Daniel Dennett 's Where Am I?

In this Daniel Dennett’s essay “Where Am I?” Dennett tackles the difference between mind, body, and a person’s identity. In his story, Dennett has his brain removed and preserved in a vat. His body stays alive, and radio transmitters make it so he can still function. Dennett starts to question who and where “he” is. Though Dennett has several strong ideas, he isn’t correct in everything he suggests.

In a series of relatively simple though complexly-worded (out of necessity) thought experiments regarding body-swapping and changes to memory and the mind, Bernard Williams attempts to demonstrate that identity should be identified with the body rather than with the mind when identity is extended into the future (and by extension during the present). That is, though it is typical for identity to be associated with the mind at any given moment, Williams argues that the logic that supports this intuitive association does not hold up over longer periods of time, and that anticipation of the future leads to an association of identity with the body rather than with the mind. Whether or not Williams is successful in this attempt is a matter of much debate, with this author finding some fundamental flaws in the very premise of the comparisons and thus the conclusions, however the argument is fairly elegant and persuasive and certainly worth of closer inspection. A careful reading of the argument might lead one to a conclusion opposite to that which was intended, but is no less rewarding for this unusual quirk.

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

Daniel Dennett tackles these mind and body questions in his essay, Where Am I. In Daniel Dennett’s, Where Am I, Dennett agrees to undergo an operation with would remove his brain from his body and insert an antennae that would enable his brain to control his body remotely. When Dennett wakes up, he finds that he doesn’t know where he is, but not in that sense that he was geographically lost. Dennett has woken up to find himself in his body without his brain, leaving him with the question, where am I? Is Dennett still in his body, in his brain, or in some cross-section between the two?

Am I the same person today as I was yesterday? Will I be the same person a few years from now as I am now? Kagan explains a few theories that can help with figuring out what makes me, me. There is the soul theory, the body theory, and the personality theory. The body theory consists of the brain and body theory and the torso and body theory. After looking into each theory carefully through Kagan’s lectures, I found that there were flaws in all three theories. The theory that I favor, however, is the body theory and more specifically the brain aspect of that theory. In my essay I will discuss why I favor the body theory and its strength and weaknesses. I will also discuss Kagan’s take on survival.

Armstrong begins his paper with a question for the reader of what it means to have a mind. It is well understood that man has the ability to perceive, to think, to feel, and so on, but what does it mean to perceive, to think, and to feel? The answer, he believes, lies in science. Seeing that science is constantly and rapidly gaining ground, he asserts that “...we can give a complete account of man in purely physico-chemical terms” (295?) Pointing out the fact that this view has been accepted by various scientists throughout time, he explains it is the most reliable way to approach the mind-body problem.

For centuries philosophers have engaged themselves into conversations and arguments trying to figure out the nature of a human person; this has lead to various theories and speculation about the nature of the human mind and body. The question they are tying to answer is whether a human being is made of only the physical, body and brain, or both the physical or the mental, mind. In this paper I will focus on the mind-body Identity Theory to illustrate that it provides a suitable explanation for the mind and body interaction.

Thus, one may further conclude that the only difference between a "normal" individual and Dennett's hypothetical case is the great temporal gap that exists between the brain and the body in Dennett's case. A difference that one may believe does not have clear philosophical implications. Therefore, it can be suggested that Dennett, in setting up his scenario in this way, does not contribute much more insight into the ‘self'-phenomenon than many

Thesis: The mind-body problem arises because of the lack of evidence when looking for a specific explanation of the interaction of mental and physical states, and the origin and even existence of them.

In the world of philosophy, there has been an ever growing skepticism of the relationship between the human body and its mental state. The physical state of a person is tangible, meaning that they can be seen by anyone and touched. While the mental state of a person is embedded in their consciencousness, meaning that it can’t be observed by others unless willing expressed by said person. I will be using Leibniz’s law of identity to show that the metal states of an individual are distinct from a physical state. Using the notion of sameness, I can prove a valid argument that the physical and mental states are distinct. While this theory in part can be debated, some identity theorists can provide a rebuttal this claim. I will provide a response to an identity theorist rebuttal.

The mind-body problem, which is still debated even today, raises the question about the relationship between the mind and the body. Theorists, such as René Descartes and Thomas Nagel, have written extensively on the problem but they have many dissenting beliefs. Descartes, a dualist, contends that the mind and body are two different substances that can exist separately. Conversely, Nagel, a dual aspect theorist, contends that the mind and body are not substances but different properties. However, although Nagel illustrates the problems with Descartes= theory, Nagel=s theory runs into the problem of panpsychism. In this paper, both arguments will be discussed to determine which, if either, side is stronger.

The mind is perhaps the most fascinating part of the human body due to its complexity and ability to rationalize. In essence, the mind-body problem studies the relation of the mind to the body, and states that each human being seems to embody two unique and somewhat contradictory natures. Each human contains both a nature of matter and physicality, just like any other object that contains atoms in the universe. However, mankind also is constituted of something beyond materialism, which includes its ability to rationalize and be self-aware. This would imply that mankind is not simply another member of the world of matter because some of its most distinctive features cannot be accounted for in this manner. There are obvious differences between physical and mental properties. Physical properties are publically accessible, and have weight, texture, and are made of matter. Mental properties are not publically accessible, and have phenomenological texture and intentionality (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). This is challenging to philosophers, because man cannot be categorized as a material or immaterial object, but rather a combination of both mind and body (Stewart, Blocker, Petrik, 2013). Man embodies mind-body dualism, meaning he is a blend of both mind and matter (Stewart, Blocker, Petrick, 2013). The mind-body problem creates conflict among philosophers, especially when analyzing physicalism in its defense. This paper outlines sound

Jeevan Jacob Philosophy 100-04 Professor Bates 4/11/14 Word count: 462 Where is the Soul? In “Where Am I,” Daniel Dennett questions the meanings of identity and consciousness. He never truly concludes his questions with an answer but I believe that the computer that is an exact copy of his brain cannot have a consciousness because it is a computer, not a human being. Dennett makes a complicated example when his body and his brain get separated, yet he can control his body through technological means. After the old one is destroyed, Dennett receives a new one that is just as capable as his old one.

The concept of mind and body interactions has been debated among many modern philosophers. Some believe that our minds and bodies are different things, thus existing separately, while others believe that they exist as a whole. In this paper, I will be introducing two rationalist philosophical views regarding this topic, one which is by Rene Descartes and the other by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Rationalists, in philosophical terms, are the ones who obtain their knowledge through reasoning rather than the human senses. Descartes and Leibniz both have similar perspectives, but Leibniz takes a slightly different approach to improve Descartes’ argument. This paper will first show Descartes’ original argument, an example that proves the argument to be invalid, and then lastly, a revised version of the argument with Leibniz’s help.

The Mind-Body problem arises to Philosophy when we wonder what is the relationship between the mental states, like beliefs and thoughts, and the physical states, like water, human bodies and tables. For the purpose of this paper I will consider physical states as human bodies because we are thinking beings, while the other material things have no mental processes. The question whether mind and body are the same thing, somehow related, or two distinct things not related, has been asked throughout the history of Philosophy, so some philosophers tried to elaborate arrangements and arguments about it, in order to solve the problem and give a satisfactory answer to the question. This paper will argue that the Mind-Body Dualism, a view in