Commanders And Their Subordinate Joint Force Commanders

Mission Command is the framework used by the U.S. Army to ensure key leaders receive clear direction from commanders. Clear commander’s guidance allows subordinates to make disciplined and informed decisions to best accomplish assigned tasks. Ideally, application of mission command principles ensures all elements integrate and sync actions, thus creating a shared understanding and purpose. Analysis of Major General (MG) William Garrison’s decision making during the Battle of Mogadishu demonstrates how mission command principles must be applied to gain and maintain a position of advantage during military ground operations. As commander of Task Force Ranger (TFR), MG Garrison demonstrated both successful and failed application of mission command principles. Four principles will be discussed in the

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate JFCs that conduct military operations within their AORs [JP-1]. GCCs takes on a lot of responsibility they are normally responsible for a large geographical area; not mention the effective coordination of operations within that area falls on the shoulder of the GCC. Directives flow from the President and SecDef through CJCS to the GCCs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national or multinational strategic objectives. GCCs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military force. One plan

According to Army ADP 6-0, mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander, using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent, to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (CAPE, 2012). Effective mission command can generally be analyzed according to the six principles outlined in ADRP 6-0. The six principles of mission command are to: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk (CAPE, 2012). This paper provides a brief overview of the

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

The Joint Force Commander (JFC) utilizes command and control to exercise authority over assigned and attached forces within his or her command. Command provides direction and motivation to individuals and units, whereas control is the task of managing forces and the associated tasks required to accomplish the mission. Effective command and control successfully balances the art of command with the science of control and strengthens the commander’s ability to make and execute decisions. Mission command advances command and control

Howard, E. 2003). CENTCOM wanted to keep as little of a footprint in Afghanistan as it could, and, therefore, tasked JSOFT DAGGER, known through the case study as TF DAGGER, to develop a plan to clear out the Shahi Kot Valley (Fleri, E. Howard, E. 2003). There are several key components necessary when planning such as “task organization, mission statement, commander’s intent, concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units, coordinating instructions and control measures” (ADRP 5-0, para 2-69). During COA development, the mistakes in planning became apparent. In the case study there are missing elements “Initially Task Force Mountain was not designated a joint task force which led to joint planning problems” (Fleri, E. Howard, E. 2003).

The Center of Gravity (COG) as defined by Carl Von Clausewitz means the source of power, which is capable of providing physical or moral strength, will to act, or freedom of action to a person or group. According to the military concept of COG as developed by Clausewitz, there are friendly and unfriendly COGs depending on the result of the military war Lieutenant (110). The friendly COG enables allied forces to attain their objectives, and the unfriendly COG depicts the element that prevents the friendly forces from achieving their objectives. The COG may also refer to the physical objects of war or simply the will to fight and win the battle (111). Centers of gravity are likely to change during a war

A way to increase the effectiveness of these types of operations for the Combatant Commander or Joint Forces Commander is to establish a “new lead department or agency for cybersecurity”. (Gerstell, p.9) The purpose of this organization would be to do exactly what you are outlining so that cyberspace operations can be carried out by

A “crucial enabler” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011, pp. III-24) or force generator, critical capabilities (CC) are the inherent functions, activities or events that allow a center of gravity to achieve its specified or implied objectives. Using the Ends-Ways-Means-Risk framework, critical capabilities represent the “Ways” (i.e. methods, tactics or strategies) in which a COG will accomplish its mission. Stated more simply, a CC is something a “center of gravity [can] do to you that puts great fear (or concern) into your heart in the context of your mission and level of war “ (Strange & Iron, 2013, p. 7).

Our textbooks define COG as, “the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action and will to act.” To have practical application of targeting COGs, I believe we should have multiple COGs. Today’s conflict environments lead to COGs that fall along the lines of structural and ideological/moral lines.

The Joint Strategic Planning System is a group of interconnected formal defense processes whose terminal objective is the execution of Operations Plan/EXORDS in support of U.S. political objectives. The entire activity is overseen by one four star general, Chair Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, and to increase information flow efficiency and effectiveness, the CJCS serves as the system focal point for all inputs and outputs. Simply, the CJCS key components, or roles, is to assess, advise, direct, and execute. The process of the CJCS, as a whole, is cyclical in nature in that upon completion of execution, the methodology returns to assessment and beings the process all over again. My cursory assessment of the process is that four primary

The GE is a versatile platform nested within the division, giving brigade and battalion commanders unprecedented access to what was a theater level type asset. This increases their lethality and maximizes their efficiency by providing a real-time picture of the battlefield, allowing them to shape it using both lethal and nonlethal capabilities. While battle proven in the COIN environment, only time will tell if it will remain a combat multiplier within the convention realm. To remain relevant, it must continue to evolve to meet ground commander’s requirements in both areas, while continuing to flush out previously identified weaknesses. This is especially true of its cyber and EW vulnerabilities as these will define future battlefields. Additionally, commanders and IC managers must understand the GEs capabilities and limitations in order to take full advantage of its laundry list of combat multipliers. In closing, the GE has cemented its place as a highly versatile asset and will continue to evolve to meet the ever-changing battlefield by providing a bird’s eye view of the battlefield to lower level commanders allowing them to make the best timely decision

C500, operational art and joint planning build upon the foundation that C300, Unified Action, and C400, Army Doctrine and planning laid. Throughout Command and General Staff College (CGSC), we are challenged to “get something out of what we put in” and to add “tools to our toolbox”. The tool I added, that will not only have joint and conventional application but furthermore life long application is the operational design methodology.

Today, military action is done as a team, and cooperation is needed between different military departments, commanders, and staff. This calls for a Joint Planning Process. The Joint planning process is the process used by planners of any military action so that they can develop a detailed plan. The joint planning process seeks to identify and mitigate risks on the battlefield and design options for successfully staging a military action. Military achieves by shaping events, facing unforeseen contingencies and responding to unexpected dangers on the battlefield. This paper will examine the seven steps of the Joint Operation Planning Process with insight on Operation Anaconda.