Cooperation And The Requirement Of Stronger Enforcement

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cooperation and the requirement of stronger enforcement or more systematic dispute settlement mechanism. My second hypothesis is that international institutions or treaties of members of significantly asymmetric national capability will have a stronger dispute settlement mechanism. That is to say, In other words, an institution that contains asymmetry of power in terms of national capacity, military capacity, economic capability, and legal resources should have stronger DSMs. In this situation, powerful states might seek for stronger DSMs for gaining advantage within institutions. The underlying logic of this idea, based on Allee and Elsig is that “many DSMs allow for both diplomatic and legal dispute settlement, so powerful states can benefit from having a menu of dispute settlement options that allows them to forum-shop even within treaties.”(Allee 97) Also, for weaker countries, stronger DSMs can give weaker countries the equal chance to argue with more powerful countries under certain framework. Strong DSMs provide relatively weaker countries such as Mexico has more capability to confront with more powerful countries and boost their chance to win the confrontation. To prove this hypothesis, I will find asymmetric countries in size and compare the agreements of these asymmetric countries to some symmetric countries. The expected conclusion should be that agreement with more heterogeneous countries would have stronger DSM. There are many existing cases can prove this
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