kennan's containment plan is a radical shift in the U.S foreign policy when the Policy of the United States towards the Soviet Union prior, and during the World War II is considered. The containment policy marks the shift of American foreign policy towards the Soviets from alliance to deterrence. Kennan's states in the Long Telegram, "USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence." (Citation needed) only two years after the end of World War II, a war both the U.S and the Soviet Union fought side by side for a common ambition. If the aspect of radical shift in the U.S foreign policy is seen from a post-Cold War perspective, another radical change can
When one can truly understand and uncover the meaning behind these articles and how they fit into one or more of the ‘boxes’ we call paradigms and perspectives. In order to dissect and analyze the case of the Cold War, especially its origins, one must not only skim through the text and uncover main ideas, but also must also relate the readings to these paradigms and establish one’s own ideals and opinions regarding the study of international relations. Personally, I believe the articles associated with the origins of the Cold War along with Professor Katzenstein’s lecture on the topic provide strong arguments for the use of a ‘middle fish’ perspective and a ‘big fish’ paradigm: domestic politics and realism, respectively. Through George Kennan’s personal accounts, experience and analysis at both the time of the Cold War’s inception and forty-plus years later after the fall of the Soviet Union, a point is made regarding the nature of Soviet expansion as an offensive maneuver, which he believed must be contained by a defensive strategy. This point of conflicting strategies by the U.S. and (especially) the Soviet Union provides the reader with a realist argument and perspective. Also, in his second piece, which details remarks made to the Council on Foreign Relations in 1994, Kennan explains that instead of whole-heartedly adopting
George Kennan did not make any detailed policy recommendations in the Long Telegram of 1946, although he made it clear that he did not regard the Soviet Union as the same type of threat as Nazi Germany. He opposed the ideas of National Security Council Memorandum 68 (1950) as a hysterical overreaction, and thought that global containment was a serious strategic error, especially in peripheral regions like Indochina. Unlike Hitler, Stalin's aggression and expansion were unplanned and opportunistic, and its leaders did not wish to risk a general war with the West. For this reasons, the Soviets were highly sensitive to the "logic of force" and would retreat if confronted with resolution (Kennan 1946). Internally, it was a police state ruled by a Communist Party oligarchy and bureaucracy, but one that was always insecure in its power. Although Marxism had no real emotional appeal to the masses, the elites were guided by the assumption that the imperialist powers were always attempting to encircle the Soviet Union and that the contradictions within capitalism would always lead to wars. They would attempt to exploit these differences within the capitalist nations, while at the same time attempting to weaken their hold on the colonial areas. Kennan was well aware that the main problem in Western Europe was war-weariness and economic insecurity, and the U.S. would have to take the lead in reviving these countries or the "Russians certainly will" (Kennan 1946). In this case, though,
With this book, a major element of American history was analyzed. The Cold War is rampant with American foreign policy and influential in shaping the modern world. Strategies of Containment outlines American policy from the end of World War II until present day. Gaddis outlines the policies of presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, including policies influenced by others such as George Kennan, John Dulles, and Henry Kissinger. The author, John Lewis Gaddis has written many books on the Cold War and is an avid researcher in the field. Some of his other works include: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War
During the Cold War, America's basic policy was that of "containment" of the Soviet Union. The policy of containment was based upon several principles. First, the Soviet Union wanted to spread socialism to all areas of the world. However, it was felt that the leadership of the Soviet Union felt no particular rush to accomplish their goal. "The Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of a long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. (Hook and Spanier, 42)." In other words, the Soviet leadership believed that, since their ideas were the correct ones, they would eventually prevail, and thus, no direct confrontation would be
Gaddis, John L. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press1997.
This caused the US to believe that Soviets had mainly expansionist aims. The US was “not prepared to see the opportunity for future investment [in Eastern Europe] foreclosed” (Crockatt 67) and this belief sparked the development of the containment policy directed by George Kennan, outlined in the Long Telegram (Lightbody 5). In addition, “the west had to oppose the Soviet Union for its own survival” (Lightbody 5) as the nuclear race between the US and USSR ensued and the USSR strived to equal the already well-established program of the US. This tension did not recede as Soviets sent spies into the US Manhattan Project, the nuclear development program (Lightbody 5). When the Soviets refused to join the Baruch Plan – which controlled nuclear weapon development – the USSR became even more openly viewed as a threat to US security. The growth of communism in Asia within the countries of Korea, Vietnam, and China along with tensions between the “Iron Curtain,” or divide, between Eastern and Western Europe also contributed to increasing threat towards capitalism and the Cold War’s inevitability.
George Kennan, the architect of the Long-Telegram, was one of the leading voices, publishing the traditionalist viewpoint both privately in the Long Telegram of 22 February 1946, as well as publicly in the anonymous article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs (McCauley 9). Soon after, most of the Western world joined Kennan in the view that: "at the bottom of the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity"(McCauley 131). Kennan warned that, "they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it" (McCauley 131).
The Cold War: A New History written by John Lewis Gaddis (a professor at Yale University who wrote other books such as The United States and the Origins of the Cold War and Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security) delivers a summarized, yet skewed interpretation of what had happened during the era known as the Cold War. Throughout the book, the author attempts to provide history of the Cold War, while adding in generalizations, incomplete facts, as well as flat out bias.
Kennan understanding of the driving forces of international relations effects how he understands the hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union. Realism is central to his argument of the structure international relations. In viewing realism as driving force of international relations, it became the base for his development of US foreign policy of containment. He frames containment to address the issues of maintaining US security, by containing the Soviets attempts to expand their power, and restoration of the global balance of power.
The polarization of the ideologies their societies were based upon led the two toward conflict. Neither side wished to begin a general war with the other; as the means with which to win the war could not be justified due to the emergence of atomic weaponry that blurred the lines between means and ends. Leaders in Washington looked to a little known Foreign Service officer stationed in Moscow at the time for answers concerning how the Soviet Union would conduct itself during the postwar years. George F. Kennan accepted the challenge of highlighting the sources of Soviet aggressive tendencies and how best to deal with the Soviets effectively. Kennan sent an 8,000 word telegram back to Washington D. C. on February 22, 1946, that argued the Soviet Union could not be reasoned with, but would instead need to be
The Sources of Soviet Conduct, a highly influential article written by George Keenan in 1946, states that the US must pursue afirm and consistent opposition to the Soviet Union. In Keenan's argument for this, he explores the two factors of ideology and circumstance which shaped the Soviet Union. This is used in order to explain the behaviour of the Soviet Union. Thus, the most effective method for the US to counteract this behaviour is then explained.