David Hume On Personal Identity

John Locke states that personal identity is a matter of physiological continuity that is based on the consciousness of a person rather than the individual’s body. Personal identity is constituted by memory connections; specifically the depiction of autobiographical memory connections that result in constituting personal identity. John Locke states that a person’s personality and psychology can be transferred to another body and that individual can still stay the same person because the consciousness of the person did not change. This idea is known as transplant intuition. This intuition is the basis of the account of personal identity. If a cerebrum was removed from one body and transplanted into a different body, the transplant intuition

According to Socrates, as stated in the Apology, the fear of death is because we on Earth do not know what comes after death or if anything comes at all. Many people believe death is the end of the being that are in this lifetime. That foolish fear of death is often intertwined with how one understands identity. Although many people experience shifts or changes in their life they consider themselves to be the same person and from this type of belief we derive the fear. In this essay, I will argue that the popular belief that a stable subject of experiences constitutes personal identity is false. I will defend Derek Parfit's theory known as bundle theory, because it provides good reasoning to believe that the self is actually a combination of experiences.

In his 1971 paper “Personal Identity”, Derek Parfit posits that it is possible and indeed desirable to free important questions from presuppositions about personal identity without losing all that matters. In working out how to do so, Parfit comes to the conclusion that “the question about identity has no importance” (Parfit, 1971, p. 4.2:3). In this essay, I will attempt to show that Parfit’s thesis is a valid one, with positive implications for human behaviour. The first section of the essay will examine the thesis in further detail and the second will assess how Parfit’s claims fare in the face of criticism.

What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind.

371). This responds to the objections raised by Thomas Reid in the 18th century (Shoemaker, 2008, p. 340), however, the Memory Theory did require a modification to include the possibility of temporarily forgetting the experiences of an earlier person-stage, “as long as one has the potentiality of remembering it” (Shoemaker, 2008, p. 340). In the conversations held by Gretchen Weirob, Sam Miller and Dave Cohen in Perry’s ‘Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality’ (Perry, 1977), this concept is addressed in depth. Miller relays a chapter written by Locke – “the relation between two person-stages or stretches of consciousness that makes them stages of a single person is just that the later one contains memories of an earlier one...I can remember only my past thoughts and feelings, and you only yours...take this relation as the source of identity” (Perry, 1977, p. 343). These concepts are logical possibilities in my opinion, and are far less unstable than those presented within the Body/Soul Theory, as these concepts do not require the senses of others, but the individual’s first person perception of their personal identity.

The purpose of this essay is to define what Personal Identity is by analyzing John Locke’s argument for Personal Identity. John Locke’s argument for Personal Identity will be examined, in order to establish a better understanding of whether or not the argument for personal identity could be embraced. In order to do so, the essay will i) State and explain Locke’s argument that we are not substances or mere souls and ii) State and explain Locke’s concept of personal identity and its relations to what he calls self, consciousness and punishment. This essay will also focus on Thomas Reid’s perspective on personal identity and iii) State and explain Reid’s criticisms of Locke’s theory of personal identity, and lastly iv) I will evaluate whether or not Reid’s objections are good. Locke’s argument may seem to be plausible at first, however, the essay will conclude by rejecting John Locke’s argument for personal identity due to Locke’s inadequate reasonings and Thomas Reid’s criticisms.

To the ignorant and self-oblivious person, the true individuality of a man’s self is presumed through his ability to possess an apt and socially preferable state of mind. Quite ironic in fact—and if I’m not mistaken—the widespread consensus regarding human identity, is that it is at its most ripe, and fertile upon one’s inevitable decision to conform to the mass. Such logic is somewhat of a paradox-in-itself and if we deconstruct the meaning of the terms ‘conform’ and ‘individuality’ their contrast is vast, and their apparent use is irrational, therefore all aspects of the human mind remain complacent, and mundane to a certain degree that it erases any former beliefs of a unique human being. Rather, human personality is an

The goal of the following paper is to convince that soul theory is directly linked to one’s personal identity. This paper will also point out an objection raised to the theory, and to finish will prove how that objection is incorrect, leaving soul theory as the only answer to what makes someone who they are.

In philosophy, the issue of personal identity concerns the conditions under which a person at one time is the same person at another time. An analysis of personal identity

Personal identity, in a philosophical point of view, is the problem of explaining what makes a person numerically the same over a period of time, despite the change in qualities. The major questions answered by Locke were questions concerning the nature of identity, persons, and immorality (Jacobsen, 2016). This essay will discuss the three themes John Locke presents in his argument regarding personal identity, which are, the concept of categories, substance vs. man vs. person, and the continuity of consciousness.

     Hume on the other hand, took a different approach to the idea of self. He believed that there in fact was no such thing as selfhood. Instead he asserts that “it must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self…is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference…” (597). By this he implies that in order to form concrete ideas, ones impressions of pain, pleasure, joy, etc. must be invariable throughout time. This, Hume states, we know without a doubt to be impossible. Passions succeed each other over time and give rise to new passions, therefore “…it cannot be from any of these impressions…that the idea of self is derived, and consequently there is no such idea” (597).

In his essay Of Identity and Diversity, Locke talks about the importance of personal identity. The title of his essay gives an idea of his view. Identity, according to Locke, is the memory and self consciousness, and diversity is the faculty to transfer memories across bodies and souls. In order to make his point more understandable, Locke defines man and person. Locke identifies a man as an animal of a certain form and a person as a thinking intelligent being. Furthermore, to Locke, a person has reasons and reflections and can consider itself as being itself in different times and places; and he/she does it with his/her consciousness (429). Basically, personal self is a particular body and personal identity is consciousness. In this

I will argue that Locke believed that if you remain the same person, there are various entities contained in my body and soul composite that do not remain the same over time, or that we can conceive them changing. These entities are matter, organism (human), person (rational consciousness and memory), and the soul (immaterial thinking substance). This is a intuitive interpretation that creates many questions and problems. I will evaluate Locke's view by explaining what is and what forms personal identity, and then explaining how these changes do conceivably occur while a human remains the same person.

Hume believed that the self was essentially a bundle of perceptions. Hume would claim that a unique identity that exists unchanged and gives the moments, which compose an individual’s life, continuity. Hume would say that when we make a claim such as “I experience a sunset” all we actually can claim, is that all the perceptions expected of a sunset are present and my mind has made relations among these perceptions. The next day “I” looks at the sunset there is no actual component, self, soul, or personal identity that is common to both experiences. Hume thinks that the idea of the

Many people question themselves, what is it exactly that makes them unique? What is it that defines them as a unique person that no one in the world possesses? In philosophy, these questions do not have just one answer, and all answers are correct depending on which theory appeals most and makes sense to you. In general, there are two ways people approach this question, some say that a person’s identity is the “self” that carries all of their experiences, thoughts, memories, and consciousness (ego theorists), and some say that a person’s identity is just a bundle of experiences and events that a person has been through in their life, these people deny that the “self” exists (bundle theorists). In this paper, I will be arguing that a person’s identity is just a bundle of experiences, denying the self and the memory criterion.