Cooper case Solution

Here, in the given pro forma in Exhibit 8, the cost of salt and other in 1984 was 1836 while that in 1983 is 1956. Thus, the growth rate is (1956-1836)/1836=6.6%.

However, based on Sierra’s calculations, come up a much more conservative view. With the request of Mr. Chu, a fair bid price could be calculated along with any appropriate counterproposals. Appropriate steady state growth rates and terminal values would be included and explained.

* If we surmise that the company’s specialist’s predictions of 4% on market growth along with renewing current and or adding more customer contracts then the profits should be as follows:

They derived this projection through estimating savings from increased operating efficiencies and by consolidation of duplicate functions. The present value of the synergies would range from $1.71 to $2.14 billion (Assuming the cash flows to be perpetuity using a discount rate of 8.3%). However, Vulcan’s leadership scoffed at Martin Marietta’s estimate of the merger synergies. Instead Vulcan CEO, Donald James was convinced the true value of synergies would not exceed $50 million per year. The present value of this synergy estimate would be $428 million (Assuming the cash flows to be perpetuity using a discount rate of 8.3%). This is summarized in table 2 below.

The standard for terminal growth is normally GDP, or 3%. Given the maturity of this

1. In the last five years the growth in sales for the company has been around 10% per annum, except for the 1997, the growth was 18.78%. In the case, nothing is mentioned that company has made any drastic changes in its strategy to grow faster. In such a scenario, projected a consistent growth of 20% per annum for the next 5 years is too optimistic.

This paper will address penetrating the global marketplace and broaden the area of operations and sales for ToolsCorp Corporation. This paper will include the overall evaluation of this corporation and the long term strategic plan development. It will also include the corporation’s mission and vision statements.

Next, the terminal value at year ten was calculated. The following formula was used to do so: terminal value at year 10 = (FCF at year 11)/(WACC - g). This time we used the long-term growth rate of 7up, which was given by the case as 1% less than the industry rate. This resulted in a terminal value of $848M with its present value calculation being $231M.

b) When assuming that Ms. Zhang’s estimates for synergies are accurate we can compute a new unlevered free cash flow looking like this:

There are only 3 main competitors in the commercial jet engine-making industry which operates as an oligopoly. Historically, all of these companies have competed with each other for jet engine contracts which led to intense price wars. To avert ruinous price wars, these companies typically enter into exclusive supplier contracts with aircraft manufacturers. In such arrangements, the engine maker becomes the sole provider of jet engines for a specific aircraft model.

The full report shows all the forecasting data for 2012 – 2016, it clearly estimate the financial trend of our company (attachment). For the data used in this model, some of them are current data, the other are historical or most recently or average number. It only depends on actually situation – for which method is much more realistic.

Then, we can get growth rates of 2007 -2011 are 2.46%, 1.76%, 4.09%, 3.61% and 2.78% respectively. Finally, we take the average growth rate of 2.94% as long-term growth rate. The computation is showed in Exhibit 2($ in thousands).

After considering the operational improvements forecasted, we project Robertson’s free cash flows and compute the terminal value using the Gordon Growth Method; the implied share price is analyzed further in accordance to growth rate and discount rate.

Cooper Industries is a broad company that uses the M&A strategy of diversification by acquiring companies that posses their own strong assets and exhibit stable earnings. As stated by the Corporate Role the company’s acquisitions had guidelines of companies that served a broad customer base, had stable earning and proven manufacturing operations using well-known technologies and had brand name product from market leaders.

Currently Atlantic’s existing Ohio linerboard mill produces 780 tons per day of linerboard, which represents a mere 1.8% of the nation’s linerboard capacity. This is far below the 150,000 tons of linerboard that Atlantic purchases every year from its competitors. Consequently, with such a tight market, linerboard could either become unavailable or available at very expensive prices. If Atlantic pursues their acquisition strategy in purchasing the linerboard mills from Royal, this could help greatly in strengthening Atlantic’s linerboard capacity and ensure to retain their box plants profits. With Royal’s current Monticello mill producing kraft paper and linerboard, this would require $140.8 million to convert all of the mill’s kraft capacity to