Description about the Sensors in the Network

Host1 send message1 to Host2,3,4. Host4 sends message4 to host3. Host3 sends message2 to host1. Host3 send message3 to host1.

The attacker counts the number of packet transmissions executed by each node in a region for a period of time. If the nodes are sending to a common destination node e.g., the sink node, then the latter should be located in a region of higher packet transmissions or

In this example, here node A wants to send data packets to node D and starts to find the shortest path for its destination, so if node D is a malicious node then it will show that it has active route to the specified destination. It will then send the response In the example, data packets transfer in a hierarchic data center network. The link capacity is 1000 kb/s. The number on each is the traffic load. The distribution of traffic is based on equal cost multi-path (ECMP). In figure 8, we can see that the 3). Congestions

A malicious node can impersonate or spoof the address of another node in order to alter the vision of the network topology as perceived by another node. Such attacks can result in the formation of loops as described below [18]

Proposed system is a cooperative system in which each host will monitor its surrounding nodes and maintain a database about the transmission of its own as well as its neighbor nodes transmission.

Undoubtedly, this paper will generate network information, diagrams, and/or tables; accordingly, these are all included in the Appendix section of the paper. Moreover, the training, vulnerability assessment, and SAQ results are also included as an Appendix in the final paper. Finally, fearing disclosure of proprietary information that could compromise network security, all project data are scrubbed and sanitized to remove sensitive information.

A node wishing to send data initiates the process by sending a Request to Send frame (RTS). The destination node replies with a Clear to Send frame (CTS). Any other node receiving the RTS or CTS frame should refrain from sending data for a given time (solving the hidden node problem).

Sending data over a network without third party intervention, and sniffing attacks, is somewhat impossible nowadays with attackers lurking over the networks sniffing the data causing privacy problems especially when the data is being transferred over a decentralized military network which is highly confidential. The idea of this project is to provide a secure means for transmission of data between different DTNs without allowing attackers to sniff data in the network by providing encrypted transmission channel and further securing it with key attributes. This is the initial idea of the proposed project and will update it further.

Key management is a fundamental problem in securing mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). In the paper, Securing Mobile Ad Hoc Networks with Certificateless Public Keys [1], Yanchao Zhang et al. presents IKM, an ID-based key management scheme as a novel combination of ID-based and threshold cryptography. In IKM the public keys of mobile nodes can be directly derived from their known IDs and some common information, thus it provides a certificateless solution. The need for certificate-based

IP provides a mechanism to uniquely identify host by IP addressing scheme. IP uses best effort delivery, i.e. it does not guarantee that packets would be delivered to destined host but it will do its best to reach the destination. Internet Protocol version 4 uses 32-bit logical address.

In dispersed system, I gathering key assention convention assumes a vital part. They are intended to give a gathering of clients with a common mystery key such that the clients can safely speak with one another over an open system. Gathering key understanding means numerous gatherings need to make a typical mystery key to be utilized to trade data safely. We think about the gathering key concurrence with a self-assertive network diagram, where every client is just mindful of his neighbors and has no data about the presence of different clients. Further, he has no data about the system topology.

tion. Therefore, Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks that need to target specic IP address(es) and other types of attacks against node 's privacy can occur. In this paper a new version of MTM6D (MTM6D II) is presented to resolve the above shortcomings. Further- more, a suggestion is proposed to prevent black hole at- tacks, as a part of DoS attacks (in which a compromised router on the path between two hosts discards packets instead of forwarding them) and bandwidth depletion DDoS attacks (that only need the subnet ID instead of the exact IPv6 address of a target).

Confidentiality: Packet boat must only be confined to two authorized leaf node without any data effluence to attackers.

Message’s injection- in this the attacker sends many false messages over network in lieu of corrupting the packet data or to simply exhaust network. Message’s replication- in this the attacker capture and resend the same packet many times to same or different sensor and at different times in order to make receiver foolish. Node compromise (Destruction or theft)- this include physical capturing of a node in order to disrupt network by breaking the communication path or reprogramming a node so that it acts as a spy in network.

TEODOR-GRIGORE LUPU presented the different types of attacks in wireless sensor networks. Attacks on the different layers are categorized. The security attacks and the threats can be categorized based on the mechanisms used in those attacks [4]. Traffic analysis is the process of analyzing the messages in order to identify the data from patterns in the connection. Data from an authentic person who is entering into a network can be fabricated by an attacker and it can be replayed the next day. Compromised nodes within a network can cause the internal attack and it is hard to identify those compromised nodes in the network. Thinking like an attacker is a better choice for creating the intrusion detection system.