Conventional and Irregular Warfare

The concept of war as a static and unchanging occurrence is an outdated and dangerous miscalculation. More accurately, war is a fluidic, evolving and shifting phenomenon constantly reinventing itself, rendering stagnant, inflexible principles potentially disastrous. Consequently, as students of war and future players in this transforming theatre, the study of eras of significant development is an extremely relevant pursuit. Recognizing the need for adaptation and the creation of doctrine is now a prerequisite for any effective modern commander. War is unpredictable in nature and particularly so in current theatres of operation, in which change is rapid

To be sure, a surprise strategic Chinese attack is a valuable worst-case scenario to study, but protracted multi-dimensional U.S.-China competition for Pacific influence—akin to the contemporary era—is arguably more likely and, thus, a more sensible scenario against which to wargame. Also, despite its plausible portrayal of a localized insurgency, the novel stops short of depicting mass civil unrest elsewhere and social stability considerations that would almost certainly accompany a future world war. Nonetheless, Ghost Fleet’s technical narrative provides ample realistic content for today’s security and defense officials to balance and refine tomorrow’s warfare strategies. Singer and Cole’s near-future depiction of U.S. technological vulnerability in warfare should spur those officials to enable American innovation and adaptation in warfighting solutions well before the onset of strategic

The notion of an American way of war informs how scholars, policymakers, and strategists understand how Americans fight. A way of war—defined as a society’s cultural preferences for waging war—is not static. Change can occur as a result of important cultural events, often in the form of traumatic experiences or major social transformations. A way of war is therefore the malleable product of culturally significant past experiences. Reflecting several underlying cultural ideals, the current American way of war consists of three primary tenets—the desire for moral clarity, the primacy of technology, and the centrality of scientific management systems—which combine to create a preference for decisive, large-scale conventional wars with clear objectives and an aversion to morally ambiguous low-intensity conflicts that is relevant to planners because it helps them address American strategic vulnerabilities.

Introduction In 1941, the United States of America faced the prospect of war. The old world order of imperial empires had fallen apart, and it seemed destined to end an inglorious blaze of destruction made possible by modern technologies of war like tanks, airplanes, machine guns, and submarines, among other things to make way for the new order to come. The United States, being both a Pacific and Atlantic power, found itself in the middle of it all and for various cultural, economic, and political reasons, it was hesitant to accept the burdens and responsibilities of international engagement that came along with the tremendous wealth and power they had almost stumbled upon in the twentieth century. At its foundation the United States did not

Originally influenced by the strategic events seen throughout the Napoleonic Wars in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the nine principles of war derived from the United States’ Army’s “Principles of War and Operations” outline a basic strategic guide on waging war. Shortly before the military adopted these guidelines, however, the United States of America saw civil unrest as the Southern states seceded to form the Confederate States of America. As the Union Army of the North battled the Confederate Army of the South, strategic principles similar to those outlined in the U.S. Army’s doctrine began to appear on the battlefield. Although the armies of the Union and the Confederacy both utilized strategic elements outlined in the United States’ Army’s “Principles of War and Operations”, the Union army’s stricter adherence to certain strategic principles resulted in their ultimate success.

The United States Military faces many challenges engaging in conflicts around the world. Stretched thin, the elements of war evolves from AirLand Battle to Unified Land Operations. From the Cold war to Operation Iraqi Freedom the way of the military is winning on offense, winning decisively, while maintaining the initiative.

Irregular warfare is an ever changing series of events with random approaches that differ from party to party. These tactics used by the enemy could be morally shocking, confusing, and seemly impossible to overcome when Marines are not prepared. There are several actions that a small unit leader is required or can take to prepare Marines for irregular warfare in future conflicts. Training Marines is by far the best action a small unit leader can take to develop the young Marines with the skills and abilities to have the edge over the enemy in irregular warfare.

Instead of working on the techniques, training, and doctrine that took place during the war in Vietnam, they decided to avoid that type of warfare in future encounters. Ricks uses many different types of evidence to back up his claims, including testimonies of Army leaders, and intellectuals who believe that there have not been any real doctrine placed to focus on the type of warfare that was used in Vietnam since the war.

Both WWII and OIF offer valuable insights into the application of strategic art. Specifically, the U.S. government’s understanding of the war and coalition-warfare are two aspects of strategy that can be used to compare/contrast both conflicts. First, the government’s understanding of the war during WWII was that the European-theater was a war of liberation that sought to expel Axis forces from occupied nations. Consequently, leaders understood the risks involved when dealing with Vichy French forces. This risk was addressed by providing adequate forces to eliminate Vichy French forces during the North-Africa campaign should they oppose the Allied invasion. This indicated that the U.S. understood the war that it was engaging in. OIF

If World War I served as airpower’s infancy, then the developments and adaptations made during World War II were airpower’s awkward teenage years. The lessons learned during WWI and WWII laid the foundation for the newest domain of warfare to mature from. Through the inter-war period all major belligerents developed doctrine on how to employ airpower in the “next” war, over land and sea. It is my belief that the United States was the best, out of all belligerents, at adapting its airpower throughout World War II (WWII) and did so while fighting in two separate theatres. Three adaptations I believe best highlight the adaptability of America’s airpower are the strategic bombing changes regarding Japan, the addition of drop tanks on fighters and close air support.

This paper reviews America’s paradoxical love-hate relationship with war and how this relationship influences American warfare through the research and study of the interpretation and analyzation of American military models, policy and goal changes, the use of military technology, “American way of war,” and the relationship with, preparation for, and application of war.

In this article various pints were made on the concepts that the evolution of society and technology can affect the acts of crime, terror and warfare. Asymmetrical warfare has become a larger course taken that brings Transnational Criminal Organizations as well as Terror groups and PMCs on the level of Nation-States. The research question can be surmised as what is the distinction between crime, terrorism and warfare in the new changing dynamic and environment? The thesis is, the changes in society along with the additional evolution of technology, there is a conflict between traditional forms of conflict and criminal organizations as well as terror groups. These changes can make smallest threat a similar threat as a military from a Nation-State.

During the Second World War, the U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) and Royal Air Force (RAF) adopted two different strategic attack missions against Germany. While USAAF preferred daylight “precision targeting” attacks, RAF preferred night “area bombing” missions. Although both sides shared same goals, their interpretation about strategic effects of airpower was different. For better understanding these differences, this paper first will analyze strategic applications of USAAF and RAF, and then will clarify why USAAF’s approach was more effective way of utilizing airpower as an instrument of national policy.

The concept of airpower and its effectiveness against the enemy’s fielded military forces is well documented in a number of literatures. In the history of American military, airpower has been considered not only as the sharpest military sword but also a highly versatile set of tools used to effectively promote national strategy. Airpower’s effectiveness in support of national strategy has significantly improved since 1945. The study of airpower exposed certain consistencies which have affected its effectiveness. The theory and practice of airpower filled the past century with frequently persuasive victories coupled with a historical documentation packed with arguable failures. It is important to note that the effectiveness of airpower, as a military operational strategy, has triggered a debate among proponents and non-proponents. Some airpower theorists have debated its effectiveness. Throughout history, the many claims about airpower’s decisiveness to independently win wars or conflicts have hindered the notional and real application of this instrument of power. This essay highlights factors which consider the scope of the strengths and limitations of airpower that has been and will continue to be effective throughout the 21st century.

Asymmetrical warfare is an appealing choice to those who may not have a military force to use. This type of warfare is a murderous tactic and has become more popular war tactic since the end of the cold world war. To resort to terror is not always chosen because the enemy is more powerful. It can happen between two great powers as the conflict becomes a total war and societies escalate against each other cutting away civilized restraints. For example, in 1950s Strategic Air Command targeteers would find ways to cause “bonus” damage by aiming blasts so adjacent towns would be destroyed as well (Howard & Hoffman, 2012). The goal here was not to kill civilians per se, but to wreak havoc on the enemy’s economy. This type of strategic attack can be hard to understand, but even states with legitimate purposes have sometimes resorted to this strategy in order to revert to a single standard which puts deliberate attacks against civilians beyond pale.