PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
1 September 1989
The Chairman,
Securities and Exchange Commission,
Washington DC
Re: Examination of Alleged Racketeering Conspiracy and Insider Trading by the Chairman and officials of Crazy Eddie, Inc.
Dear Sir,
We have conducted a fraud examination concerning alleged incidents of racketeering conspiracy and insider trading by Chairman and former Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Eddie Antar, and other officials of the Crazy Eddie, Inc.
Our examination was conducted in accordance with lawful fraud examination techniques, which include—but are not limited to—examination of books and on-line records, voluntary interviews with appropriate personnel, and other such evidence-gathering procedures as necessary under the circumstances.
Overview of the Case: The Securities and Exchange Commission claims Mark D. Begelman misused proprietary information regarding the merger of Bluegreen Corporation with BFC Financial Corporation. Mr. Begelman allegedly learned of the acquisition through a network of professional connections known as the World Presidents’ Organization (Maglich). Members of this organization freely share non-public business information with other members in confidence; however, Mr. Begelman allegedly did not abide by the organization’s mandate of secrecy and leveraged private information into a lucrative security transaction. As stated in the summary of the case by the SEC, “Mark D. Begelman, a member of the World Presidents’ Organization (“WPO”), abused
Our project team analyzed the Fraud and Illegal Acts Case (True blood Case Studies- Case 08-9), which involves a questionable sales transaction made between Jersey Johnnie’s Surfboard, an SEC registrant, and Mr. Sinaloa, an independent sales representative of the company. As a simplified overview of the case, an external audit firm was hired on to perform a year-end audit of Jersey Johnnie’s Surfboards, Inc. Towards the end of the audit, the engagement partner notified the auditors that there could be a possibility of fraud and illegal acts made by the company.
Mr. Spindler revealed that Eddie Antar engaged a series of schemes between 1984 and 1987 designed to embezzle money from the company and later falsely to portray Crazy Eddie as a thriving commercial enterprise so that Antar and others could sell their shares at an inflated price.
Werle used Digital Analysis technique to uncover this fraud. She conducted computerized analytical review. She also conducted in depth research to investigate irregular activities and contracts that could have been entered in to by
a. The falsification of inventory count sheets. – Auditors should have observed a physical count of the inventory to check for accuracy. The case had mentioned that Eddie Antar would ship inventory to his retail stores before auditors arrived to conceal any shortages. (Knapp, 2011) These sites should have been audited unannounced in order to hinder any attempt by the client to conceal fraud.
The Fraud Examination Team conducted due diligence background checks on both Mr. Eddie Antar and Mr. Sam E. Antar by checking on-line and other records, reviewing financial statements of Crazy Eddie, interviews of key participants and Crazy Eddie employees who we believed may have information regarding the alleged fraudulent activities.
I am surprised at the number of Steven Cohen’s fortune. Within two decades, he accumulated a vast fortune: “a sprawling 35,000-square-foot mansion on Connecticut's gold coast; a $62-million beach house in the Hamptons, and several New York apartments, including a $115-million midtown duplex -- all of them furnished with some of the world's most expensive art” (kqed.org). Moreover, I was shocked with Jiau’s illegal gain through insider trading. According to the interview, in exchange for her information, Jiau “reportedly received about $120,000 a year, plus a number of other perks such as three iPhones, a $300 gift certificate to the Cheesecake Factory, and a dozen fresh lobsters” (complianceweek.com).
Insider dealing has been affecting the efficiency of stock markets in different places like United States, United Kingdom and Australia. Hong Kong is of no exception. Basically, insider dealing refers to the trading of a corporation’s stock or other securities by individual with potential access to non-public information of the company. The law of insider dealing in Hong Kong provides a much more detailed definition and is very comprehensive. However, when it comes to enforcement, it seems not very effective. In the following, the law of insider dealing in Hong Kong will be summarized. After analyzing the comprehensiveness of the law, the underlying reasons of the difficulty in enforcement will be identified. Some
Following the risk assessment procedures, substantive procedures are designed and conducted to detect material misstatements of relevant assertions. Substantive procedures include analytical procedures and tests of details. Analytical procedures involve evaluations of financial statement information by a study of relationships among financial and nonfinancial data. Tests of details may be divided into three types. One test is the test of account balances to address whether there are misstatements in the ending balance of an account. In the case of Crazy Eddie, auditors should have put greater attention to inventory and accounts payable accounts. The second test is a test of classes of transactions to determine whether particular types of transactions have been properly accounted for during the period. Crazy Eddies fraudulently classified these transshipping transactions as retail sales to inflate its sales revenue and continue growth at existing stores. A key ratio for retailers is to compare growth in existing stores to growth from new stores. The third and final test is a test of disclosures to evaluate whether financial statement disclosures are properly presented. Crazy Eddie prepared bogus debit memos of over $20 million to understate accounts payable.
Fraud, lying, conspiracy...not terms that any individual generally wants associated with their history, nonetheless with their reputation and personality, especially if that individual happens to be Martha Stewart. Martha Stewart: a name which almost every person who calls themselves an American can recognize. Her name pronounces itself across cookbooks, magazines and even has its own show on Style and The Learning Channel. It now pronounces itself with yet another captivating theme, as part of one of America's major scandals.
I believe that highly paid business executives engage in illegal practices such as insider trading is greed. I was thinking about this and talking to this about my dad about this topic. We were thinking that these big business executives want to find a way to make even more money than they have now or they want to double it and they might be able to get away with it with bribery for example.
It can fairly be said that an Investor considering an investment decision (whether to purchase, sell or hold stock) in publicly traded company acts on the basis of extensive information which is available by corporation to him until the last moment of his investing decision and try to determine the fair price of corporate stock. In the light of continuous creation of a particular impression of corporate affairs by the corporation, new information by corporate can vanish the importance of previous available information to investor. In the scenario only one kind of investors can get advantage over others, who is either very close to corporate operation (corporate officers) or can access nonpublic price-sensitive information to corporation
The fact that the insider trading charges were thrown out, but the conspiracy charges stuck is curious. It appears, yet again, the judicial process and mainstream social construct of acceptable behavior collided with what Martha, her broker, and fellow investor touted as ‘nothing wrong’. Knowing more of John Savarrese’s role as Martha’s pretrial counsel, gives two more important points about Martha’s case of white collar crime. The first is questionable ethics and the other is arrogance. Mr. Savarrese has been criticized by legal analysts for not providing ethical legal advice to Martha or making the right professional choices himself. The belief is that Savarrese knew or at least suspected, Martha and Bacanovic planned to perjure themselves. As Martha’s legal counselor it was ethically negligent of Savarrese not to advise Martha of the legal repercussions of lying to the SEC. If Martha insisted on presenting her fraudulent story, Savarrese should have immediately withdrawn as her counsel (Hoffman, 2007). More importantly than if Savarrese knew or not, in her arrogance, Martha never thought this issue of a mere $45, 637 would develop into charges nor a prison sentence! She was simply above the laws and saw no reason to tell the
This research examines the extent of the use of the financial investigation method to advance the process of fraud investigation. To achieve this aim, an exploratory case study was utilised to allow the researcher conducting an in-depth investigation. This case study is carried out by exploring several fraud cases that significantly used financial investigation method in the process of investigation.
Insider trading refers to the trading of a listed company’s stock or other financial securities by individuals who has access to non-public material information about the company. This action often occurs within employees/ex-employees of the listen company. Information is considered to be non-public material information if making it public would affect the price of securities, and using such information in decisions to buy or sell financial securities would be unfair to non-insiders (Bainbridge, 2013). Insider trading is treated as a mischief in more than 90 countries, and defendants are imposed with penalties (Beny, 2012). Specific insider conduct regulations in New Zealand were first enacted in 1988, followed by amendments in 2002, 2006 and 2008. The insider conduct regimes between 1988 and 2008 are often considered as a failure due to weak enforcements. Thus in 2008, the regulator introduced a new regime, which was a close model to the Australian insider conduct legislation. Both regimes are expansive, meaning it could be applied to any person in possession of insider information. However, while the Australian laws were aggressively enforced (more than 26 prosecutions were brought since then), no prosecutions have been launched under the new legislation in New Zealand. In addition, New Zealand also had no convictions secured prior to 2008, illustrating a clear enforcement deficit in the New Zealand