Command Structure Of Operation Anaconda

On November 27 through December 13, 1950, the Battle of Chosin Reservoir was a decisive battle in the Korean War. The battle was fought over some of the roughest terrain during some of the harshest winter weather conditions of the Korean War (Appleman, p24). Major General Olive P. Smith, commander of the US 1st Marines Division, used proper mission command

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

Major military units and headquarters include NATO’s Allied Command Transformation, U.S. Joint Forces. Command, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, the U.S. Air Force’s Air Combat Command, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

During arduous combat operations coinciding with a high OPTEMPO unit cohesion may flux toward a detriment of mission success. This report will focus on the 56TH Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in order to address the critical leadership problem. In addition, focus will center on relevant facts and assumptions that led to the critical leadership problem and rectify the issues. Furthermore, a new ABCT vision will be published in order to restructure the organizational culture toward a unified purpose and an increase in esprit de corps. (Verify with lesson for correct purpose)

Operations Desert Shield/Storm took place during the Gulf War, which was a conflict between Iraq and a coalition force of more than 30 nations mandated by the United Nations, led by the United States commanded by General Norman Schwarzkopf, who conducted one of the greatest military campaigns of all times that resulted with the coalition victory. The name Operation Desert Shield was for the operation leading to the built up of troops and defense of Saudi Arabia and Operation Desert Storm for the combat phase to liberate Kuwait. This war included more than 500.000 United States troops, dominated by technological superiority that definitely favored the coalition forces. The use of missiles, guided bombs and invisible plane made easy to destroy Iraqi ground targets, being so the first war in history to use the air power to defeat ground forces. The commander of this operation General Schwarzkopf was a consolidated leader with great experience in war and diplomacy, who had extend knowledge of the Middle East since the childhood. General Schwarzkopf ability to use the principles of mission command led the coalition into the desired end state, which was the defense of Saudi Arabia and liberation of Kuwait. General Norman Schwarzkopf successfully utilized mission command principles within Operation Desert Storm/Shield by creating a shared understanding, building cohesive teams through mutual trust, provide a clear commander’s intent, and accept a prudent risk, which played a

The mission command system is expressed as the placement of individuals within a unit conducting operations with a specific set of procedures and principles in place to optimize the use of its equipment. What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? There are six key principles of mission command in developing a cohesive team that support all aspects of a mission. The following essay will discuss these principles and examine examples of how the famous Operation Anaconda both endured victories and inadequacies.

In the mountainous Shah-i-Khot region south of the city of Gardez in Eastern Afghanistan, Operation Anaconda took place early March 2002. Operation Anaconda, to this day, stands as the largest reported ground action in the Afghan war. This 17-day battle led to eight U.S. casualties and over 50 wounded. Operation Anaconda is viewed as a success due to coalition forces being able to kill and root out several hundred Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, which left U.S. and coalition forces in control of the Shah-i-Khot Valley. Originally intended to be a three-day battle with light resistance, a seven-day battle ensued with intense fighting and was finally

As Operation Anaconda took shape the command structure became very convoluted. MG Hagenbeck had command and control (C2) of the majority of the U.S. ground force elements, but not all of them. There was a separate chain of command for black Special Operations Forces (SOF) and inter-agency operations. These forces reported directly to CENTCOM, and had different priorities and the authority to request and receive support from a variety of the same assets needed for Operation Anaconda, to include AC 130 gunships. Operation Anaconda Case Study (2003)

10th Mountain Division’s Commander, General Hagenbeck became the Combined Joint Task Force Commander. CJTF Mountain would be operating out of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Colonel Mulholland was the Special Forces Commander also located in Afghanistan. They both agreed that a cordon was needed around the valley and slowly tighten in on the Taliban forces. The mission was appropriately named Operation Anaconda.9

SOF were organized into five individual task forces with specific roles and responsibilities: Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF-N), know as Task Force Dagger; Joint Special Operations Task Force-South (JSOTF-S), known as Task Force K-Bar; Task Force Sword; The Joint Inter Agency Task Force – Counter Terrorism (JIATF-CT), known as Task Force Bowie; and

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

Major Mark Davis conducted extensive interviews on this topic with air, ground, and special operations commanders, staff officers, and other forces that participated in Operation Anaconda. In his research, Davis found some major problems had occurred that caused a failure in coordination efforts. The first error Davis sighted was that “the DOD failed to establish proper command structures and relationships needed for integration among the systems” (MacPherson 2005, p. 350). This made it difficult for air and ground forces to communicate among each other when the battle was underway. Davis also sites that U.S. Central Command Chief Franks, made a costly decision to command the war from his office in Tampa, Florida. He was 7,000 miles and 10 time zones away from the battle front. Chief Franks believed that rather than move himself and his unit, would speed up the operating progress and not slow down the mission. Franks and his command relied on video phone conferences instead of personal communications, which led to limited communications. Another problem was that Franks gave lists of plans to be carried out rather than one battle plan. Also, because of the large numbers of independent units that participated, it was impossible for Franks to maintain communication presence and coordinate over this large command structure. This ultimately left decision making in the hands of CENTCOM staff

U.S. battle plan for Anaconda employed forces, tactics, and procedures that reflected earlier successful experiences in Afghanistan. The early stages of the battle, however, produced stronger enemy resistance and a more adverse combat environment than expected, and major adaptations had to be made to the initial plan. In particular, joint air forces had to be quickly called on to provide a large volume of close air support. Because such changes had not been expected or prepared for, U.S. forces initially had some difficulties integrating their service-component actions into true joint operations; allied contributions and agency cooperation were also lacking. The battle was predicted and planned to last 2 to 3 days. In the event, U.S. forces