Do All Companies Have The Same Governance Requirements?

Case Study of Boots Plc Boots Plc have various kinds of stakeholders in their business who do various kinds of jobs suitable for which group there are in. Like any other Plc their stakeholders at least have a say in the business depending their role. E.g. shareholders have a bigger say than the employees who have very little say in the business. Boots Plc have the following external stakeholders in their businesses that play different roles between them are: - Ø Pressure Groups

There are three internal and one external governance mechanisms used for owners to govern managers to ensure they comply with their responsibility to satisfy stakeholders and shareholder’s needs. First, ownership concentration is stated as the number of large-block shareholders and the total percentage of the shares they own (Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson, 2017, p. 317). Second, the board of directors which are elected by the shareholders. Their primary duty is to act in the owner’s best interest and to monitor and control the businesses top-level managers (Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson, 2017, p. 319). Third, is the

Critically analysis the key differences and similarities between corporate governance in the uk public and private sectors.

Common stockholders are the basic owners of a corporation, but few stockholders of large corporations take an active role in management. Instead, they elect the corporation’s board of directors to represent their interests. Board members seldom get involved in the day-to-day management of the company. They establish the basic mission and goals of the corporation and appoint

Farrar, J. (2008). Corporate Governance: theories, principles and practice. 2nd ed. South Melbourne, Vic: Oxford University Press

It is essential that the role, duties and responsibilities of directors are clearly defined. The Combined Code (2006) states that “the board’s role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework of prudent and effective controls which enables risk to be assessed and managed”.

To the extent of prevention of corporate failure, I argue that three ASX principles and recommendations could halt the demise of Dick Smith. Firstly, the 2nd principle which is “Structure the board to add value” by structuring the board with a majority of independent directors would prevent CEO dominance because some suggest that independent outside directors can reduce the influence of dominant individuals (ASX, 2014, p. 17). In accordance with Gallagher and Bennie (2015, p. 20), the independent directors are likely to focus on the company’s objectives and not to make decision relying on others. Furthermore, an addressing of independent directors would reduce the reliance on management, and create the effectiveness on monitoring (Dechow et al. 1996 cited in Christensen, Kent, and Stewart (2010)), as well as capability to lessen the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders (Hardjo & Alireza, 2012, p. 4). Thus, DSE’s board would be more active to monitor the CEO’s performances because independent directors pay attentions to the interest of company (Gallagher & Bennie, 2015, p. 20) and shareholders (Hardjo & Alireza, 2012, p. 4)

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, consider what the prospective directors ' affiliation might be with executives. Members of the board are often obliged to make arduous decisions concerning finances, personnel and salaries. Ensure that potential members do not have a conflict of interest concerning management and other key personnel. Professionals emphasize board members must

So investors should worry that Alibaba wouldn’t be share a significant amount of the value created with them over the time. Actually, lots of global public companies have a large shareholder with a lock on control, but normally controlling shareholders often won a substantial portion of the equity capital that provides them with beneficial incentives. In the case of Alibaba, investors need to worry about the relatively small stake held by the members of the controlling Alibaba Partnership (Bebchuk, 2014). All those factors shows Alibaba’s structure does not provide adequate protections to public investors. So investors expect Alibaba changes its Corporate Governance strategy, for instance Jack Ma need to reduce his stake in Alibaba within 5 years, including by having shares in Alibaba granted to Alibaba employees. It also should give more power to the shareholder’s to guarantee shareholder’s right which will seeks to allay investor concerns. If Alibaba change their strategy, giving its stockholders’ strong confidence, the business success of Alibaba might be large enough to make up for the costs of diversions and give public investors with good returns on their investment in the

The appointment of independent directors became very necessary, as shareholders looked for a way by which management became more responsible and accountable, and as such; the need for independent directors, who would not only checkmate the excesses of the board of directors, but also have the interest of the company and the shareholders at heart.

The complex governance structures typical of infrastructure PPPs, and the close relationships between shareholders and directors – often the same person – change the nature of the governance task when compared to the listed sector. The key difference between closely held private boards and listed boards stems from the changed balance between agency risk and conflict of interest. The Corporate Governance Principles for ASX listed companies include the following three principles (numbers 3 to 6) viz:-

This report sets out to review corporate governance at a private company, namely, Paramount Insurance Company. The specific objectives were to identify the relevant codes the organisation follows, why they are important and review the structure, process and

Economic science teaches us that due to their subjective needs, individuals have subjective preferences, and hence different interest. Occasionally different subjective interests give rise to conflicts of interest between contracting partners. These conflicts of interest may result in turn, in one or both parties undertaking actions that may be against the interest of the other contracting partner. The primary reason for the divergence of objectives between managers and shareholders has been attributed to separation of ownership (shareholders) and control (management) in corporations. As a consequence, agency problems

The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance states that: "Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are

As explained by Schelker (2013), the agency problem between the owners and the management of a firm is at the heart of the corporate governance literature. Hence, there is a need for a