Cyber Deterrence And Its Impact On Western Europe

By 1962, the Soviet Union was considerably behind the United States in the nuclear arms race. The Soviet Union had limited range missiles that were only capable of being launched against Europe, but the United States possessed missiles that were capable of striking anywhere within the entire Soviet Union. As it is often said, when it comes to national security, leaders sometimes make irrational decisions. In an effort to restore the balance of power Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev devised the idea of placing intermediate-range missiles in Cuba (14 days in October). This deployment of weapons in Cuba would double the Soviet strategic arsenal and provide a credible deterrent to a potential U.S. attack against the

In the aftermath of World War II, tensions heightened between the two dominant powers: America and the USSR. The differences between the ideologies of the communist USSR and the capitalist United States led to a rapid deterioration in relations. The era between 1945, which marked the end of World War II, to 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved, became known as the Cold War due to the fact that despite the lack of large scale conflict, both sides still feared a nuclear holocaust. Both the United States and the Soviet Union followed the military strategy of mutually assured destruction (MAD), meaning that neither side was willing to risk first attack lest the other nation retaliate massively . The fundamental tenet behind MAD that enabled it to serve as an effective deterrent was the idea of secondary strike capability. In essence, it was the ability of a nation to launch a counterattack and thereby ensure mutual destruction. Submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) fulfilled this criteria admirably due to their ability to stay submerged for extended periods of time, the difficulty involved with locating a submarine, and their invulnerability to nuclear missile attacks when submerged. As a result, the United States attempted to corner this leg of the nuclear triad.

The United States has been unable to fully break from Cold War mentality which began after World War II, and any attempts to try and adjust this policy have been done in miniscule steps resulting in little change. Deterrence has been a strategy utilized by several presidents and administrations since the onset of the Cold War, and in many ways it still remains the central strategy for current foreign policy. The objective of deterrence is to prevent foreign powers from committing unwanted actions against the U.S. or

After the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as superpowers and subsequently a period of tension and hostility arose, known as the Cold War. During this time, a new possibility of complete nuclear destruction that would claim the lives of many emerged, therefore “the easing or relaxing of tensions” on both sides was needed, this period would be known as detente. Both countries had been guaranteed mutually assured destruction as they had both managed to stay ahead in the development of nuclear arsenals. By the late 1960s the Soviets had surpassed the United States in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) by 1,300 to 1,054. Although the U.S was still ahead

In his article, “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Marc Trachtenberg considers three historical approaches to the role that nuclear arms played during the 1962 conflict: first, the view that nuclear arms played no role at all, with U.S. and Soviet weapons cancelling each other out, second, the interpretation that the risk involved with nuclear warfare heavily influenced policy making, and finally the view that the strategic imbalance of nuclear force, characterized by a substantial American advantage, significantly impacted the outcome of the crisis. In weighing the three interpretations, Trachtenberg dismisses the first in supporting the existence of the second, using a variety of primary sources to identify instances when decision-makers were influenced by the risk of nuclear warfare. The focus of the article, however, is on advancing and complicating the third approach, which Trachtenberg claims is congruous with the second. In this third section, Trachtenberg advances the approach that the imbalance of nuclear capabilities impacted Soviet strategy but not American decision making. Accordingly, Trachtenberg’s article is characterized by two central claims: that risk of nuclear war influenced policy during the Cuban Missile Crisis and that American nuclear superiority disproportionately affected Soviet decision-making.

After the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as superpowers and subsequently a period of tension and hostility arose, known as the Cold War. During this time, a new possibility of complete nuclear destruction that would claim the lives of many emerged, therefore “the easing or relaxing of tensions” on both sides was needed, this period would be known as detente. Both countries had been guaranteed mutually assured destruction as they had both managed to stay ahead in the development of nuclear arsenals. By the late 1960s the Soviets had surpassed the United States in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) by 1,300 to 1,054. Although the U.S was still

Emerging problems with the Soviet Union: When the Soviet’s see the power and capability of our bomb, they will tuck their tails and run back to Moscow. The Soviet’s will not even attempt a counter attack on East Asia because they will know that after we drop the bomb, the war will be wrapped up within a few

Another hypothesis set forth for the utilization of the nuclear weapons was the developing intensity between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was turning out to be progressively clear from the behavior of the Soviet Union that there would be a part inside of the associates taking after the war. The United States and Britain felt that the Soviets were not to be trusted, and a show of Western military force was important to maintain

During a heated debate in policy for two of his presidency , Reagan announced research program on Strategic Defense Initiative ( SDI ) “to find the advanced technologies such as lasers and missile warheads, high-energy defense against intercontinental ballistic missile sites” (“The Strategic” 32). Reagan’s idea, at that time, was to intercept and destroy the incoming ballistic missiles far away from his country. Although many scientists have expressed doubts about the feasibility of SDI technology and the economy have shown the enormous costs , but the government continues to implement this project . The Strategic Defense Initiative was eventually abandoned, and after a few years, it was nothing but a short chapter in history books. The program was hopefully a new revolution in defense system which was told to be impenetrable. But under the political pressure, the Strategic Defense Initiative was slated for failure. The Strategic Defense Initiative was not solely a failure, it had an important meaning of Reagan. Reagan was feared that the US actually could not protect their soil from aggressive weapon which the two superpowers were racing for so many years. Reagan knew the USSR feared the same threat. The Strategic Defense Initiative made the Soviet

Deterrence is preventing an adversary from taking actions one regards as undesirable by threatening to inflict unacceptable costs on the adversary if the action is taken. In the second chapter of the documentary, it is discussed how the Soviet Union continued to test nuclear weapons in Cuba thus ending a two-year moratorium.

For example, President Eisenhower limited the amount of money being spent on defense by forty billion and instead, he put that money towards having a large amount of nuclear weapons (Hagan). The theory caused the idea that neither country would feel safe knowing that the other has the power to destroy them to develop. Several moves were made towards both improving both offense and defense during the years to improve the safety of the civilians in the country. This included when in the early 1960’s the U.S deployment of submarine launched ballistic missiles guaranteed retaliation in case of a first attack (Ball). By 1964 the U.S, the continuous buildup of nuclear weapons left America with enough to to destroy both the Soviet Union, China, and the Soviet union's satellite nations. Russell Weigley stated, “A strong strategy of annihilation could now be so complete that the use of.. atomic weapons could no longer serve ‘for the object of war’ unless the object of war was to transform the enemy country into a desert”

Today the United States of America still possess approximately 1,300 tactical nuclear weapons, including about 480 bombs deployed on NATO military bases deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In response Russia is estimated to possess at least 3,000 of these generally smaller, portable, but still devastating weapons. It only takes a fifteen-minute alert and the decision by one human being at the touch of the button in the U.S. to deploy hundreds of nuclear warheads. Surely with still such a large number of nuclear weapons still easily accessible, they cannot be strategically obsolete. Robert McNamara says, “It was luck that prevented nuclear war”. He continues: “At the end we lucked out. It was luck that prevented nuclear war.... Rational individuals came that close to total destruction of their societies. And that danger exists today. The major lesson of the Cuban missile crisis is this: the indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons will destroy nations”. In the end maybe it was deterrence theory that won out, but from McNamara’s perspective this was not the case. McNamara mentioned in his Fog of War Interview that if it hadn’t have been for John F

All these events lead to concrete planning regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Robert McNamara, then defense secretary, stated in a speech in 1962 ‘principle military objectives in the event of a nuclear war against the NATO alliance should be destruction of enemy’s military forces, not his civilian population. Five years later, towards the end of his tenure as secretary of defence, McNamara stressed ‘now it is imperative to understand that assured destruction is the whole essence of the deterrence concept. It means the certainty of suicide to the aggressor, not merely to his military forces but to society as a whole’. This shows the smart and clear shift in McNamara leaning towards the limiter’s school. The Soviets had begun to build very large warheads, and many of them put even well-protected sites in additional risk. Perhaps more important, however, was the advent of MIRV, Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle meant that one missile with several warheads could independently target multiple missiles. For a variety of reasons, rather than becoming another stride in the arms race, ABM development in the late 60s and early 70s provided an impetus for the first US/Soviet arms control agreement. Together with the ABM restrictions, the first strategic arms limitation treaty SALT put the first limitations on offensive missiles. The SALT agreement became SALT I and then, as an interim, SALT II, imposing further limits on bomber delivery

Since 2010 there have been over 13 major cyber attacks in the US, the FBI categorizes the severity of the attack based on what could possibly be at stake such as information on US citizens or hijacking of critical information . Cyber attacks are classified as crimes committed with the aid of a computer. Cyber crimes are considered felonies, however most people who commit the crimes can usually not be found. Recently there has been an uprising in cyber crimes, in the year 2017 alone 9 minor incidents have occured (minor attacks can consist of malware and internet “trolling” which is a form of cyberbullying) and 4 major crimes have been committed. Most crimes consist of identity theft, robbery, and hijacking private information. Recently programmers have been able to build security systems that can detect a threat almost immediately. With a growing expansion of technology protecting information gets harder day by day. Cyber security is the body of technologies, processes and practices designed to protect networks, computers, programs and data from attack, damage or unauthorized access.

The American doctrine of deterrence stemmed from the development of nuclear weapons. Strategic analysts, using this development as a point of departure, recognized that a nuclear capability established a defense scenario that was, in fact,