Colonel (Col) Michael Steele’s resolute beliefs regarding how to prepare his unit for combat and his bravado demeanor commanded respect from other bemused military officers. While serving as Commanding Officer (CO), 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Col Steele aggressively cultivated a command climate focused on three core principles: personal protection, precision, and lethality. Although these three core principles narrowly aligned with the Army's "Soldier's Creed", Col Steele’s principles did not reinforce the Army’s individual and organizational core values. 3rd Brigade’s disassociated ethical subculture fostered a toxic environment which compromised both subordinate commanders' and individual soldiers' moral standards to various extents. Col Steele’s vague guidance concerning proper ethical behavior during the execution of high stress Counter-Insurgency (COIN) missions resulted in subordinates failing to conduct kinetic operations in accordance with established Army ethical standards. The military establishment shall remember May 09, 2006 as the day the revered "Rakkasans" failed to personify the unit's motto of "Ne Desit Virtus," meaning "Let Valor Not Fail". For on this day, four soldiers assigned to Charlie Company, known to the “Rakkasans” as the "Kill Company", murdered eight unarmed Iraqi citizens during Operation Iron Triangle. These four soldiers failed to understand the nature and consequences of their iniquities as they could no longer distinguish
The 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, a unit known as the Rakkasans, were conducting Operation Iron Triangle in 2006 in Iraq when soldiers killed eight unarmed Iraqi men. The US military severely reprimanded the Commander of the Rakkasans, COL Michael Steele, for the unethical command climate his leadership allowed to exist within the unit at that time. This unit will need a new commander that can set and maintain an effective, ethical command climate through his leadership. That new commander should resolve the issues that led to the reported war crime in order to establish a culture that perpetuates an ethical command climate.
James R. McDonough sets a spectacular example of what it is to be a second lieutenant in the United States Army and what it is truly like to lead a group of enlisted soldiers for the first time. Lieutenant McDonough, a graduate of West Point, was deployed as a platoon leader in a small fort with the mission of holding a Vietnamese village out of the hands of the Viet Cong. When he arrived, Lieutenant McDonough discovered that the former Lieutenant and platoon leader of the 2d Platoon, Bravo Company, 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) hardly ever left his
Among these leaders was Bravo Company’s 1st platoon’s SFC Robert Gallagher. The platoon endured terrible living conditions including no running water and filthy living space. These inadequate living conditions must be met with some relaxation on the standards they were expected to follow. Company leadership viewed this as a bribe to keep the soldiers in high spirits. In reality, they set the stage for the erosion of the morals the enlisted soldiers are supposed to possess. While the morals were being chipped away, so was the original plan the battalion had hoped to follow. Fragmentation orders became a pseudo-standard for the boys of Bravo Company. What had originally started as short-term overnight patrol bases turned into fortified traffic control points with the exception of any form of fortification other than in notion only. Despite the fact that platoon-level leadership requested for supplies they were repeatedly turned down. A major breakdown in the communication between the leadership created a loss in faith in the higher leadership for the lower-enlisted soldiers on the ground. Very soon into deployment, Bravo Company began to experience contact with unseen enemy forces. The enemy was able to engage and plant IED’s and cause casualties while remaining elusive. After the first few casualties within the company, the mission to start set up traffic control points was to begin. While conducting patrols down the road time and time
In the United States Army we are taught to live by the Seven Army Values. They are broken down to us in the acronym ‘LDRSHIP’ which is short for Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage. We are all taught these 7 Army values repeatedly from day one in the United States Army. First we memorize these values. Then we are trained to live by them. All of these 7 values coincide with each other, and play an important roll in our Army lives. These 7 Army Values also play well into life outside the Army in our personal life. People sometimes do not realize the importance these values have on the way we are viewed by the people who look up to the men and woman who are privileged enough to represent the
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the real world consequences of when Army leaders become complacent dealing with foreign national soldiers, and the day to day operations while in a combat theatre. To gather lessons learned from the example discussed in order to lower the probability of a reoccurrence among the force. Through the example demonstrate the need for Army leaders to constantly fight against complacency, and the extreme importance that leaders know their soldiers, and place their soldiers’ needs before their own. The scenario discussed was a real incident that took place in Iraq in 2009, at a Coalition Outpost (COP) approximately 30 kilometers south of Mosul, in a city called Hammam al-Alil.
The book The Ugly American clearly demonstrates several of the established Special Operations Force (SOF) imperatives outlined in ADRP 6-22. As a Special Forces soldier I can relate these imperatives to stories illustrated in the book and apply them to real life situations that I have experienced in the field. The Ugly American is a goldmine of wisdom and a handbook for special warfare. All Special Operations soldiers should read it.
Deceased philosopher Bertrand Russell once said, “War does not determine who is right- only who is left”. Those left are the soldiers of the 1-502nd, specifically Bravo Company 1st plt, and the Janabi family and to a greater extent, the ever-changing global world we all live in today. The tragic events that conspired in a small Iraqi village became a microcosm of how leadership failures at every level shaped the actions of a few soldiers who committed atrocious acts. One can also see how a high operational tempo, along with prolonged violence and death, has on a person’s psyche. It is the ugly side of war that the average American citizen may not want to hear or talk about. For a soldier, it is inevitably what they train their
The ethical wilderness introduces the rules of engagement in many respects. Nobody wants to die in combat, especially when loss of life can be prevented. To Americans, it is nearly impossible to differentiate between Vietcong soldiers and civilians. In many instances, the two are interchangeable. A natural response is to engage anyone who is not an American or not where movement is expected. However, rules of engagement are created to prevent the slaying of noncombatants to include civilians and medical personnel in the like. These rules are not concrete, but in fact, they are very fluid so as to prevent ambiguity in changing circumstances. Marines with nervous trigger fingers make following such rules very difficult.
In September of 1993, the Clinton administration made a grave mistake. General Colin Montgomery, who led the elite soldiers, requested for heightened military reinforcements. The administration denied the requests since the administration did not want to make the US look like they were increasing forces when their main goal at that time was to lessen them. On October 3rd to the 4th, Operation Gothic Serpent took place. The operation was a seventeen hour-long mission that resulted in eighteen soldiers killed with eighty four others injured. (“Ambush”). During this mission, Somali fighters that were loyal to Aidid shot down two helicopters with rocket-propelled grenades. Once the helicopters crashed, mobs of Aidid’s men hacked and dragged the fallen soldiers through the streets of Somalia “as trophies” (Kuzmarov).
As they began to clear the routes in the AO the casualties starting occurring. After some time had passed all the platoons had experienced many deaths and were starting to lose a lot of their platoon leadership. The mounting pressure of combat combined with the pressure coming down from LTC Kunk communication between the company and battalion level leadership began to digress. With morale lowering with every day and casualty that went by the men began to run the tactical checkpoints that they had set up ruthlessly. They weren’t treating civilian harshly and would even harass them physically. This gave them a notorious record among the Iraqi civilians. Going into December 2005 the men had begun to relax on their own standard operating procedures along the
While these three points are extensively discussed and dissected, it is apparent that the key factor that makes us professionals is the ethical standard that we must hold every individual soldier, from the lowest private to the highest general, to. One of the major points that are missing is what happens when the ethical standard is breeched and how it is dealt with.
There are quite a few positive characteristics within the troops as well that make up for the mistakes they may have made. One main one is that they always have each others' backs. The Deltas look after the Rangers, and act as their role models. “It was as if the Rangers saw the D-Boys as their big brothers, and since their big brothers were around, everything would be okay” (Bowden 234). This shows the bond between the troops, and adds emotion to the novel. Another characteristic is that the older soldiers try to be positive throughout the war, even if situations got tough. “Smith was now asking the medic to tell his parents and family good bye . . . 'Hold on tight,' Schmid told the dying corporal. 'We're working on getting you out of here'” (Bowden 238). There are also some points within the novel that show soldiers making jokes about their situation, instead of letting it bring them down and get the best of them. The final trait is that even throughout all of the horrors the two teams went through during the war, they still did their best and pushed through until it was finally over. “'There's no doubt that the perception people have of this episode is that it was a total fiasco.' Bowden says. 'But this was a successfully completed mission. And in the eyes of the military men involved, it's a mission they're very proud of'” (EDIT). So even though these teams saw, heard, and participated in horrifying events, in
The culture of a combat unit is parallel to none. Combat units develop a cohesive bond that only life threatening event can create. The culture of the 918th was no exception. Two extremes are played out during the command of Colonel Davenport and General Savage. Colonel Davenport became so close to his men that he went to great lengths to protect them. He questioned orders that put his men in harm’s way and made excuses for poor performance. The men admired and respected him, but had a low commitment to their organization. Davenports culture was one were the men were coddled and were not held accountable. General Savage held everyone to a high standard and demanded accountability. During flight briefs he demanded reasons for poor performance. Most importantly poor performance was met with consequences.
Black Hearts is a non-fiction book about a platoon of soldiers from the historical 101st Airborne Division in the 502nd Infantry Regiment which was activated during World War II and has served in the Vietnam War, first Gulf War, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The book describes the unit’s deployment in 2005 to Iraq to the region known as the Triangle of Death which was south of Baghdad which was one of the country’s most dangerous territories at that point in the war. The platoon that is written about in Black Hearts was 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion. The leadership in this platoon was toxic all the way from the top starting with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Kunk. By the end of the deployment 11 of 1st Platoon’s 33 members were either dead or in jail for murder. I believe it was because Lieutenant Colonel Kunk injected nothing but a negative style of leadership to the leaders below him because he was slacking many of the Army leadership traits like empathy. Murphy’s law demonstrated that everything that could go wrong, went wrong. The good leaders that 1st Platoon needed died early in the deployment and with a combination of multiple things like poor leadership and combat exhaustion lead to a total war mentality to the platoon. Early in the deployment Sergeant Kenith Casica died and he was one of the leaders that
Combating in modern warfare does not simply mean killing the enemy. There are ethical rules and standards of behavior that soldiers must strictly follow because these rules are essential for defeating the enemy, winning "hearts and minds" of potential allies, and maintain the morale of the troops. These tasks have become especially challenging in the face of the proliferation of guerilla warfare that has been adopted by weaker military forces in the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries. In fighting insurgencies, abiding by the ethical standards of the Army behavior may be even harder than in fighting conventional battles. The ethical rules may sometimes put the soldiers in dangerous positions. Disregarding the acceptable standards of behavior, however, may have even graver consequences, putting innocent non-combatants at risk and risking total demoralization of the Army unit participating in disorderly behavior. It is therefore essential that Army leaders maintain an ethical command climate during the war.