Earning Management

When analysts question a firm’s earnings quality, it raises concerns regarding under or over aggressive accounting practices that may be allowing the firm to manipulate the earnings. Earnings quality is defined as the strength of the current earnings in being used to predict future earnings and cash flows. Since earning quality is indicative of future performance, analysts are more likely to address issues that have substantial impact on the earnings quality. An issue arises when the nature of the earnings is questioned. While permanent earnings are part of normal operations, any irregular, one time earnings can skew the earnings, making the firm look more profitable than it is. This is due to the inability to recreate similar one-time transactions that will give rise to such numbers. Investors prefer predictable

Understandably, there are a variety of ways in which a company can manage their earnings, and if accomplished successfully, the results can be highly profitable. Not all techniques are fraudulent, as effective earnings management is considered good for business and shareholders. Income smoothing is a specific example of permissible earnings management that involves controlling fluctuations in net income to make earnings less variable over a given period of time (Goel & Thakor, 2003). Smoothing is acceptable as long as it adheres to the restrictions of U.S. GAAP, which maintains that all revenues and expenses are accounted for in a defined fashion. There are a lot of incentives in figuring how to effectively smooth income, as substantial value can be created through the successful arrangement of financial transactions. Management is able to make more intelligent decisions with regards to the future of the firm if the earnings are able to match the forecasts. One instance this is seen is when management is faced with the decision to smooth total income or

Such an intense focus has been placed on quarterly earnings as an indication of a company’s success by everyone from analysts to executives that ethics have for the most part been thrown out the window, sacrificed to the all important number, i.e. earnings per share. This is the theory in Alex Berenson’s book “The Number: How the Drive for Quarterly Earnings Corrupted Wall Street and Corporate America.” This number has become part of a game to be played, a figure to be manipulated – beat the number and Wall Street all but throws a parade, miss it and a company’s stock may be abandoned. Take into account the incentives that executives have to beat the number and one can find plenty of reasons to manage earnings.

In this research paper the authors want to express their thoughts by stating that how to them earnings reporting pertains to the discovery of information that has not been disclosed by either people or other types of sources and focus towards the negative in this study. In my opinion, the title of the paper itself could have had a different title only because throughout the paper it analyzes negative or bad news rather than really paying attention to both perspectives. Also the paper captures the information or news that occurs by using a three day window in which Quarterly Earnings Announcement (QEA) take place and compares it to a period where it does not take place. Furthermore, in this paper there are three hypotheses that arise

Companies often try to keep accounting earnings growing at a relatively steady pace in an effort to avoid large swings in earnings from period to period. They also try to manage earnings targets. Reflect on these practices and discuss the following in your discussion post.

Information based on accrual accounting has historically and empirically provided a better indication of a company’s ability to generate cash flows than information gathered under the cash method. If there is not inter-period allocation, then the information is not as meaningful and will result in a mismatching of economic benefits

Pro forma earnings are earnings which often exclude non-recurring items and are defined by each individual firm rather than under the general accepted accounting principle (GAAP). Pro forma earnings reporting is commonplace in the U.S. (Doyle et al. 2013; Bentley et al. 2016). Items such as nonrecurring gains and losses, depreciation and amortization expenses, write-downs, restructuring and merger costs, stock compensation expenses, and interest expenses are often excluded in pro forma earnings figures. Since many of these exclusions are likely to be transitory in nature, pro forma earnings can be viewed as a better measure of permanent earnings and have received increasing focus recently. Research studies found that pro forma earnings are more value relevant, informative, and better associated with stock prices than GAAP earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya et al.,2003; Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Entwistle et al., 2010). However, exclusion of the non-recurring items is completely discretionary (Doyle et al., 2013) and managers may use the flexibility to opportunistically influence the market’s perception of the firm’s recurring earnings (Dechow and Schrand, 2004). Managers may have strong incentives to manipulate the reported pro forma earnings to influence investors’ perceptions about the

Baruch Lev and Feng Gu authors of “The End of Accounting and The Path Forward for Investors and Managers” indicate that over the past 110 years, the structure and content of financial reports has not changed, and that the role that these reports play in influencing the decisions of investors has greatly diminished. Lev and Gu make a case that non-transaction events that are not captured by the financial reports such as those disclosed through 8-k filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have a greater impact on stock prices, and thus more useful to investors. In addition, they suggest that one of reasons for the decline in usefulness of financial reports stems from the increase of estimates that has made its way into these reports (Lev and Gu 2016).

Consider two related items related to uncollectible accounts, to further understand possible earnings management. First, there were disproportionately large allowance for doubtful accounts balances at the end of 1994 and 1995: nearly 40% of gross receivables. These existing balances could have been drawn down without the need to record an accurate provision for doubtful accounts. Consequently, the year-end charge to bad expense, required to replenish the depleted contra-asset account, could have been less than normally expected if the unadjusted allowance balance jibed with economic reality. By understating expenses in this manner, HealthSouth could have manufactured earnings beginning in the mid-1990s. These data provide some evidence of the classic “cookie-jar reserve” ploy (Reed et al, 2003).

Does it matter what your competitors are doing? Step back and consider management’s incentives and choices. What is the motivation to manage earnings?

Ethical and legal obligations apply to all members of society. As one in society, the obligation to act in an ethical, law abiding manner on a daily basis is vital to the integrity of daily life. Many professions have their own code of ethics. Financial reporting is not exempt from such ethical and legal standards. One’s lively hood depends on decisions made in the business world. Business transactions are done daily and can impact one’s economic stability. Trust is placed in the hands of corporate America and an obligation of financial reporting to reveal a complete honest and legal picture of an entity’s accounting practices is important in attaining trust. This paper will discuss the obligations of

4 a) Do you think situations like this (i.e., aggressive accounting or even financial statement

* With a focus on net income, managers could be incentivized to maximize ROE at the expense of other stakeholders, particularly bondholders. For instance, managers may fuel earnings growth by over-levering the company to benefit from tax shields in order to increase the value spread.  In addition, there are many other ways in which managers can manipulate earnings, for example, by slowing down depreciation charges or selling off assets to realize extraordinary gains.

In the underlying paper the author re-examines the conservatism principle and its asymmetric effects on earnings. With samples consisting of all firm-year observations from 1963 to 1990 with returns data on the CRSP NYSE/AMEX Monthly files and respective accounting data on the COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial and Research files, he formulates and tests four major hypotheses to find evidence for his predictions. At first he chracterizes “conservatism in accounting as the more timely recognition in earnings of bad news regarding future cash flows than good news”.1 In his first hypothesis he predicts a more sensitive response of earnings towards bad news in comparison to good news, proxied by negative and positve annual stock returns. His second prediction is that earnings are more timely than cash flow, indicating a stronger association of accruals to conservative accounting effects. Hypotheses three and four account for a test on the

Nowadays, as our economy is facing possible everyday crises, managers undergo an increasing pressure in order to keep their company 's earnings stable. Shareholders and analysts expect companies to meet forecasted goals and not to deviate from these. Especially, reliable companies are to report positive results and shall not present any 'surprises '. Managers therefore often turn to their accounting departments for help, whose job it then is to improve the bottom line by changing the information shown in financial