The Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition and resourcing process consists of a combination and integration of three major decision support systems. These three support systems are the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS), Defense Acquisition System (DAS), and Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process. The DoD acquisition and resourcing process is not known for its speed and efficiency; however, it is known for its thorough system of checks and balances. The Joint Strike Fighter Lightning II (JSF) program is an example of an acquisition program gone awry. Not because the system in place is ineffective, but because the system in place was sidestepped and vital recommendations disregarded. This paper will analyze the Joint Strike Fighter program as it meandered its way through the acquisition and resourcing process as well as how the iron triangle influenced its progression. Joint Strike Fighter Lightning II Background With the end of the Cold War and a reduction in defense spending the U.S. needed a fresh review of its DoD programs. Therefore, in 1993 the …show more content…
The stated focus of the JSF program was affordability-reducing the development, production, and ownership costs of the program as compared to earlier fighter aircraft programs. The JSF acquisition strategy was designed to lower technical risk through aircraft demonstrations and advanced technology development prior to awarding the engineering and manufacturing development contract. Theoretically, by incorporating this particular strategy the JSF program would avoid cost and schedule overruns, and performance gaps. Furthermore, the JSF program office was created earlier than typical in the acquisition cycle to obtain necessary input from the various stakeholders such as operators, maintenance personnel, industry representatives, government engineers, and the
Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF): The GEF consolidates and integrates DOD strategic planning guidance. Moves DOD from a “contingency-centric” to a “s
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) examines “the national defense strategy and priorities”, and “sets a long-term course for the DoD”. The QDR "assesses the threats and challenges that the nation faces, while seeking to re-balance DoD‘s strategies, capabilities, and forces to address today‘s conflicts and tomorrow's threats." The QDR is required by Congress every four years and is produced by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). The three pillars that the 2014 QDR rests on are: protect the homeland; build security globally; and project power and win decisively. One of the ways that the US armed forces support the QDR is through the application of airpower. Airpower is “the ability to project military power or influence through the
The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.
On Nov 2013, the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) awarded the contract to “modernize” its existing custom developed application Cadet Administrative Management Information System (CAMIS) II to the Solers Corporation (Solers Corporation, 2016). CAMIS was developed over several years and began to encompass support for many disparate business processes at the Academy, but primarily served as a Student Information/Management System. This modernization effort or CAMIS III was the third iteration of moving CAMIS from a legacy system to a new platform. Almost 2 years later: Mar 2016, this project ended with the government decision to discontinue the modernization effort. This was done by primarily not exercising option years and stopping funding on the modernization development line item of the contract. (Paulson, 2015) Despite modernization effort ending, the government continued to support the CAMIS III operations and support portion of the contract, as well as the legacy CAMIS II contract. This paper attempts to analyze why this software project failed, based on the personal experiences and perspectives from the overall combined team and attempts to understand why. The major reasons for failure included: gross underestimates (scope, cost, and schedule). However, there were opportunities to achieve a better outcome. These opportunities were failures by the program manager, vendor team, and management stakeholder expectations.
BAL developed capabilities in the areas of space and communications, site management and the upgrade and maintenance of military aircraft and equipment. As BAL grew, it faced difficult decisions how to improve or upgrade its procurement system and process to meet its customers’ requirement, especially its major customer the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
The military industrial complex was a term coined by President Eisenhower describing the growing relationship between the military and the government, mostly regarding the massive increase in military spending. Since the Cold War, the United States has continually expanded military spending, particularly the Department of Defense, which is currently 21 times more expensive than the State Department. The most common effect this has on members of Congress is the pressure that is put on them to appropriate funds for the DOD in the best way possible. The consequences of not being able appropriate the proper funds could result in job loss missed economic opportunities and ultimately not being reelected. Congress deals with funding projects such as the expensive F-35 which has yet to be made. Lockheed and Martin, the F-35s designers, applied a method called political engineering in order to get bipartisan support. This method includes using the 133,000 jobs across 45 states as leverage in order for state politicians to continue their support. Another deal congress has had to deal with is the Base Realignment and Closing Commissions (BRACs) which essentially
The DOD strategy for development of the F-22 was to create a fifth-generation fighter with revolutionary capabilities that would put it to a decade´s leap ahead of any foreseeable threat. However, the F-22 Raptor development strategy resulted in a significant cost increases and schedule delays. The program costs increases and schedule inefficiency in weapon system acquisitions, as well as reductions in Defense spending caused the failure of the F-22 Raptor acquisition strategy.
The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is a decision-making model to assist military members in making sound military decisions and to compile operation orders. This paper will describe MDMP and show how it can be applied to daily operations. The paper will identify the steps in the model and describe how critical thinking impacted the decision.
In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.
This position paper will address if the F-35 JSF program is worth the current investment the United States has placed into it. First the pros of the program will be presented followed by the cons. Finally, the paper will discuss why the JSF program is not worth the investment.
By having the right filters and anti-spoofing (It stops the packets coming from non-IP broadcasts) will prevent these attacks. Controlling and monitoring the filter configurations, updating the filters and configuring the anti-virus software’s will help.
Lockheed Martin is a major security and aerospace company headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland. Employing over 97,000 employees worldwide, Lockheed Martin is principally focused on research, design, development, manufacture, integration, and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products, and services (Lockheed Martin at a Glance, n.d.). Lockheed Martin is organized into broad business areas to include aeronautics ($17.8 billion in 2016 sales), missile and fire control (6.6 billion in 2016 sales), rotary and mission systems (13.5 billion in 2016 sales), and space systems (9.4 billion in 2016 sales) (Lockheed Martin at a Glance, n.d.). To better understand the global giant that is today’s Lockheed Martin, a historical look at the two companies that merged in 1995 and their respective accomplishments is essential.
The DoD communicated to Congress that the JSF program was essential to national security and needed to continue. DoD was not the only corner of the iron triangle to influence Congress’s decision to continue the program. Lockheed Martin and various lobby groups highlighted the fact that the JSF program supported 133,000 jobs many of them subcontractors and parts suppliers that were spread across 45 states. Moreover, when full rate production was to begin, the employment figure would grow to well over 250,000. With constituents in 45 states tied to the JSF program it was a given that Congress would decide to continue with the JSF program. It is unlikely that Lockheed Martin having subcontractors and parts suppliers spread throughout 45
The entrepreneurial sprit which began the foundations of Lockheed Martin remains alive within the company today. Although, the companies’ stricter guidelines do not allow an employee to simply begin an entrepreneurial venture on their own, the company has evolved from an airplane manufacturer to an organization that is involved in everything from defense to space exploration. This massive diversification of interests was brought about by intrapreneurial ventures. It was Lockheed Martin that coined the phrase “Skunkworks”, meaning specialized teams dedicated to discovering new projects. The origin story of “skunkworks” is well known and shows the tenacity and innovation that Lockheed Martin is capable of. In 1943, an engineer named Clarence “Kelly” Johnson and a group of young engineers were asked to design and build a jet fighter to help the US Army prepare for the growing German threat. The small group was isolated and the project was kept secret operating out of a circus tent because available and private space was scarce in the Lockheed Martin facility. The group was given one hundred and fifty days to complete the project, and they completed the jet in one hundred and forty-three (Miller, 1995). This spirt of innovation and growth marked the true beginning of the boom in product development which continues to this day under the same name, but this time trademarked.
As military members we are educated to think very linearly about strategy. For many years we have been trained to have a strategic thought process based on the use of a methodology that espouses three major steps: Ends (Objectives), Ways (Strategic Concepts), and Means (Resources). (Barber 1997)