Corollary Principle

Roughly 2,753 people were killed on September 11, 2001, by terrorists who overtook commercial airplanes (Jones). The cause of these thousands of deaths were a series of attacks in New York City by an Islamic terrorist group, Al-Qaeda. However, there are still many questions about what actually happened the morning of September 11, 2001. As there are many different conspiracy theories about what happened that day, 9/11 was an attack which began with Al- Qaeda hi-jacking airplanes, but ended with more questions than answers. Many questions still remain about the authenticity of cell phone calls from inside the planes, why air defense was told to “stand down,” and how three buildings imploded as the result of two buildings being struck by airplanes.

Clay Dillow’s October 2015 article in Popular Science “To Catch a Bombmaker” explores how FBI forensic skills have been developed since 2003 to benefit United States forces fighting bomb making foreign insurgents. Dillow tells the story of how a small lab at the Marine Corps Base at Quantico has used FBI analytical data to link more than 2,700 suspects to possible terrorist activities, adding more than 350 people to the terrorist watch list. Dillow’s purpose was to reveal how detective skills have evolved to address a growing number of homemade bombs threats to the United States. While the article examines many one case in which insurgents are nabbed, information is not shared on how forensic data alone may not be enough to tell a more balanced story about bomb makers. Dillow writes an article of how one bomber is stopped, but the narrative falls short of offering a deeper account of how effective our efforts have been to stop terrorists in their tracks.

Beginning in 2001 Intelligence about the impending nature of an attack was increasing, not only from US Intelligence sources but also from 11 other countries such as Britain, Israel, India, Egypt, Morocco and even a top Taliban commander from Afghanistan (Thompson.) Beginning in August warnings become coming in from everywhere, foreign governments, CIA and FBI sources and so on however, next to none of this information was shared between the many intelligence agencies. In April, NORAD launched a training scenario in which the pentagon was to be incapacitated by a hijacked airliner however the Joint Chiefs of Staff disregarded the scenario as “too unrealistic” (September 11 attacks advance-knowledge debate.) On august 19th the Israeli’s gave US intelligence personnel credible information including, the list of 19 suspected terrorist’s names and the fact that a large aircraft would be the primary weapon involved. The names were not shared by the CIA with other intelligence agencies (Robinson.)

The key question he presented was whether or not the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) was capable of making a difference and finding those who were responsible for insurgent outbreaks. Dillow carefully covered each aspect that answered this one question and did not rely on his own point of view to strengthen the article. Multiple facts were given to supported his argument along with quotes from experts, such as Greg Carl and Tim Beam, who held important FBI positions. Carl stated, “Up until TEDAC, the Department of Defense didn't understand the

If you had that one piece of the puzzle that would have prevented the bombings of the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon on September 11 2001 would you know it? If you saw someone do something weird or suspicious before the attack on September 11 2001, would you have called the police? If someone had walked into a United States Embassy in a foreign country and said that they know someone was going to use a plane to destroy New York in two days, could this have stopped the attack? Intelligence Analysis puts the raw sources of information together, make predictions based on the data, and finally publish the results.

September 11, 2001 forever impacted America and gave a new challenge to our government that went far beyond any challenges that a natural disaster had presented in decades. The terrorist attacks were definitely a wake up call to being more prepared for natural disasters and reevaluating our intelligence agency jobs and communication levels. In chapter 2, one of the key points that Kettl discuss is connecting the dots. We can see that in the midst of 9/11, America focused on the nation’s intelligence services for answers. As the American people we wanted to know, who were the hijackers, where was security and most importantly, and who do we hold accountable? Furthermore, that the intelligence agencies failed to piece together information that already had about terrorism speculations. In chapter 1, Kettl talks about the warnings and signs that the government has before catastrophes (such as September 11, Hurricane

Before September 11, the Federal Aviation Administration perceived that sabotage was a much greater threat than hijacking. This is because there had been no domestic hijackings in a decade, the commercial aviation system was thought to be more vulnerable to explosives than to weapons, and explosives were perceived as deadlier than hijacking and therefore of greater concern (9/11 Commission, 82). The FAA therefore did not think that a hijacking was even a possibility. There was enough concern of sabotage that a "layered defense system" was implemented where a passenger went through prescreening, check point screening, and onboard security (9/11 Commission, 83). However, these were not effective, as the terrorists on 9/11 were still able to carry out their plan.

There was a possible security threat regarding a tractor-trailer that occurred in Times Square in New York City. The New York Police Department issued an advisory that a possibly dangerous tractor-trailer had deviated from its original course and was headed towards Times Square after being paid $10,000. After proper communication and information was shared between the New York Police Department, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Rhode Island Fusion Center, Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, and the Connecticut Intelligence Center, the Connecticut State Police was able to intercept the vehicle and determined it was not a threat. It only took three hours from the time the New York Police Department issued an advisory to the time that the Connecticut State Police stopped the vehicle and determined it posed no threat to the public (5). Even though the truck was not a threat, this was a great example of proper communication, fusing of information, teamwork, and dissemination of information to counter a possible terrorist attack.

The 9/11 attacks opened the avenue for a scrutiny of the performance and ability of the intelligence community to detect any threats to the safety of the United States. The media, politicians, reformists and other interested parties would not comprehend how such an attack would happen without the knowledge of the intelligence community. However, it is important to consider the fact that the attack was one of its kind and could not be approached with the resources and expertise used in other initiative such as the cold war. Therefore, the need to restructure the intelligence community arose from the view that it was still operating in the mindset and spirit of the cold war even in the modern era that had seen a revolutionary change of warfare

Upon analyzing 9/11 it was clear to focus on the limitations that the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency had faced. Security breaches and poor intelligence sharing were just some of the critical failures that were encountered. Moreover, the main focus is pointed towards the miscommunication between these two agencies. Evidently, the execution and tactical strategies went unnoticed despite the apparent red flags that presented themselves, in addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency failure to pursue threats and establish a baseline of security resulted in the disaster of 9/11. In conjunction to these mistakes, the restriction of shared information

Assessing our vulnerability to terrorist attack remains difficult in part because the events surrounding the attacks of September 11, 2001, have not been thoroughly explained. In its investigation into them, the 9/11 Commission slid past many important questions, leaving them unanswered, and did not adequately challenge the Bush administration when it refused to cooperate or obfuscated its own actions.

Thesis: Pan Am flight 103 was one of the first commercial aircraft to be taken down by terrorist with an improvised explosive device (IED) containing Semtex, a high explosive, and a timing device hidden in checked luggage. The flight was delayed on takeoff time, which resulted in the aircraft exploding over land leaving evidence for forensic investigators. FAA regulations of screening checked bags with X-ray technology was ignored, allowing the (IED) device on board with checked luggage in the cargo hold. Theories of motive lead investigators to believe this was an act of retaliation.

The term “Covert Action” brings with it a connotation of shadowy figures wrapped in secrecy and intrigue. It also brings with it a substantial amount of moral questions as to “what is right.” The use of covert action has been widely publicized since the early seventies, but trying to find out the truth to these events has been difficult to say the least. What is even more difficult, is historically recording these events into categories of successes or failures. These operations are difficult to dissect because of their secrecy and although events have been recorded, some facts simply aren’t apparent. This paper will seek to identify the complex issues associated with covert operations.

Imagine it is 1971 and you are on a flight from Portland to Seattle. You take your seat and get ready for your flight. You see an ominous man and you have your suspicions, but you think nothing of it. Later in the flight, you see him talking to the stewardess and see him slip her a note. He then shows her what is in his suitcase and asks her to sit with him. You start to get a bad feeling that something is not right. The man then seems to request something as the stewardess gets up to go to the cockpit. She appears to be anxious as she returns. After about twenty minutes your flight lands in Seattle and you have an eerie feeling that something suspicious has gone down. What you just witnessed was the infamous D.B. Cooper hijacking that forever

The United States Intelligence community draws on advanced technology and analytical techniques. An intelligence process that sets objectives, collects, analyzes, and report findings, with feedback loops integrated throughout. Explicitly, the intelligence community advantages technology and tradecraft within a proscribed process. However, estimation of threats and decision-making are outcomes of human thinking. Analysts and policymakers create mental models, or short cuts to manage complex, changing environments. In other words, to make sense of ambiguous or uncertain situations, humans form cognitive biases. Informed because of personal experience, education, and specifically applied to intelligence analysis, Davis