Decisions For War By Richard Hamilton And Holger Herwig

Through the book ‘Europe’s Last Summer’ David Fromkin tackles the issues of pre WWI Europe, and the surrounding political, economic, social, debacles that led paranoid countries to go to arms after nearly a full century of relative peace within the European continent. While Fromkin certainly points his fingers to all the nations of Europe his primary focus lies with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Though he continues to stress throughout much of the book that Kaiser Wilhelm II and Archduke Ferdinand were fervent keepers of the peace within their nations, the fault of the war ultimately could be laid at the feet of their two nations and their constant attempts at war-mongering. He claims the war could have been avoided for the moment, had all the nations of Europe wanted peace, but the two bad eggs of Europe drew them all into an unavoidable general war.

The source presented depicts an army of men following a singular leader off the edge of a cliff, as well as the quote from Einstein that compares the ideas of nationalism to the childish disease of measles. The perspective clearly is that nationalism is the rooting cause of war and misfortunate events that have occurred throughout history. From the source it can be inferred that nationalistic beliefs are dangerous and promote blind obedience. The partial embracing of the source can benefit the reader and open minds to certain ideas. However, the complete embracement of the source can lead to extremely close minded and biased opinions; only one side of the source is revealed, inferably from a

Fischer argues that German imperialism bears the onus for the Great War, as he concluded that they had gone to war to achieve European and worldwide domination. He states that Germany had ‘confidence in the invincibility of her military strength,’ implying that Germany had been building up their forces. This indicates Germany must have already been preparing for war, strengthening her army until she saw that both France and Russia were ‘militarily weak’ in comparison - to the extent that German elites believed they would remain somewhat unhindered in their continuation of ‘aggressive intentions.’ This is significant for several reasons. First, it was controversial as these ideas challenged the pre-existing general consensus of historians’ outlook since the 1930s: that all involved European nations shared a collective war-guilt from the First World War. Fischer rejects this view. He references a document written by Bethmann’s private secretary on 9 September 1914, outlining the Chancellor’s plan for peace negotiations which he anticipated would soon take place, as according to the September Programme. Fischer extrapolated that these detailed plans (that already had the support of the wider political nation in Germany) must have existed in August and July, and that this was indication towards Germany’s

Appeasement, a foreign policy particularly prevalent in the period of time leading up until the outbreak of World War Two, undoubtedly played a role in the ignition of the second world war, however the extent if this role and the impact it had a cause for the war is debatable. Appeasement was a policy employed as a preventative measure to stop the outbreak of war, at a time when the horrors of the First World War were still affecting European society, and involved making concessions to the opposition, in this case Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany. Whilst it is clear that Appeasement was a failure as it did not manage to prevent the outbreak of another war, some historians argue that it in fact was one of the causes of the war. This aspect of the debate was ignited in 1961 by notable historian A.J.P. Taylor, when he asserted1 that the outbreak of War in Europe in 1939 was as much the fault of the politicians of Europe and their persistence with Appeasement, which gradually allowed Hitler and Nazi Germany more freedom then the terms dictated in the Treaty of Versailles and eventually paved the way for militarization and the outbreak of war, as it was in fact Nazi Germany’s. The most commonly accepted views of Appeasement are that of Historians such as Norman Rich who asserted2 that Nazi ideology and Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy made the outbreak of war unavoidable. However, to form a conclusion about these debates, we must first understand the policy of Appeasement and its

This war, which lasted for four years instead of its intended four months, marks a paradigm shift in the concept of warfare. Benefiting from the Industrial Revolution, this conflict was to shape the following century. Interestingly enough, this clash of super nations was expected to be “The War to End all Wars.” These nations believed that war was inevitable for the prosperity of Europe and the world. However, from a contemporary perspective, this is erroneous. The changing of warfare, the Treaty of Versailles and the reluctance of many nations, made it impossible for

World War I was without a doubt one of the defining event of the 20th century. It turned America into an industrial power, tore down the dying empires of Europe, and led the world into the Modern Age. One would think that this war, with how destructive it was, would be conventional in its declaration, or reasons for it, but this it was, in fact, very different from how and why wars now might be declared. The aging political, economic, and governmental systems of the time acted as a very intricately set chain of dominoes, set over hundreds, maybe even thousands of years of different leaders making the system more and more complicated. The leaders had to be capable enough to be able to navigate this system effectively, as the fate of their country was in their hands. With this increasingly complicated system, leaders’ occupations were becoming more and more difficult, and it only took a few chance events combined with leaders not as capable as their predecessors and the system’s intricately set chain of dominoes to set off the defining event of the 20th century: World War I.

Being one of history’s major wars, World War One, formerly known as “The Great War”, provokes the controversial question that leaves historians debating: Was World War One avoidable? With prior tensions, naivety to war, and rivalry for pursuit of power, the conditions present in Europe, in 1914, were all the makings of an inevitable war–World War One. To begin with,

The publication in 1961 of Fritz Fischer book Germany 's Aims in the First World War, caused a wave of reactions from other historians and the general public. His claim angered German historians because it stated that Germany was solely responsible for the outbreak of World War I because they had “aggressive war aims in 1914.” According to Fischer, World War I was the excuse Germany needed to advance these aims. Although Fischer’s claim focused only on Germany the impact he made was felt among other nations who had also taken part in World War I. In turn each of these nations reacted differently to it. However, through articles written by T.G Otte and J.F.V Keiger some similarities appear between Britain and

When thinking of the phrase “The Second World War”, often the first thing to pop into the average person’s mind are images of combat, death and endless rows upon rows of sharply uniformed soldiers passing by, their leaders shouting an impassioned speech behind them. However, behind every image is a history. Wars do not simply spring out of nothing. What is it that drives entire countries to invade, murder, and commit atrocities otherwise never seen? The answer is simpler than one would think. World War Two was more than a war between countries; it was a war between regimes and ideas. The causes behind World War Two are complex and heavily intertwined, however, in the end it was Fascism that acted as the main catalyst.

The first source that is undergoing evaluation is a secondary source, written by Samuel R Williamson, Jr. It is titled: “The Way to War”, and was published by the Freie Universität of Berlin on October 8th, 2014. Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. taught at West Point, Harvard, and the University of the South, and frequents the topic of World War One. As a teacher, Mr. Williamson, Jr.’s reason for the research and articles is to spread awareness and knowledge about the First World War. This source is valuable because it provides an in-depth analysis of how international politics changed with the differing factors preceding World War One, like the Bosnian conflict and how it change European politics. However, it limited the detail it was able to provide

In recent years this post-Fischer consensus has in turn been revised. Historians have returned to the arguments of the interwar years, focusing for example on Russia’s and France’s role in the outbreak of war,[4] or asking if Britain’s government really did all it could to try and avert war in 1914. Germany’s and Austria-Hungary’s roles are deemphasised, and it is stressed that there were decision-makers in all the major capital cities who considered a general European war in August 1914 to be a risk worth taking. After 100 years of debate, every conceivable interpretation seems to have been advanced. In some of the most recent publications, even seeking to attribute responsibility, as had so confidently been done at Versailles, is now eschewed.[5]

Although the mass majority faults Germany for the first World War; some are now challenging that narrative. Among scholars “It is generally recognized by the best historical scholar in all countries to be no longer tenable or defensible. They are agreed that the responsibility for the War is a divided responsibility. But they still disagree very much as to the relative part of this responsibility that falls on each country and on each individual political or military leaders” (Fay, page 31) It is common knowledge the outbreak for the war was the Serbian assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife.

World War I was a conflict that claimed over 10 million peoples’ lives, ravaged all of Europe and engineered modern warfare, as it is know today. The Great War has been scrutinized and examined through many complex theories in order to understand how such a conflict escalated to one of the most epic wars in history. This essay, like many works before it, looks to examine WWI and determine its causes through two distinct levels of analysis, individual and systemic. The individual level of analysis focuses on the characteristics of human decision-making in order to locate the cause of conflicts attributed to individual leaders of particular countries. The systemic level of analysis explains the causation of a conflict from a system wide level that includes all states, taking in to account the distribution of power and the interaction of states in the international system.

Following onset of The First World War, Normal Angell received extensive criticisms for his previous writings on war. Angell’s opinions could be perceived as predictions of how war in the modern era was impossible and therefore how he had been tremendously wrong. However, at no point in time did Angell explicitly declare that he has regarded was as impossible. In this critical review, I intend to illustrate how Angell’s work was no prediction of the impossibility of war in the modern era, it was merely cautionary advice, in an attempt to promulgate the futility of war, and disregard the ‘great’ illusion’ held by all: that war can be advantageous. This is advanced using his ideas of the futility of war regarding economics, psychological

For the majority of the twentieth century Europe had experienced domestic peace and throughout this time many became unaccustomed with war. When tensions came to boiling point in England the country made the decision that it was necessary to go to war. A scholar writes “I spent the evening walking around the streets specifically in the neighborhood of Trafalgar Square, noticing cheering crowds… average men and women were delighted at the prospect of war.” So at least in England they were seemingly ready for war and encouraged their government to pursue its interests no matter the cost. This sentiment is similarly expressed in other European nations