Command And Control And Integration Of Joint Functions Associated With The Invasion Of Sicily

Six principles comprise the philosophy of mission command: (a) build cohesive teams through mutual trust; (b) create share understanding; (c) provide clear commander’s intent; (d) exercise disciplined initiative; (e) use mission orders; and (f) accept prudent risk. When combined together, these six principles assist the commander in balancing the aforementioned art of command and science of control. To understand how General Robert E. Lee’s performance at Gettysburg lacked the marks of a great mission commander necessitates a deeper understanding of the individual principles of mission command.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

Operational leaders see how the individual components of an organization fit together and use those individuals work to make a larger outcome. When they focus on a problem, they think of what works best within the process and systems to make an impact on the situation. These types of leaders play a big part in making sure that things get done in an effective and functioning manner. According to the Army Doctrine ADP 6-0, the Army over time has strayed away from operational leaders and adapted Mission Command, which gives leaders the ability at the lowest level the capability to exercise disciplined initiative in an act of carrying out the larger mission . Mission Command is made up of the following six steps: Understanding, Visualize,

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

Mission command consist of the following six principles: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create sheared understanding, provide clear commander’s

Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1).

According to Army ADP 6-0, mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander, using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent, to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (CAPE, 2012). Effective mission command can generally be analyzed according to the six principles outlined in ADRP 6-0. The six principles of mission command are to: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk (CAPE, 2012). This paper provides a brief overview of the

What might have been the setback we previously faced in making decisive, clear or sound effective decisions? Was it a defect in how Commanders and Leaders led units or troops, or perhaps the philosophy in which we chose to command and control every aspect of the battlefield? What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? The six principles of mission command are key in developing a cohesive team that will support all aspects of the mission. Asking “why” is now encouraged when it pertains to certain situations or missions. Understanding the purpose of why a course of action or desired outcome is necessary, leads to mission success and a cohesive unit with thinking leaders. Thinking clearly usually isn’t an issue for most leaders, but position an individual in a situation of extreme stress or complexity, then there might be a reason to be concerned. Through

General Washington 's adherence to mission command principles promoted the environment needed to win. Senior allied partners deferred decision making to Washington based on trust and collaborative input. Effective communications encouraged subordinate commanders to propose constructive alternatives aimed at streamlining action. The Siege of Yorktown embodied the approach effectiveness. Admiral Lafayette’s decision to avoid a major naval battle in Chesapeake Bay demonstrated this. Lafayette’s understood Washington’s intent, and the established trust ensured vital Colonial waterway supremacy. This decisive act ensured Lord Cornwallis’ entrapment throughout the siege. (COL Jerry A. Turner, 2015)

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

One could imagine living in a world without television, the internet, whiffle ball, bubble wrap, or snowboarding. None of these twenty-first century items that are taken for granted today were around in 1944. Everything about normal life was changing in 1944 due to events happening across the world. Although most fighting from World War II was contained to Europe, its effects were certainly felt at home in the United States. Food and other necessities were rationed. Men were being drafted into the war. Families were being split apart. The Allied Forces fighting the war were losing strength, so in an attempt to regain strength and bring the war to an end, the Allied Forces launched the largest sea invasion ever. Nicknamed Operation Overlord,

These deficiencies led his senior subordinates to develop their own diverging commander’s intent. Admiral Andrew Cunningham, Air Chief Marshall Arthur Tedder and General Harold Alexander, all British and Eisenhower senior lieutenants, constructed additional Commander’s intent and personalized operational understanding of Husky that facilitated their own additional operational end states, beyond the capture of Sicily. Admiral Cunningham wanted to ensure the safety of his fleet and refused to operate in the contested waters near Italy. Air Chief Marshall Tedder, above all

Without the ability of the subordinate commanders to understand the situation, take appropriate action and coordinate joint functions, especially naval fires and movement and maneuver, Operation Husky could have been a far more painful experience for the Allied

General Eisenhower was a trustworthy leader who failed to establish an effective command climate in the Mediterranean Campaign. As the Commander of Allied Forces Headquarters Command (AFHC), Eisenhower initiated an ineffectual command climate through poor administration of personal focused behaviors with his command staff. In lieu of an effective command climate, Allied strategic successes are attributed to the collective professionalism and determination of the Allied staff.

The Normandy Landings were a series of landing operations by Allied forces to capture Normandy during World War 2. The Normandy Landings were also known to the Allied forces as Operation Neptune, or D-Day. Meanwhile, the operation to gain control of France was named Operation Overlord. The purpose of Operation Overlord was to seize Western Europe starting with France from Nazi control and enter Germany together with the Soviet forces from Eastern Europe to end the Nazi regime. During this conflict, 156,000 Allied troops fought against a outnumbered 50,350 Nazi force. In the end, the Allies had approx. 10,000 causalities as opposed to the Nazi’s 4000-9000 casualties.