Did Desert Storm Represent a Revolution or Evolution in Air Power?

The concept of war as a static and unchanging occurrence is an outdated and dangerous miscalculation. More accurately, war is a fluidic, evolving and shifting phenomenon constantly reinventing itself, rendering stagnant, inflexible principles potentially disastrous. Consequently, as students of war and future players in this transforming theatre, the study of eras of significant development is an extremely relevant pursuit. Recognizing the need for adaptation and the creation of doctrine is now a prerequisite for any effective modern commander. War is unpredictable in nature and particularly so in current theatres of operation, in which change is rapid

The Battle at Midway was a critical turning point of the war in the Pacific during World War II. Attribution to American success is in direct relation to their ability to conduct signal collection and crypto-analysis leading to the battle. The elimination of this capability from consideration during the preparation for this battle will drastically influence the outcome. Through critical reasoning and battle analysis, this paper will determine the level of effect of the capability. The analysis will also seek to understand the change in outcome as a result of this change to history. The product of this analysis will be a thorough understanding of the importance of intelligence capability to United States success during World War II.

In 1993, John Keegan, the world’s most prominent military historian, called the war “a triumph of incisive planning and almost faultless execution.” Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the first war, later to become Secretary of State, concluded in his 1995 biography that even though Saddam Hussein remained in power, “the remaining Iraqi army is

Intelligence gathering and collection in the United States has significantly increased over time. This paper examines how intelligence reporting and pre-mission planning was crucial to the success of the United Nations involvement at The Battle of Inchon during the Korean War. By examining how intelligence played a role in this battle, you will be able to understand why it is important to gather and collect intelligence prior to every mission executed. Intelligence collection should be the baseline for all military operations. Inchon Landing has an ample amount of actionable intelligence; collected and disseminated appropriately we will discuss how it played a role in a low probability mission accomplishment to the last great amphibious assault in history. This paper provides detailed explanations on why The Battle of Inchon was a success and what could have been the outcome had it gone the other way.

According to this now-infamous study, Saddam had "so overextended his capital in the war with Iran that he was not in a position to undertake any significant hostile action for, at the very least, three years"�. The CIA grossly underestimated Saddam's penchant for military expansionism. Critics of the quality of US intelligence abound. Freedman and Efraim have concluded that "Operation Desert Storm was a low point for Marine Corps intelligence. It revealed an antiquated architecture that was unresponsive to the needs of the United States Army"� while Seliktar writes of an "unprepared organization" and of "considerable in-theatre limitations and restrictions."� Arguably, the military success camouflaged these intelligence failings. Surprisingly, these intelligence failures during the Gulf War were carried over into the Iraq War.

The purpose of this paper is to examine a historical battle and apply the four steps of battle analysis to provide an alternate outcome. This paper will define the battle, review the settings, describe the actions, and assess the significance of the actions for Operation Ivory Coast. The operation took place during 1971 in Northern Vietnam by United States Special Forces operators. The

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

The political ramifications of this successful operation are still being seen today. Russia, the only challenging power to the U.S. dominance across the world and especially the Middle East has just recently started to challenge that hegemony as seen in its operations in Syria but the region is still heavily influenced by U.S. foreign policy that was established during the operation Desert Storm. The operation brought to the battlefield a new era of military technology. Majority of the battles were won from the air (Operation Desert Storm, Evaluation of the Air Campaign, 1997). This aerial manner of conducting warfare was highly effective because it was not only successful in terms of the damage inflicted on the enemy, also it is said

One significant action that was coordinated with the press was that of the “pseudo-events” that occurred when the President landed in a carrier off the coast, in a full flight suit, then reciting the speech “Mission Accomplished” in 2003 (Bennett 133). This was successful coverage by the press, as it lured the public in with a Hollywood type of atmosphere, indicating that Iraq was a good thing and they got what they deserved. However, only a select few have experienced the task of stepping out into the dark and un-known for the safety and wellbeing of others; while those who set policies and orchestrate headlines, push papers. This was made possible by the initial launch of war in 2003 with the bombing of Bagdad (Hayes 1). As by now, the substantial press influence in promoting war had taken its

Air power is instrumental for changing the course of wars. Experience in Libya shows how important it is developing influence on the field and devoting sustained efforts for postwar stabilization.

At Coalition airfields and on board Coalition warships all across the Gulf region, the first hours after midnight 17 January were marked by activity with a new sense of urgency. The initial attack packages marshalled south of the Iraqi and Jordanian early warning and ground control intercept (GCI) coverage. By employing modern stealth capabilities the coalition forces intended on targeting a specific Iraqi radar dish, which would, unless destroyed, alert Iraqi air defence of the impending assault. The entire coalition attack armada moved north, comprising of hundreds of aircraft from many different nations and services, proceeded into hostile airspace at 2:10 am, Baghdad time . Eight US Army AH-64 Apache helicopters led by two US Air ForceMH-53 Pave Low helicopters destroyed Iraqi radar sites near the Iraqi-Saudi Arabian border which could have warned Iraq of an impending attack, hence providing the coalition forces with an initial advantage. Shortly after the operation was authorised and the initial assaults on airfields in Western Iraq begun. These airfields were targeted on the basis that they were the quintessential first response of the Iraqi army and by effectively destroying them the coalition forces hoped to obtain the advantage with air superiority. Coupled with the assault on these specific airfields, a large US led squadron began to bomb the Iraqi city of Baghdad , which was to act as a diversion, which resulted in the small Iraqi air forces currently deployed to return to Baghdad in an effort to counter the coalition bombing campaign. These attacks were met with little resistance, which can be attributed to the successful planning and delivery of Phase. 1 can be attributed to the coalition forces ability to effectively survey

The Air Forces’ Global Strike Command's mission is to provide strategic deterrence, global strike and combat support. (1) Global Reach and air and space superiority simply can’t be achieved without the global strike mission. With the expertise of over 26,000 Airmen, the Air Force’s nuclear and conventional precision strike forces can credibly threaten and effectively conduct global strike by holding any target on the planet at risk and, if necessary, disabling or destroying it promptly—even from bases in the continental United States. These forces possess the unique ability to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic effects all in the course of a single combat mission. (3) We proved our capabilities in 2011, with the air bombings in Libya with bombers that took off from Whiteman AFB, Missouri and were able to hit targets with strategic aerial refueling without landing at a forward operating base. With our defense mission involving

“Pull up.” At 0745 the phase was heard over and over on the air-control net. A second principle of war had been met, Israel was successful at massing its forces on multiple objectives at a synchronized time. The Egyptians had four training flights aloft, none of which were armed. Surprise is an understatement when describing this feat.

Van Creveld predicted that armed forces of the world would have to adapt to the frequency of involved conflict. This challenging book was too readily dismissed by some critics as reflecting Van Creveld?s personal proximity to the first intifada against Israel and a classic case of overgeneralization (1991, pg. 25). The massive mechanized assault conducted by an American-led coalition to pry Iraq?s invading force out of Kuwait in 1991 lent credence to those who did not want to contemplate the rise of new modes of combat. ?The Changing Face of War? represents van Creveld?s second attempt to flesh out the developments in military history and the rise of unconventional methods in book-length form.

Giulio Douhet, in his seminal treatise on air power titled The Command of the Air, argued, “A man who wants to make a good instrument must first have a precise understanding of what the instrument is to be used for; and he who intends to build a good instrument of war must first ask himself what the next war will be like.” The United States (US) military establishment has been asking itself this exact question for hundreds of years, in an attempt to be better postured for the future. From the Civil War, through the American Indian Wars, and up until World War II (WWII) the American military’s way of war consisted of fighting traditional, or conventional, wars focused on total annihilation of an enemy. Since that time, there has been a gradual shift from the traditional framework towards one that can properly address non-traditional, or irregular wars. While the US maintains a capability to conduct conventional warfare, the preponderance of operations where the US military has been engaged since WWII have been irregular wars. Therefore, this question articulated by Douhet, as to understanding the character of the next war in order to properly plan, train, and equip, is certainly germane to the current discussion of regular war versus irregular war. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, the questions remains, which will dominate the future and therefore, garner further funding and priority. Based on the current threats and the US role as a superpower, the US