Command Of The Air Force

The quick evolving military environment, needs the US Army redouble its efforts to reduce the uncertainty associated with the downsizing. There are some predominant principles that can guide the Army’s efforts in minimizing the impact of uncertainty during the force reduction. Even with major political and legislative challenges, keeping balance among the different proportions of readiness is a goal of US defense policy. During the budgetary preparation, downsizing of the armed forces often becomes one of the first victims of fiscal reduction. This was true of the years between World War I and World War II, when the Great Depression made military preparedness a very low national priority. The Army’s downsizing effect put its readiness

Consequently, the Obama Administration has silenced defense leader for a long time, so he could keep his Budget Control Act or (BCA). For example “8 years under the Obama Administration, top defense officials were largely silenced and prevented from articulating their concerns about budget cuts and decreased readiness”(Cooper pg1). The Obama Administration neglected top defense officials, which has resulted in “Army has lost more than 205,000 soldiers, or 30 percent of its staff”(Spencer). Nevertheless, this has also resulted in “3 of 58 Army brigade combat teams are considered ready for combat”(Cooper). Conversely, Obama cut down the military so far that America has 150,000-225,000 troops ready in the Army when all of our combat teams should be ready for combat, so that the armed forces can protect America’s interests at home and abroad. Moreover, the Army is not the only who has experienced decreased readiness, for example, there have been budget cuts across the board which have resulted in “The Air Force is the smallest and oldest it has ever been”(Cooper). “80 percent of the United States Marine Corps or (USMC) do not have the minimum number of aircraft they need for training and basic operations”(Cooper). “The Navy’s fleet is the smallest it has been in nearly 100 years”(Cooper). “Maintenance period will increase costs 2.6 times”(Pickup). Accordingly, all parts of the Armed forces have experienced budget cuts

The history of force reductions after the Cold War era and Operation Desert Storm proves the reliance on contract support to America’s fighting force was important to accomplish the mission. (CGSC, 2015). The Army should maintain its level of contract support relative to the current budget constraints and force reductions. Contract support with oversight from Army Material Command is a force multiplier but will require several mitigation measures in order to be effective in future campaigns.

In September 2011, the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee voted to cancel the Army and Marine Corps' Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) in their version of the fiscal year 2012 defense bill (Munoz, 2011). This measure could have completely shut down efforts to replace a thirty year-old fleet of Humvees, loyal but potentially outmoded tactical wheeled vehicles. The Army's Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle program has been a project set to replace the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) family in the works for years. The project, however, continues to be stymied by budgetary constraints. Per-vehicle costs for the JLTV begin at $250,000 and are likely to climb, as Lockheed-Martin secured a preliminary contract for engineering, design, and development. The high cost of the JLTV does preclude it from completely replacing the HMMWV, and yet cost does not preclude the JLTV from supplementing the Army's fleet. A middle-ground solution is the best method of maximizing initial investments, while also banking on the robustness of national security.

The Department of Defense (DOD) must decide how to rebalance the armed forces general force structure to meet future challenges and opportunities in an austere fiscal environment. The general force structure and capabilities of Joint Force 2020 necessary to adjust the force based on current strategic direction and fiscal constraints is a smaller, efficient, adaptable and integrated joint force. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) emphasizes US military forces will evolve and remain modern, capable, and ready while accepting some increased risk through force reductions. Rebalancing will require innovative approaches and solutions to protect the homeland, build global security, project power, and win decisively with a leaner force.

On August 2, 2011, Congress passed the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 which cut $487 billion from projected defense spending over the next 10 years.1 The act also established a system of sequestration, which would cut an additional $495 billion from the defense budget.2 Altogether, the BCA would cut almost $1 trillion dollars from the Department of Defense (DoD). The passing of the BCA and the subsequent loss of funding mark an end to a 13-year period of robust budget allocations to support the global war on terrorism. From 2001 to 2013 over $1.6 trillion has been allocated to the DoD to support preparations for and execution of operations in various overseas areas.3 Within this $1.6 trillion, 94% of the funding was allocated to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 This robust amount of funding cultivated a culture within the DoD that there would always be funding available to cover costs at home and abroad. This culture is deeply entrenched within the United States Army due to large budgets provided to the Army over the past 13 years. In today’s environment of shrinking budgets, this culture can no longer stand true and must be changed. Establishing a cost-conscious culture (CCC) within the Army is critical to our ability to sustain the current Army force structure and make the needed modernization investments to ensure our capability to fight and win our nations wars.

A few decades ago, the military needed an upgrade on its cargo and troop carrying capabilities. In the 1950’s, the less modern World War II cargo aircraft were the C-190, C-47, and C-46’s. These did not meet the requirements for a continuously modernizing U.S. Military. (Simpson, M. (2011, October 19)). Therefore, in 1951, the U.S. Air Force put out a General Operating Requirement for a new airframe that will meet specifications in the category’s of how many passengers or paratroopers it will hold, as well as size

The Army has already established the need for maintaining an operational reserve, through former and current TAAs, capable of breaching AC capability gaps to meet joint force requirements. However, the analysis lacks resources to accomplish this guidance effectively. The demand for RC forces requires generating more operational unit readiness to fully complement the rotational force pool to meet the deployment demand at the same standard as the AC. After conducting a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) analysis, both overarching recommendations address an identified capability requirement and associated capability gap that could be mitigated with a non-materiel solution with changes or existing capabilities in five, organization, training, personnel, facilities, and policy, of the eight functions.

The third issue that was discussed in these articles is a strong disconnect between what is being planned vs reality. Following 9/11, Pentagon budget went up significantly to justify the ongoing fight against global terrorism. However, if we look carefully, it is obvious that a higher percentage of the defense budget is going to fund Cold war era programs and may reduce readiness for Asymmetric warfare we are currently experiencing or may experience more in future. Additionally, unreliable information coming from DOD’s accounting system makes it extremely difficult to generate future force projections and cost estimates based on past and present status of expenditures. Overall, it creates an unrealistic ballooning defense budget that is not economically sustainable.

Pick an assumption that, if proven false, would have the greatest impact on your COA and provide two changes to your air approach in order to adequately address this issue. Discuss how this changes the overall risk assessment of the operation for the combined force commander.

The Army has endured many issues as ebbs and flows with this process. It is imperative for any long-term operation to be a sustained warfighting effort. The quality of the force readiness is measured on its ability to be sustained. Sustainment in itself has eight different elements of which each has multiple facets or sub-elements that comprise the system.

Field commanders requested safer vehicles suited for irregular warfare tactics, and received up-armored Humvees and add-on armor kits, which did not provide sufficient protection in an irregular warfare environment. Further, the services were slow to respond to combatant commanders’ requests for MRAPs because their priority was to develop the JLTV, fueled by the assertion that MRAPs would be obsolete beyond the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This speaks to the tendency of the services to invest in future capabilities, while failing to provide combatant commanders with a method to develop or procure equipment necessary to successfully fight present wars (Carter, p.2). The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) oversees JCIDS and is “often misaligned because it often defers to the services. Neither the Army nor the Marines wanted to invest in MRAPs, so neither did the JROC” (p. 10, Lamb). As a result, the requirement for MRAPs was slow to validate and once valid remained an unfunded requirement until political pressure and public opinion forced the Pentagon to reevaluate fielding MRAPs in large numbers.

The main focus of this journal is the question of American ethics, when regarding to German civilians. It is explained that the American Airforce was told to do routine bombings in areas that weren’t heavily populated; however, the locations that were bombed still had locals at risk. These individuals had nothing to do to do with the war, causing author Ronald Schaffer to raise the question of: How does the United states differ from other entities attacking innocent lives? Regardless of the other atrocities taking place during this time, the ethics of the American Airforce is put on a negative display over the course of this war. In Schaffer’s conclusion, he describes how ethical issues directly relate to the Airforce’s leaders during this

The United States Air Force, USAF, was recognized on 18 September 1947. It was on this day that air activities were reassigned from the United States Army. The mission of the USAF is to fly, fight, and win in air, space, and cyberspace. To attain this mission, the USAF has a vision of Global Vigilance, Reach and Power. That vision circles around three core competencies: developing Airmen, technology to war fighting and integrating operations. These core competencies make our six distinct capabilities possible. The Public Health Technology, AFSC 4E0X1, career field is 1 of 133 different career fields in the USAF. The Public Health career field is a part of the medical group and falls under the Air Force Medical Service (AFMS). The mission

1. The focus of this paper is the total force initiative and the positive impact that it should have on the Air Force. This concept will allow the cost of reequipping the Air Force to be split between three different allotments of funds. The opponents to this policy claim that the active duty budget will decrease causing a reduction in the number of professional airmen. This argument is countered by the integration of Active Duty (ADAF) personnel with Air National Guard (ANG) and Reserve (AFR) units