Crime And The Broken Window Theory

The 1980s and early 90s were home to an extreme wave of criminal activity that swept across much of the country. The dramatic uptick in crime can largely be attributed to the spread of the crack-cocaine epidemic and subsequent “War on Drugs.” New York City, for example, suffered from 2,605 murders and 208,813 burglaries in 1990, at the height of the violence . Much of this criminal activity centered around and affected the poorest individuals in those communities – which often included minorities.

In the article, “Is Broken Windows a Broken Theory of Crime?” Kevin Drum defines the Broken Windows theory as a theory which “suggests that tolerance of small acts of disorder creates an environment that leads to rising amounts of serious crime. So if police crack down on small offenses – petty vandalism, public lewdness, etc. – crime reductions will follow” Though this theory has been around for a long time, it is still not a sound theory of crime.

William Bratton, commissioner of the New York Police Department from 1994 to 1996, presided over a dramatic decline in the city’s crime rate. Hired by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani as part of a new crime fighting initiative, Bratton embraced the “broken windows” theory that had made him so successful as chief of the city’s transit police. According to this theory, when a community ignores small offenses such as a broken window on a parked car, larger offenses such as burglary, robbery, and assault inevitably follow. Conversely, serious crime can be prevented if a community polices the little

Violent crimes such as robbery, rape, and auto theft has decreased by 74% from 1990 to 2009 (Jeffery 1521). This shows how a strict crack down on the streets can trickle down and effect other crime rates. During this time period, crime rates nationally were down, but New York’s crime rates were down drastically more than other cities. Other facts point out that stop and Frisk was not very successful. Only 6% of New York City police stops led to an arrest, and only 3% of those stops led to a conviction of an arrest.

The book’s fourth chapter, “Where have All the Criminals Gone?” in particular, includes several subjects the authors acknowledge will “provoke a variety of reactions, ranging from disbelief to revulsion, and a variety of objections” (140). By this point, readers already know the authors’ view that the legalization of abortion in Roe v. Wade caused the drop in crime during the 1990s because this idea first appears on page four. Rather than simply explaining why abortion lowered crime rates, Levitt and Dubner use a chart to introduce seven explanations commonly cited by experts for the sudden drop in crime during the 1990s, then examine the authenticity of each one. The first possible cause is “a fairly uncontroversial one: the strong economy”

[Additionally, an enormous change to the system is the increase in crime. Evidence shows that between 1982 and 1992 the number of people behind bars in America doubled to one million, and arrest rates continue to soar (Moyers, 1992). There are several schools of thought on the increase of crime, some attribute the influx of “crack” cocaine, and other

New York City during the 1990s has experience crime rates dropping dramatically under Mayor Rudy Giuliani and Police Commissioner Bill Bratton lead. Both began new approach to policing by developing several new strategies under the proponent of “broken windows” theory. Under Bratton, the NYPD began to enforce statutes aimed at curbing “quality of life” offense, offenses that are minor and were overlooked in the past in favor to concentrate on serious crimes. Under the Broken Windows theory, small crimes leads to bigger crimes so taking a stance against the minor behavior sends a signal to the community that any kind of law breaking would not be tolerated. Community policing program was adopted in a minor form as police officials focused their

After that introduction- they go on to tell the story of American crime in the 1990’s, and explore several other expert theories about the dramatic and unprecedented rise and fall of

Since the 1990s and the crime drop, there has been many questions to the reason why. Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner thoroughly looked through the different theories but came to a conclusion that the main reason crime had fallen is abortion (117-145). One of the reasons they discuss is whether or not the increase of incarceration affects the fluctuations in crime rates. Levitt and Dubner suggest that the crime system became relaxed due avoid racism; however, the crime rates then began to rise (122). “Between 1980 and 2000, there was a fifteenfold increase in the number of people sent to prison on drug charges” (Levitt, Dubner 123). The purpose of this review is to evaluate the validity of the incarceration effects on crime rates.

Five years after the program implementing this style of policing was enforced, the Police Foundation in Washington, D.C., published an evaluation of the foot patrol project, showing that foot patrol had not reduced crime rates. Additionally, the article “How A Theory Of Crime And Policing Was Born, And Went Terribly Wrong,” cited that crime rates in New York (where the broken windows approach had appeared to have been wildly successful) had already been dropping prior to the implementation of this approach/the election of Guiliani who was in support of this style of policing. Not only this, but crime dropped not just in New York, but in many other cities where nothing like broken windows policing was in place, leading me to conclude that the drop in crime existed separately from the practice of broken windows

In chapter 4 the chapter considers a variety of possible explanations for the significant drop in crime and crime rates that occurred in the 1990s. Based on articles that appeared in the country’s largest newspapers, the authors compile a list of the leading, commonly offered explanations. The next step is to systematically examine each explanation and consider whether available data support the explanation. What the authors, in fact, demonstrate is that in all but three cases–increased reliance on prisons, increased number of police, and changes in illegal drug markets–correlation was erroneously interpreted as causation and in some cases, the correlation wasn’t even that strong.

Examining the crime rates following the ‘New York miracle’ certainly lend credibility to the effectiveness of ZTP. Gibbons (1996) noted that burglaries decreased 24%, robberies 32% and motor crime 40% in the two years following April 1994. The overall crime rate was reduced by 37%, with decreases in homicide and violent crime of 51% and 38% respectively (Bratton, 1997). Advocates of ZTP attribute these reductions in crime rates to the use of a proactive and intensive policing approach, situational crime control, rapid analysis of information and heightened efficiency & accountability (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, Bintcliffe, 2014).

The national crime rate has been dropping for the past several years. Over a 38% drop has been reported since 1993. The drop in the crime rate of America is mainly because of three top reasons. These reasons include the involvement of the community, the offenders of small crimes are being interrogated to come up with leads of larger crimes, and the new computer technology available today.

In this paper I will discuss and explain anatomy of a crime decline in New York City as well as if in these days can we say that the city is safe. Purpose of this book " The City That Become Safe " written by Franklin E. Zimring is to show us how crime rate changed during 1990 to 2009. According to author this book presents a detailed profile of New York City crime over 20 years period. Book provides the vital statistics of the crime drop by type of crime, by borough, and by year. There are two reasons that such exhaustive detail is required as a beginning to the study. First, the size and the length of the drop are without precedent in the recorded history of American urban crime. The second reason that the details of the crime decline are needed is as a road map for explaining what changes in the city and its government might have caused this epic decline. The more we know about the specific character of the decline- when it happened, where it happened, which offenses- the better our capacity for sorting through different theories of what caused the drop. In addition, shifts the focus from the two decades of the decline to an assessment of current conditions in the city. How safe is New York City?.

In the 1990s, as crime was continuing to rise at a steady rate, American leaders soon realized they had a crisis on their hands. In response to this, President Bill Clinton released a bill in 1994 aiming to take extreme action in combatting crime. This bill included many actions such as increasing the amount of police officers, more funding for cities’ law enforcement programs, and enforcing